Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD5903
2006-04-06 13:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

A/S BOUCHER DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH

Tags:  PREL IN AF PK IR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 005903 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016
TAGS: PREL IN AF PK IR
SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH
PAKISTANI FM KASURI AND FOREIGN SECRETARY KHAN


Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 005903

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016
TAGS: PREL IN AF PK IR
SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER DISCUSSES REGIONAL ISSUES WITH
PAKISTANI FM KASURI AND FOREIGN SECRETARY KHAN


Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b.


1. (C) Summary. SCA Assistant Secretary Boucher reviewed a
range of regional issues in separate April 4 discussions with
Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri and Foreign Secretary Khan.
Kasuri and Khan were optimistic on relations with India,
taking heart from PM Singh's recent speech in Amritsar and
the prospect of progress on Siachen and Sir Creek in advance
of a possible visit by Singh in coming months. Khan
emphasized the need for progress on the core issue of
Kashmir. Kasuri and Khan underscored that Pakistan wanted
stability in Afghanistan, but expressed frustration that
Pakistan is criticized abroad for not doing enough against
the Taliban while at home it is viewed as serving as an
American stooge. On Iran, A/S Boucher underscored the need
for the international community to stand together in pushing
Iran to abide by its commitments. Khan agreed that Pakistan
should do more to build relations with Central Asian states.
A/S Secretary Boucher's discussions of the Strategic Dialogue
and of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Initiative are reported
in septels. End Summary.

India/Kashmir
--------------


2. (C) Kasuri underscored that he was a believer in the
Indo-Pak peace process, which Pakistan was pursuing out of
self-interest. Settling Kashmir would remove a significant
factor underlying Islamic extremism in the region and would
help Pakistan achieve its objective of becoming a moderate,
democratic Moslem state.


3. (C) There had already been significant progress on a
number of fronts, Kasuri said, and there was "an even chance"
the parties could resolve the longstanding disputes over
Siachen and Sir Creek. Kasuri welcomed Indian PM Manmohan
Singh's recent speech in Amritsar, especially his call for
"practical and pragmatic" solutions -- words that Musharraf
had also used. He noted that Musharraf was now interacting
with a range of Kashmiri representatives -- including
pro-Indian ones -- and that these Kashmiri voices were now
putting pressure on India. He expected that PM Singh might
visit Pakistan in coming months, possibly to finalize deals

on Siachen and Sir Creek.


4. (C) A/S Boucher explained that as the U.S. looks to
promote broad regional markets in central Asia, it views
India as a destination. Kasuri responded that this was "no
problem" -- Pakistan had crossed that bridge in the context
of discussions over the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline.
Boucher also noted that the U.S. is seeking observer status
in SAARC.


5. (C) A/S Boucher noted U.S. support for a strategic
restraint regime between Pakistan and India. Kasuri agreed,
saying that Pakistan had sought to include missiles in the
talks, and remained ready for that. Pakistan favored
strategic restraint, he said.


6. (C) A/S Boucher stressed that, the U.S. wanted to be
helpful on Kashmir. President Bush had mentioned Kashmir in
the U.S. prior to his visit as well as in India and in
Pakistan. This was the moment to move forward: President
Musharraf had advanced ideas, India was looking for
"practical and pragmatic" approaches; Prime Minister Singh
was interested in a soft border.


7. (C) Echoing Kasuri, Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan said
there had been significant progress with India in the
Composite Dialogue, but not enough movement on the key
issues, especially Kashmir. Trade with India was opening up
as "negative lists" continued to shrink; however, even with
lowered tariffs, Pakistan's most competitive exports had low
profit margins and were priced out of the Indian market.


8. (C) Khan confirmed that there were differences with India
over transit trade with Afghanistan. India wanted a land
route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, but it was an issue
that needed to be looked at in an "overall perspective"

ISLAMABAD 00005903 002 OF 003


taking into account the lack of progress on "the issues"
(i.e., primarily Kashmir). Pakistan did allow one-way
transit trade from Afghanistan to India, and on a case by
case basis it had allowed some Indian humanitarian goods to
transit to Afghanistan.


9. (C) Khan was encouraged by Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh's mention of "consultative mechanisms" in his Amritsar
speech, but said there was limited progress on the ground.
Pakistan had hoped for more freedom of movement across the
Line of Control, and continued to hope for progress towards
demilitarization of the area. It was important for the
Kashmiris to see real change. Pakistan had hoped India would
consider redeploying out of Kashmiri population centers; if
it didn't work, Indian forces could always return. If India
wanted symmetry, Pakistan would "thin out" troops and close
camps on its side of the Line of Control.


