CARTOONS FAIL TO UNITE OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003804

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2021
TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM PK
SUBJECT: CARTOONS FAIL TO UNITE OPPOSITION

REF: ISLAMABAD 3022 AND PREVIOUS

ISLAMABAD 00003804 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d


1. (C) Summary: For a brief moment, Pakistan's political
opposition appeared poised to transform popular anger over
the Danish cartoon issue into protests against the Musharraf
government. In the end, however, self-interest and
government inducements have combined to split the divergent
parties within the political opposition, diffuse the issue,
and eliminate any potential threat to the sitting government.
The more moderate (and larger) secular and Islamist
opposition parties, the Pakistan People's Party
Parliamentarians (PPPP) and the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazlur
Rehman (JUI-F) refused to participate in the street tactics
being advocated by their counterparts. Absent their
participation, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Pakistan Muslim
Leaque - Nawaz (PML-N) protest strategy appears unlikely to
be losing momentum. End Summary.


2. (C) With anger over the Danish cartoons running high, JI
sought to direct this anger against the Musharraf government.
Through proxies and in concert with the local leadership of
the PML-N, it was responsible for early (and sometimes
violent) protests in which demands for Musharraf's immediate
resignation were part and parcel of the uprising. JI
convinced a skeptical PPP and JUI-F to participate in
combined and individual party protests in Islamabad and
Peshawar (the latter turning violent) and to frame the issue
as a movement against their common enemy Musharraf. At the
high point of such protests, JI leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed
publicly promised that a street movement would oust Musharraf
by March 23, Pakistan National Day. JI ruling council member
Shahid Pervez told poloff that the party's strategy was to
create a security situation such that the military would have
to intervene, oust Musharraf, and install a popular caretaker
government led by the political parties in advance of the
2007 elections. Large-scale, nationwide demonstrations to
coincide with the President Bush's visit were the focal point
of this strategy.


3. (C) The violence in Peshawar appears to have been the
first breaking point within the opposition alliance.
According to JUI-F Foreign Relations Committee Chair former
Ambassador Mohammad Jalalud-Din, the JUI-F, which controls
the NWFP provincial government and was an active proponent of
the protests, appears to have been caught off-guard by the
scale of the violence and the central government's and
public's strong reaction against it. This, he claims, caused
the JUI-F to reassess its strategy of supporting JI's street
tactics. Jalalud-Din admitted that JUI-F's primary goal was
to retain the government in NWFP and that subtle threats by
the GOP had accompanied their urging of a JUI-F change in
tactics. In addition, Jalalud-Din expressed doubt that a
"security crisis" would result in military intervention to
impose a civilian government. Martial law, in his view, was
the more likely outcome.


4. (C) According to PPPP Chairman Makhdoom Amin Fahim, his
party was never comfortable with the JI (and PML-N) protest
strategy. He stressed that the PPPP had purposely avoided
participation in the Lahore demonstrations and had given only
tacit support to the Islamabad demonstrations. The party had
organized its own protests in response to growing public
condemnation of the cartoons and a need to burnish its
"Islamic" credentials. Fahim admitted, however, that the
PPPP did not believe protests were the best way to achieve
democratic change. The PPPP ultimately broke with the JI on
this issue after Benazir Bhutto personally instructed the
party not to participate in protests against President Bush
(septel). Fahim claimed that the party would instead attempt
negotiations with the GOP on a national unity government
and/or necessary changes to ensure free and fair elections in

2007.


5. (C) Comment: The Danish cartoon issue illustrates the

ISLAMABAD 00003804 002.2 OF 002


difficulties that the opposition faces in building a true
anti-Musharraf coalition. The smaller parties, JI and PML-N,
believe that their interests lie in "embarassing" the
Musharraf regime. With little stake in the current structure
and minimal possibility of a deal with the GOP, neither is
concerned about negative government reaction to their
tactics. In contrast, the JUI-F (which holds the government
in NWFP and is a coaltion partner in Balochistan) and the
PPPP (which continues to believe that a deal with Musharraf
is possible) are wary of undertaking any action that puts
them too far at odds with Musharraf. For these reasons, we
believe that a united opposition anti-Musharraf coalition
will continue to exist in name only for the foreseeable
future, posing minimal threat to the sitting government.
CROCKER