YASIN MALIK TELLS KASHMIRI MILITANTS "GIVE PEACE A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 005767

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL PK PGOV PTER IN
SUBJECT: YASIN MALIK TELLS KASHMIRI MILITANTS "GIVE PEACE A
CHANCE"

REF: ISLAMABAD 4386

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Introduction: Srinagar-based Kashmiri separatist
leader Yasin Malik has told post that he has used his
extended March-April 2006 visit to Pakistan to reach out to
Kashmiri militant leaders, counseling them to lay down their
arms and give the peace process a chance. In between
highly-publicized addresses to the Pugwash Conference (March
7-8, Islamabad) (reftel),the World Social Forum (March
24-25, Karachi) and an International Institute for Peace and
Conflict Resolution (IIPCR) seminar of conflict resolution in
Kashmir (April 3, Islamabad) and meetings with high-level
Government of Pakistan (GOP) officials, Malik balanced his
assessment that the time for armed struggle has ended with a
call for India and Pakistan talk to the militants directly,
giving them a role in the peace process. Malik's message,
which coincided with rumors that the GOP is tightening the
screws on the Kashmiri militants, may be gaining ground with
key militancy leaders. End introduction.

GOP Tightening the Purse Strings?
--------------


2. (S) Malik's early March arrival in Pakistan coincided
with press reports and rumors circulating in Islamabad that
the ISI had summoned the leaders of the Kashmiri militancy
for a March 8 meeting in which the GOP thanked the militants
for their struggle, but then told them to lay down their arms
and give the bilateral peace process a chance. Several POL
contacts confirmed that such a meeting occurred; the militant
leaders responded to the orders to stand down and cuts in
their GOP-subsidies by staging a ten-day protest, refusing to
leave the safe house in which the March 8 meeting took place.
Although the details varied, most accounts agreed on the
basic message: that the time has come for the militants to
stop the violence, to allow space for President Musharraf
and Prime Minister Singh to move forward with peace
initiatives.


3. (S) Mohammed Rafiq Dar, Secretary General - Jammu Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF - Yasin Malik branch),offered the
most detailed description of the meeting and its aftermath.
Dar, who was shepherding Malik's visit to Pakistan, said
that the confusion amongst the UJC leaders following the
March 8 meeting created an opening for Malik to advocate a
cease fire. For example, Dar said that Malik held several
conversations with Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) leader Mohammed
Yusuf Shah (aka "Salahuddin" or "Syed Salahuddin," a
heavy-hitter in the UJC),who said that he found himself
joining the strike simply out of comradeship, swept along as
the other militants reacted impulsively to the GOP's message.


HM: On Board, or Not?
--------------


4. (S) Malik and Dar told poloffs that subsequent
conversations with the HM leader reinforcing the message to
stop the violence and support the peace process led to
Salaluddin's public statement, reported in the "Daily Times"
on March 31, that "not only HM but the entire militant
leadership would consider (a) truce if the Indian government
acknowledges the disputed and tripartite nature of the
Kashmir issue." Saying that the dialogue between New Delhi
and the moderate All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
leadership in recent months has so far failed, Salahuddin
said that armed confrontation would automatically recede as
serious dialogue process moves forward." (Note: The syntax
of Salahuddin's remark suggesting that the militancy would
naturally die off if only the militants were given a seat at
the table indicates that it was lifted straight from Malik's
talking points, which paraphrase Preseident Musharraf's own
thinking. End note.)


5. (U) Two days later, the April 2 edition of the Daily
Times reported on HM spokesperson deriding the peace process
and the Kashmiri politicians (i.e., the APHC) who had joined

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it. The article quoted an HM press statement as saying that
mujahideen would only encourage a dialogue process that
focuses on Kashmiri self-determination. Interestingly, the
article quoted complaints from an unnamed senior HM official
that "for the past two or three years, they (the Pakistani
government) have withdrawn all sorts of support from us and
recently, we received messages that there should be no more
cross border movement."


6. (S) Despite the back-sliding in the April 2 HM
statement, during a brief exchange on the margins of the
IIPCR seminar on April 3, Malik and Dar reaffirmed to poloff
that Salahuddin is on board with the move toward a cease
fire...and that he is in a position to help Malik bring other
UJC leaders along.

Comments
--------------


7. (S) As celebrated Kashmiris moderates like Malik and APHC
leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq (who also stayed on for a week of
public appearances and official meetings following the World
Social Forum) have traveled across the LOC with some
frequency in the past year, their dialogue with the Pakistani
public has drawn out common threads: a call for all parties
-- including the Kashmiri militants -- to renounce the use of
violence; support for President Musharraf's initiatives for
pursuing the peace process; and insistence that Kashmiri
voices (including the militants) be included in the peace
process. (Note: Malik advocated the "Nagaland model" as
instructive in all of his conference presentations. End
note.) Aside from these themes, however, what has been
equally apparent to Pakistan observers is the failure of
Kashmiri leaders to come to a consensus as to who speaks for
Kashmir, who will get the seat at the table. For example,
Malik's vision of a trilateral peace process is a far cry
from ecumenical, including hard-core militants but excluding
"pro-India" Kashmiris such as Omar Abdullah.


8. (S) Both Malik and Dar were eager to update poloffs on
their campaign to promote the Kashmir peace process and build
a constituency for Malik's vision of the way forward, with a
trilateral dialogue that includes direct talks with Kashmir
militants. They took pains to note that, when confronted
with popular disappointment that the Kashmir dispute did not
receive greater visibility during the recent POTUS visit,
Malik defended President Bush's remarks calling for a
resolution acceptable to all parties and endorsing the U.S.
preference for "quiet diplomacy" as the right choice. Their
openess with poloffs, and repeated endorsements of
behind-the-scenes U.S. facilitation of the peace process,
reflect in equal measure Malik's interest in building a
constituency for his primacy amongst moderate Kashmiri leader
and his efforts to persuade militants to give peace a chance.
Malik and Dar have other reasons to cultivate USG support --
Malik plans to travel to New York in a few weeks for medical
treatment; Dar continues to hope for a positive adjudication
of his pending visa application so that he can accompany
Malik on his trip.


9. (S) Malik's visit offered poloffs an unusual opportunity
to assess GOP assurances of a clamp down on the Kashmiri
militancy. Malik and Dar monitor the militants closely;
their confirmation that Kashmiri militants are chafing under
the GOP clamp down and that some militancy leaders are
inclined to tow the line, is encouraging. The minimal public
controversy surrounding Musharraf's Kashmir policy suggests
that he has largely succeeded in changing the terms of
reference. Whereas Pakistanis have historically seen the
conflict as a matter of Pakistani's national claim to
Kashmir, it is increasingly viewed here as a matter of
Kashmiri rights. Recent visits by Malik, the Mirwaiz and
even Omar Abdullah (who praised Musharraf's initiaves
following the President's meeting with Pugwash participants)
are reinforcing this new perspective.


CROCKER