Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD22178
2006-11-27 10:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

FOREIGN SECRETARY BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER

Tags:  AF IN PK PREL PTER 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271006Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5269
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9707
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1481
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3882
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1021
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1778
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6531
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7403
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4704
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9763
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 2192
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 3620
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0685
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 8904
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 022178 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2016
TAGS: AF IN PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: FOREIGN SECRETARY BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER
13-14 COMPOSITE DIALOGUE

REF: NEW DELHI 7954

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 022178

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2016
TAGS: AF IN PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: FOREIGN SECRETARY BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER
13-14 COMPOSITE DIALOGUE

REF: NEW DELHI 7954

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During a November 17 meeting with the
Ambassador, Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan was positive about
the tone of the November 13-14 Composite Dialogue talks,
saying that the atmosphere was business-like with no
"excessive restating of positions." The effort focused on
exploring areas for progress. Khan said that the outcome was
largely what he had anticipated, with some positive movement.
Despite this modest progress, ForSec Khan said that it is
increasingly difficult for GOP officials to persuade the
Pakistani public that the Composite Dialogue process is
solving any significant dispute between the two capitals. We
need to solve some issue, Khan said, or we will not be able
to convince the public that the process is worthwhile. Khan
reported that he had a pleasant 40-minute meeting with Indian
Foreign Minister Mukerjee, but that the conversation was
little more than a set piece, with each side stating
long-held positions. End summary.


2. (C) Counterterrorism (CT) Mechanism: Khan said that the
GOP understood the domestic pressures facing their Indian
counterparts on terrorism, and agreed that establishing a CT
Mechanism is necessary to insulate the peace process. He
said that he told ForSec Menon directly that Pakistan cannot
prevent terror attacks in Pakistan and certainly cannot
guarantee against terror attacks on Indian territory. Khan
said that the Indian side passed some information regarding
the 2005 bombing in New Delhi and 2006 Varanassi bombings,
but that these consisted of the statements of detainees
suspects who are not Pakistani national who have indirect
links to Lashkar-e-Tayyba (LeT). The MFA has passed this
information to the appropriate security services for
investigation. Khan stressed to the Ambassador that the CT
Mechanism must be forward-looking to prevent future terror
events, similar to the partnership that Pakistan has
developed with the UK. If the parties use the CT mechanism to

blame each other, it will do nothing to improve security or
bilateral relations. Both governments are facing serious CT
challenges and must be serious about this cooperative
endeavor. (Note: When the Ambassador asked whether the
Indian delegation had a detailed sense of CT actions
undertaken by the GOP in the past year, Khan said that he was
not sure. I did not feel comfortable raising the issue, he
said, as it would have led to a discussion of India's
internal challenges from domestic extremism -- too sensitive
a topic to address after the pause in the dialogue. End
note.)


3. (C) Kashmir: ForSec Khan indicated that there had been
some exchange on Kashmir, but that each side had been careful
not to step on issues under review in back-channel
discussions. Aside from exchanging stock positions (Pakistan
pressing for demilitarization in Jammu & Kashmir, with India
responding that violence in the region must first be
reduced),the most significant point of agreement was a
common recognition that each side must work to streamline
bureaucratic hurdles that impair existing confidence-building
measures (CBMs),such as the cross-LOC bus route.


4. (C) Sir Creek: ForSec Khan detected some Indian
willingness to move forward on Sir Creek, a reflection of the
looming deadline to submit maritime claims under the UN Law
of the Sea Convention. If India is ready, Khan said, so is
Pakistan, noting that a November 23-25 bilateral meeting of
technical experts could reach a resolution.


5. (C) Siachen Glacier: Khan expressed some disappointment
in the discussions on Siachen, wondering whether the Indian
military's reluctance to withdraw from the Glacier is because

ISLAMABAD 00022178 002 OF 002


it is comfortable in with its current situation or instead
reflects genuine fears. If the latter, we can address it
through a dialogue between the Army Chiefs of General Staff.
Khan reviewed the two sides' positions -- that India wants to
authenticate current positions, so it would have a demarcated
map should Pakistan attempt to re-occupy posts following a
withdrawal; that Pakistan has proposed a zone of
disengagement which incorporates a statement of current
positions and a schedule for withdrawal into the agreement.
Khan says that the Indian Foreign Office is amenable, but
that there is palpable opposition in the Indian defense
establishment. Khan emphasized that Pakistan cannot accept
demarcation of current positions as the first step of an
agreement, as this would confer tacit acceptance of
Indian-egress on disputed territory; current positions must
be incorporated as part of a complete package and schedule
for withdrawal. Khan said that ForSec Menon agreed to
revisit this issue. Khan told the Ambassador that, dueling
press headlines to the contrary, Siachen cannot be resolved
in a day, as a series of CGS-level military meetings are
needed to resolve technical issues related to demarcation and
withdrawal. (Note: Khan has wanted to explore allowing
international trekking and research expeditions to travel to
the zone of engagement, a CBM that had caught his fancy, but
had been discouraged from raising the concept as it is
allegedly anathema to the Indian defense establishment. End
note.)


6. (C) SAFTA and Trade: Khan said that detailed
discussions on SAFTA could be discussed by Commerce Ministers
at SAARC. Khan did share with the Indian delegation GOP
concerns about non-tarrif barriers, which keep Pakistani
products -- particularly textiles -- out of Indian markets.


7. (C) Comment: During his November 26-28 personal visit
to New Delhi, Foreign Minister Kasuri hopes to build on
improved atmosphere that the Foreign Secretary reported at
the Composite Dialogue talks. Although the stated purpose of
Kasuri's travel is to attend the wedding of the daughter of
Union Minister Mani Shankar Ayer on November 27, Kasuri is
reported to be joining Foreign Minister Mukerjee for lunch
earlier that day for an informal review of bilateral
relations and progress in the Composite Dialogue. This will
be Kasuri's first meeting with Mukerjee since the latter
assumed the External Affairs portfolio. The local press is
already speculating that FM Mukerjee will visit Pakistan in
mid-January, followed by the long-awaited visit by PM
Manmohan Singh in late February or early March.
CROCKER