15TH PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN-U.S. TRIPARTITE MEETING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003542

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: AF MARR MASS MCAP MOPS PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: 15TH PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN-U.S. TRIPARTITE MEETING

Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d


1. (C) Summary: The 15th U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan Tripartite
Commission meeting, held at Bagram on February 25, was
characterized by frank discussion between the Afghan and
Pakistani delegations. The agenda focused on cross-border
issues, intelligence sharing, steps to counter IEDs, and the
link between enhancing security, governance and
reconstruction. Participants noted that the open discussion
was a sign of the usefulness of the Tripartite Commission and
of growing comfort levels between Pakistani and Afghan
counterparts, but both delegations emphasized the need to
cultivate trust as the key enabler for continued progress.
(Contrary to press reports, the Pakistanis did not cite the
Bajaur incident, though their allusion to "increased border
violations" was clearly a reference to the incident. The
U.S. response "noted" Pakistan's concerns, while emphasizing
the need to take effective measures to counter the threat
posed by the common enemy.) End summary.


2. (C) On February 25, Afghan, Pakistani and U.S. military
representatives met at Bagram for the 15th Tripartite
Commission meeting. The Pakistani delegation was led by
Major General Yousef, Director General of Military
Operations, and the Afghan delegation by ANA Chief of
Operations Lieutenant General Karimi. The U.S. delegation
was led by CFC-A Commander Lieutenant General Eikenberry.
The NATO-ISAF observer was Brigadier General Tabor, Special
Advisor to the NATO-ISAF Commander. Khowst officials,
including the Governor and his provincial police chief, the
RC East Commander, the Khowst PRT Commander, and PRT civilian
representatives from State and USAID participated via a VTC
link. Presentations were made by the Chairs of the Border
Security Sub-committee, the Counter-IED Working Group, and
the Military Intelligence Sharing Working Group.


3. (C) The focus of the 15th tripartite was civil-military
affairs, including enhanced military-military cooperation and
the importance of improving security through reconstruction
and governance on both sides of the border. Briefing topics
included a US presentation on how PRTs function, and a
following briefing focused specifically on Khowst province,
with a range of Khowst officials offering their insights on
civil/military cooperation. The Pakistan delegation provided
an in-depth briefing on its three-tiered
(military-political-development) strategy in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Beyond civ/mil issues, the
delegations had in-depth discussions on ways to enhance
intelligence sharing and to deepen cooperation on combating
IEDs. The NATO observer briefed on NATO transition in
Afghanistan.

Countering IEDs
--------------


4. (S) Discussions began with a substantive exchange on
strategies to counter the growing threat of IEDs. It was
agreed that a common database of the types of IEDs used/found
should be developed. Both sides underscored the need for
improved intelligence sharing in creating this database. The
Pakistani side pointed out that a lack of technical
capability in protecting forces against IEDs weakens
Pakistan's ability to manage the growing use of IEDs. Afghan
representatives noted that as the majority of casualties from
IEDs are civilians, engaging border area inhabitants on both
sides through a public information campaign to teach
civilians to identify an IED and to notify authorities would
be useful. The session ended with LTG Eikenberry emphasis on
the need to attack all nodes of the IED employment and attack
cycle by aligning counter-IED efforts into a comprehensive
framework that incorporates intelligence, public engagement
and information, attack against IED cells, TTP (tactics,
techniques, and procedures),force protection, and
exploitation. Pointing to an example of the relationship

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between security and development (the theme of the talks),
LTG Eikenberry noted that in Konar Province, the paving of a
stretch of road had dramatically reduced the volume of IED
attacks.

Intelligence Sharing
--------------


5. (S) After a briefing on the last meeting of the Military
Intelligence Sharing Working Group, Pakistani Director of
Military Intelligence, Brigadier General Reza Muhammad,
stated that intelligence that was neither timely nor
actionable, no matter how well-shared, was akin to having a
"doctor after death." The Afghan side responded that they
often provide actionable intelligence -- especially regarding
the location of Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistani territory
and the use of madrassas as recruitment centers -- but they
rarely see results. Both sides emphasized the need for
greater intelligence sharing at the tactical level and faster
response times to take maximum advantage of opportunities for
action against insurgents or drug traffickers.

Continued Cross-Border Violations
--------------


6. (S) Pakistani and Afghan delegations discussed continued
cross-border movement )- in both directions -- of
insurgents, arms, and drugs. The Pakistani delegation cited
cases of Afghan weapons smuggled into Balochistan and the
flow of "miscreants" from Afghanistan into Pakistan. The
Afghan side noted examples of Pakistani citizens in
Afghanistan caught planning suicide bombings in Kandahar and
Taliban insurgents arrested entering Afghanistan. Pakistani
officials responded with assurances that the over 80,000
Pakistani soldiers in the frontier tribal areas were prepared
to respond to useful intelligence passed to them, and that
Pakistani forces are tightening border passage to
Afghanistan. With scanners and passports, cross border
movement could be even more restricted. The Pakistani
delegation also noted an increase in border violations by
Coalition Forces since the last Tripartite meeting in
December. (Note: Contrary to press reports, the Bajaur
incident was not specifically mentioned, though this was
likely the intended reference. The US response was to
¬e, Pakistan's complaint while emphasizing the need to
take effective measures to counter the threat posed by the
common enemy.)

