Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD22617
2006-12-28 05:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

FM KASURI DESCRIBES VISIT TO DECEMBER VISIT TO IRAN

Tags:  AF IR PK PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5117
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #2617/01 3620535
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 280535Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5710
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9742
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1603
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3920
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0895
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1060
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1824
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6598
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4819
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9936
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1038
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 2322
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0975
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 3892
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0912
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 9161
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1620
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 022617 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2016
TAGS: AF, IR, PK, PREL
SUBJECT: FM KASURI DESCRIBES VISIT TO DECEMBER VISIT TO IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 022617

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2016
TAGS: AF, IR, PK, PREL
SUBJECT: FM KASURI DESCRIBES VISIT TO DECEMBER VISIT TO IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary: Fresh off his plane from Tehran, Foreign
Minister Kasuri briefed the Ambassador on December 22
regarding his conversations with President Ahmedinejad, FM
Muttaki, former President Rafsanjani, IPI pipeline negotiator
Larijani and others. Kasuri reported that, despite serious
misperceptions in Tehran's understanding of U.S. policy
regarding Iran's nuclear program, Iranian leaders want to
continue the dialogue with the U.S. and EU. Tehran shares
Pakistani and American concerns regarding the resurgence of
the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. Sensitive to the
potential for Iraq's sectarian violence to seep throughout
the region, the Foreign Minister cautioned his Iranian
interlocutors not to fuel the Shi'a-Sunni violence in Iraq.
End summary.

The Nuclear Issue
--------------

2. (C) Although the MFA had publicly described the Foreign
Minister's visit to Iran as centering on the
Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, Kasuri told the Ambassador that
he discussed a number of other topics, such as nuclear
policy, Lebanon and Iraq. Over the past three years, Kasuri
recalled, he has made it his mission to persuade Tehran not
to provoke a conflict over Iran's nuclear program and thus
endangering regional -- and Pakistan's domestic -- security.

3. (C) When Kasuri specifically asked Larijani why the
nuclear issue has not been resolved, the Iranian complained
of "bad air" (i.e., bad vibes) coming from Washington. We
negotiated with them, Larijani said, only to have them refer
the matter to the Security Council. According to Larijani,
EU negotiator Javier Solana has been pleased with the
progress of the negotiations, but confided that the U.S. had
not. (Note: Kasuri asked the Ambassador why Solana had
speculated that the U.S. was holding out for a global
settlement, as reported by Larijani. The Ambassador replied
that it was Iran, not the U.S., that sought to leverage the
nuclear issue to force a global dialogue, one the U.S. sees
no utility in pursuing, given Iranian unhelpful
ness in
Lebanon, Iraq, etc. End note.)

4. (C) Kasuri left Tehran believing that the Iranians want
to resolve the nuclear dispute through dialogue (although he
admitted that none would say this outright until he had
pushed the point),but that the Iranian leadership has
dangerously misread U.S. policy. We do not understand their
logic, Larijani complained: The U.S. wants our help on
Afghanistan and Iraq, but then treats us badly in the nuclear
talks. We've analyzed this, he continued: the U.S. can do
nothing to us, given its present difficulties. If they take
action against us, the IAEA inspectors will be kicked out and
the whole nuclear program will go underground. If they make
us suffer, we will make them suffer. Kasuri said that he
repeatedly urged the Iranians not/not to take precipitous
action based on mistaken interpretation of American
intentions or capabilities.

5. (C) Kasuri ported that his Iranian interlocutors were
closely following the public debate surrounding the Iraq
Study Group recommendations. Kasuri counseled the Iranians
that there is a multiplicity of opinions about Iran in the
U.S., but as the Administration has not ruled out the use of
force, Tehran should abandon any strategy based on
brinksmanship. The Ambassador suggested that that the
Iranians know exactly who speaks for the Administration and

ISLAMABAD 00022617 002 OF 002


were simply trying to confuse the issue by citing unofficial
voices involved in the public debate.

Afghanistan
--------------

6. (C) Tehran is also worried about the Taliban, Kasuri
said, noting that he has delivered the same talking points in
Tehran as he had in Kabul -- that Pakistan has no/no interest
in seeing the return of Taliban rule. The Iranians appeared
to appreciate the GOP position, praising President
Musharraf's "progressive" leadership. Without pressing for
Pakistan to "do more," Tehran encouraged greater cooperation
between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kasuri concluded
that he perceived no daylight between the Iranian and U.S.
positions on Afghanistan.

Iraq
--------------

7. (C) On Iraq, Kasuri found that the Iranian blamed the
U.S. for the present Shi'a- Sunni schism, while proclaiming
that Tehran supported "progressive" forces -- both Shi'a and
Sunni -- in the Islamic world. Without assigning blame for
the Shi'a-Sunni split, Kasuri responded by warning that Iran
will not come out a winner if it fuels the sectarian
conflict. When the Iranians stressed their support for full
implementation of the Constitution in both Iraq as the first
step to stability, Kasuri (a pragmatic pol at heart)
countered by pressing Tehran to use its influence to press
for a more Sunni-friendly revenue sharing scheme.

Comment
--------------

8. (C) In a closing remark, Kasuri observed that the
Iranians should enter negotiations with the U.S. with a
degree of gratitude, as the U.S. has eliminated enemy regimes
in Iran's two largest neighbors. That said, Kasuri remains
visibly troubled that Tehran does not fully appreciate the
risks it runs in testing U.S. patience on the nuclear program
or in fostering the Shi'a-Sunni conflict in Iraq.


CROCKER