Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD7770
2006-05-02 11:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

PRINCE SULTAN'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN: MOSTLY OPTICS;

Tags:  PREL MARR PK SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7035
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 5168
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 8316
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 5615
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 0812
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 8635
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 6453
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 007770 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PK SA
SUBJECT: PRINCE SULTAN'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN: MOSTLY OPTICS;
MAYBE DEFENSE SALES

REF: STATE 58668

Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 007770

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PK SA
SUBJECT: PRINCE SULTAN'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN: MOSTLY OPTICS;
MAYBE DEFENSE SALES

REF: STATE 58668

Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b.


1. (C) Summary. In the week following Crown Prince Sultan
Bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud's April visit to Pakistan, PolCouns
sought assessments in separate meetings with the MFA Director
General for the Gulf region Sajjad Haider, Saudi Embassy DCM
Abdullah Al-Omari and a respected local journalist, Farhan
Bokhari (strictly protect). While MFA and Saudi Embassy
officials sought to play down the significance of the visit,
the journalist, citing an inside source, said that in fact
there had been substantive discussions of security issues,
including a possible sale to the Saudis of 150 Al Khalid
battle tanks and 12-15 K-8 trainer aircraft. This was Prince
Sultan's first visit to Pakistan since becoming Crown Prince,
and it came as the last leg of a three-nation tour that
included Japan and Singapore. The stop-over followed an
official visit by Saudi King Abdullah in February -- an
inaugural tour abroad as Saudi King that took him to China,
India, Malaysia and Pakistan. End Summary

2 (C) Haider characterized the trip as a routine stopover,
with no agreements signed and no significant policy
developments. It was "mostly symbolic" he said. Unlike
King Abdullah's visit, this had not been an extravaganza.
Following Sultan's arrival, President Musharraf had met with
him for a one-on-one, then hosted him for dinner and for an
evening of entertainment. The following day, Prime Minister
Aziz hosted him for lunch, and Sultan flew out that
afternoon. The Saudi delegation had not included the Saudi
Foreign Minister nor any noteworthy officials, other than the
Prince himself (who also served as Saudi Defense Minister).
"It was all princes, but minor princes," Haider explained.
Though he was not privy to what had transpired in the meeting
with Musharraf, Haider said that in other meetings the sides
had discussed extremism, Pakistan-India relations, terrorism,
economic relations, prospects for Saudi investment and issues
relating to the 1.1 million Pakistani workers in Saudi
Arabia.


3. (C) Al-Omari echoed Haider's assessment, downplaying the

significance of the visit and saying that the stopover had
been an afterthought. Originally, the Prince had planned to
visit Japan and Singapore only, but the stopover had been
tacked on to address Pakistani dismay following King
Abdullah's much-heralded visit to India in late January.
Sultan sought to reassure the Pakistanis that Saudi relations
with India would not interfere with its long-standing
friendship with Pakistan. (At the same time, Al-Omari
explained, the Saudis maintain very good relations with
India, which was a major market for Saudi oil.) As for the
meetings themselves, the Pakistanis were looking to promote
trade and investment and wanted to explore whether earthquake
survivors could be offered employment opportunities in the
Saudi Arabia. Defense issues had not been discussed, and no
joint statement had been released.


4. (C) Bokhari, who writes for the Financial Times, reported
that he had been told by a source privy to the
Musharraf-Sultan meeting that, in fact, defense issues had
been discussed at some length. He observed that this was to
be expected, as Sultan was Saudi Defense Minister. He
claimed that Musharraf was pursuing the sale of 150
Pakistani-made Al Khalid main battle tanks to the Saudis for
$600 million. According to Bokhari, approximately half this
amount would amount to a Saudi subsidy for the Pakistani
defense industry -- an industry in which the Saudis had, he
posited, a strategic interest. Secondly, Musharraf had hoped
to offer training in special operations to the Saudis, and
perhaps to provide actual Special Operations Task Force units
that could be deployed at sensitive oil installations or in
Dhamam province. Third, the Pakistanis had hoped to sell the
Saudis a dozen or more K-8 trainer aircraft. Bokhari
believed that the two sides had reached an agreement on the
Al Khalid tanks, but not on the other two items. While
military sales had been the focus, according to Bokhari,
economic issues had also been discussed, as the Pakistanis
were eager for Saudi investment on the Balochistan coast.


Comment
--------------

ISLAMABAD 00007770 002 OF 002




5. (C) The Pakistanis have been pushing the Al-Khalid and K-8
sales for a while, hoping they might break the ice for sales
to cost-conscious buyers in the developing world. We are
aware that the Pakistanis also took Prince Sultan's
delegation to visit production facilities, which suggests
that they are still at the marketing stage and haven't yet
finalized a deal. The Saudis, of course, already have access
to much better (U.S.) equipment, so any purchase from the
Pakistanis would be a goodwill gesture and lend some credence
to Bokhari's thesis that the Saudis have a strategic interest
in sustaining the arms industry in a friendly and nearby
Islamic state. Musharraf's reported offer of special forces
training or personnel would be surprising; the performance of
Pakistani special forces in Waziristan suggests that they are
still on the steep end of the learning curve.

BODDE