10. (C) Khan said the ball was in India's court on Siachen.
In his view, the dispute would be resolved if India could
agree to a demilitarized zone on the glacier. The next step
on Sir Creek was to conduct a joint survey once there was
agreement on the extent of the area to be surveyed.

Afghanistan
--------------


11. (C) Foreign Minister Kasuri complained that Pakistan was
being criticized on all sides. The Afghans and the western
press accused Pakistan of playing a "double game" and not
really going after the Taliban. Pakistanis meanwhile accused
their leaders of being U.S. stooges, taking and inflicting
casualties needlessly. Kasuri asked that the United States
make clear that in its assessment Pakistan is not playing a
double game.


12. (C) A/S Boucher observed that while it might not be
possible to satisfy the New York Times, both the
Administration and Congress understood what Pakistan was
doing and were strongly committed to the relationship. It
was important that people in both countries understand that
the U.S. and Pakistan were cooperating in a broad range of
areas. The Administration had already been clear that no
country has captured more Al Qaida or lost more people doing
so than Pakistan. The public needed to understand that
dangerous people were moving back and forth across the
border, posing a threat to all parties, and that the solution
was to help both countries work cooperatively to extend their
control in the border region. In addition to words,
however, both countries must take tangible steps to work
together in the Tripartite Commission and other fora to
advance common objectives, including customs administration,
economic development and counter-narcotics.


13. (C) Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan stressed that Pakistan
wanted stability in Afghanistan, but that the fragmentation
among ethnic groups and regions created significant
challenges. Afghan Pashtuns were "ruffled," though it helped
that Karzai was Pashtun himself. Much was at stake for
Pakistan, he explained, because while Afghanistan might have
10-13 million Pashtuns, Pakistan had 32 million, including
many Afghan refugees.


14. (C) Speaking frankly, Riaz Khan said that Pakistan was
tired of being told "do more, do more" to stabilize the
region. It had already lost hundreds of troops. "What more
do you want us to do? Strafe villages?" The tribal areas
would not change overnight, he added, because extremism was a
mindset. Pakistan was also eager to work with Afghanistan in
combating narcotics, Khan said, suggesting that legalizing
some poppy cultivation might help. A/S Boucher expressed
caution about the legalization option, given Afghanistan's
limited institutional capacity to execute a strictly limited
program, but said he was encouraged that for the first time
Afghanistan was implementing all the elements of its
counternarcotics strategy, including eradication,
interdiction and alternative livelihoods.


15. (C) As he had with Foreign Minister Kasuri, A/S Boucher

ISLAMABAD 00005903 003 OF 003


noted that Afghanistan was interested in establishing a
strategic level dialogue with Pakistan to address common
problems in the border region -- as had Kasuri, Khan agreed.

Central Asia
--------------


16. (C) Khan reported that he had been one of Pakistan's
first Ambassadors in Central Asia, serving in Kazakhstan in

1992. At the time, turbulence in Afghanistan had been a
physical barrier to relations and a political barrier, after
Pakistan was "credited" with supporting the Taliban and other
Islamic groups that were viewed with misgivings in Central
Asia. There was clearly potential to expand relations given
that Pakistan offered access to the Arabian Sea. Pakistan
no longer had many students from Central Asia, Khan said,
especially now that foreign madrassa students were being
expelled. Khan agreed with A/S Boucher that Pakistan should
consider offering scholarships to Central Asian students, and
that there was much Pakistan could offer in terms of exposure
to business, journalism, public policy, economic reform and a
sense of democracy.

Iran
--------------


17. (C) A/S Boucher told Khan that it was important for Iran
to get the message that there is unity in the international
community. Following the Security Council statement, Iran
had 30 days to "rectify the problem;" it would be
constructive if Pakistan could use any opportunity to
underscore that message. Khan responded that Pakistan had
been reminding Iran of its obligations, but Iran insisted
that it was not weaponizing. A/S Boucher repeated that Iran
had 30 days. Iran's behavior was "highly offensive" across
the board, he added. It was violating its commitments,
funding terrorists, opposing the Middle East peace process
and interfering in Iraq. Iran needed to hear that it was time
for them to honor commitments they had voluntarily taken on
themselves.


18. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher has cleared this
message.
CROCKER