Building Security Through Reconstruction
--------------


7. (C) All participants agreed that reconstruction and
economic and political development are crucial to improving
security in the border areas. Pakistani Director of Military
Operations, Brigadier General Nasser Janjua, presented a
comprehensive Pakistan strategy for improving security in the
FATA through military, political and development means. The
CFC-A Regional Command ) East Commander, Colonel Pat Donahue
the Governor of Khowst, Merajoddin Pathan, and the Khowst PRT
Commander Lieutenant Colonel Sammons presented a similar
three-pronged strategy for improving security and enhancing
development in that province. LTG Eikenberry noted the
similarities of these strategies and encouraged greater
Pakistani-Afghan coordination and collaboration in these
efforts to improve conditions on both sides of the border,
pointing out that tribes and clans span both sides of a
common border, thus necessitating a common strategy.
LTG Eikenberry's Wrap-Up and Proposals
--------------


8. (S) LTG Eikenberry closed the meeting with three proposals
for the Pakistan delegation (already vetted and approved by
the ANA delegation). He announced that CJTF-76 is presently
planning "Operation Mountain Lion", a coordinated Afghan-CFC

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spring offensive against the Taliban. He suggested that the
Pakistan Army be included in aspects of the operational
planning with the aim of achieving common effects on both
sides of the border. The second proposal was that the
Tripartite's successful Border Security Subcommittee be
expanded to RC South starting in April and include
participation by the Canadian RC South Multi-National Brigade
Commander. The Pakistani side welcomed this idea, but
indicated on the margins of the meeting that it is unsure if
the counterpart would be the Frontier Corps or 12th Corps,
pointing out that unlike 11th Corps stationed in Peshawar,
12th Corps was not deployed along the Afghan-Pakistan border.
They will consider options and re-engage. LTG Eikenberry's
third proposal was that NATO representation at the April
tripartite in Pakistan be upgraded and that NATO become a
full Tripartite member in June, sharing the third leg of the
Tripartite with CFC -) in the run up to NATO Stage three
transition in the South later in the summer and stage four
thereafter. These proposals met with approval in principle,
with details to be worked out. Both delegations concurred
with the CFC proposal to backbrief the results of the
mid-March AFG-PAK Mil seminar at the Marshall center in
Germany on common security issues -) the first in a series
of planned conferences aimed at developing common
perspectives on security and nurturing personal and
professional relationships among Pakistani and Afghan
officers at the 05 and 06 (Lt Col and colonel) levels. Two
dates were suggested for the next Tripartite Commission
meeting (a 4-star event)in Islamabad: April 11-13 or April
18-20.

Comments
--------------


9. (S) The 15th Tripartite Commission meeting highlighted the
Afghans' frustration over continued IED and suicide attacks
in Afghanistan, and their conviction that Pakistan could do
more. Though LTG Karimi did his best to reframe their
observations in diplomatic terms, his DGMI and the Governor
of Khowst delivered tough messages. The Pakistanis responded
by defending their efforts and going on the offensive,
challenging the Afghans to do more to combat gun-running into
Balochistan and narcotics trafficking. The discussion was
frank but the tone was controlled throughout and the sides
parted with embraces at end of the session. More
importantly, over the past months the concept of a common
enemy has taken firm root in underpinning the need for these
discussions. Afghans and Pakistanis also recognize the
fragility of the relationship, given the inherent lack of
trust. The problem of trust can be overcome to the extent
exchanges like these generate action on each side, and also
through tangible successes such as those produced by the
Border Security Subcommittee and, prospectively, by
cooperation in Operation Mountain Lion. Still, improved
military operational effectiveness must be achieved in the
coming year or the Tripartite Talks will be seen by the
Afghan side as without substance.


10. (S) Considerable progress is being made in setting the
stage for expanded Coalition-Afghan-Pakistani military
coordination across the Balochistan border (i.e. CFC-A
Regional Command ) South, Afghan National Army 205th Corps,
and either the Pakistan army's 12th Corps or the Frontier
Corps),as well as for a seamless NATO-ISAF transition into
the lead international military position in the Tripartite
Talks. This will be important for the Coalition and NATO, as
well as key individual nations (UK, Canada, etc.) during the
upcoming command changes in Afghanistan. Offers to exchange
liaison officers (LNOs) initiated outside of the Tripartite
framework risk confusing Kabul and Islamabad, and undermining
their confidence in the continuity and coherence of the
process.
CROCKER