A/S BOUCHER AND PAKISTANI FM KASURI DISCUSS U-S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 005822

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016
TAGS: ENRG MNUC PGOV PK IN PREL
SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER AND PAKISTANI FM KASURI DISCUSS U-S
INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR INITIATIVE


Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d.


1. (C) Summary: In an April 4 meeting with visiting SCA
Assistant Secretary Boucher, Pakistani Foreign Minister
Kasuri repeated Pakistan's request that the U.S. consider a
"package deal" on civil nuclear cooperation that would
include Pakistan as well as India. At a minimum, the U.S.
should choose its words carefully to hold open the
possibility that Pakistan might be included in the future.
He complained that a deal that excluded Pakistan would
undermine goodwill generated by U.S. earthquake assistance
and contribute to a perception that the U.S. was an
unreliable ally. Kasuri also expressed concern that the deal
would indirectly bolster India's strategic nuclear program.
A/S Boucher affirmed the U.S. commitment to Pakistan and
stressed that the U.S. would deal with India and Pakistan
based on their distinct needs (with Pakistan receiving some
benefits not offered to India). He reiterated the U.S.
conviction that the Civil Nuclear Initiative would lead to
more power plants, not more weapons. End Summary.


2. (C) Kasuri noted that the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear
Initiative had generated significant domestic criticism in
Pakistan. The Pakistan Government had waited a decent
interval before voicing its concerns that the Initiative was
not a package deal (i.e., extending to both India and
Pakistan).


3. (C) Kasuri expressed concern that the deal with India
would erode the goodwill that had been generated by U.S.
earthquake assistance and feed into a long-standing Pakistani
perception that the U.S. was an unreliable friend. People
felt "let down" he said, and they worried that history was
repeating itself. Kasuri suggested "changing the language"
used to describe U.S. reservations about a similar nuclear
initiative with Pakistan. He recommended latching onto
Secretary Rice's formulation "for the time being" and

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regretted Energy Secretary Bodman's statement that such an
initiative with Pakistan "was not possible."


4. (C) A/S Boucher responded that the relationship with
Pakistan was very important to the United States and that
Pakistan's success as a moderate, democratic nation was a top
administration priority. The depth of U.S. commitment had
already been amply demonstrated diplomatically, financially
and in terms of personal relations among the leaders. With
respect to perceptions of the President's visit, Pakistanis
should stop to consider that Pakistan had also received
deliverables that India had not, such as a range of
educational initiatives and trade initiatives, including the
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones. The intent of
dehyphenation was that each country's particular needs should
be addressed. Nor was the United States oblivious to
Pakistan's security concerns, A/S Boucher continued,
recalling how India had earlier reacted (negatively) to the
granting of Major Non-NATO Ally status to Pakistan.


5. (C) A/S Boucher observed that there are strong arguments
to counter concerns raised by the non-proliferation
community. As a consequence of the agreement, India's
available facilities to produce enriched fuel for weapons
would be halved. Kasuri responded by expressing concern that
the agreement would permit India to use all of its
domestically produced fuel for weapons once it could import
fuel for power generation. Boucher replied that this
argument would only hold if availability of fuel were a
genuine constraint on India's weapons program, which it was
not; in any case, nations habitually put their security
concerns foremost. If there were a trade-off between weapons
and energy, weapons would prevail. The U.S. had analyzed the
Initiative carefully and was convinced that it would lead to
more power plants, not more weapons.


6. (C) Kasuri countered by observing that the same logic
should apply to Pakistan. What was achieved by denying
Pakistan access to nuclear energy? By 2030, Pakistan would
be the fourth largest country in the world (in terms of
population),and without cleaner fuel there would be
implications for the global environment. Pakistan understood
the damage done by AQ Khan (though it chafed at being
repeatedly reminded),but how could it now move forward?


7. (C) A/S Boucher underscored that the United States was a

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long-time champion of the NPT and non-proliferation regime.
Thus it was not a question of why Pakistan was being denied
the nuclear option. It was rather a question of why India
was uniquely qualified, and the U.S. saw only one set of
circumstances that merited this exception.


8. (C) Note: the nuclear power issue also came up in a
subsequent meeting, reported separately, that the A/S held
with Foreign Secretary Khan. Khan argued that the initiative
was a "missed opportunity" for a package deal that would have
included Pakistan, and that instead it had created an "optic
of discrimination." Pakistan had a case, he said, and would
continue to press it. End Note.


9. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Boucher.
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