Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD22024
2006-11-16 11:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

VOX POPULI: REACTIONS TO BAJAUR MADRASSA ATTACK

Tags:  PGOV PK PREL PTER 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 022024 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: VOX POPULI: REACTIONS TO BAJAUR MADRASSA ATTACK
AND SUBSEQUENT DARGAI ARMY BASE BOMBING

REF: A. PESHAWAR 664

B. PESHAWAR 662

C. PESHAWAR 659

D. PESHAWAR 653

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 022024

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NOFORN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: VOX POPULI: REACTIONS TO BAJAUR MADRASSA ATTACK
AND SUBSEQUENT DARGAI ARMY BASE BOMBING

REF: A. PESHAWAR 664

B. PESHAWAR 662

C. PESHAWAR 659

D. PESHAWAR 653

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)
public remains exercised over the October 30 Pak-Mil attack
on an extremist madrassa in Bajaur Agency and the November 9
retaliatory suicide bombing at Dargai Fort. In the rest of
Pakistan, neither event has resonated outside of the
community of intellectual elites, the military and the
mullahs. Mainline Pakistani political parties worry that the
Bajaur attack may be a potent issue for the religious parties
in national elections later in the year; intellectuals are
concerned that Bajaur was a form of extra-judicial
punishment. Some military and ISI contacts report that their
colleagues have been hit hard by the Dargai bombing (which
killed 42 Army recruits) and are starting to complain about
the costs of "a war that is not Pakistan's war." Such
sentiments are unlikely to affect decision-making in the
highly-centralized Pak-Mil bureaucracy, but the Dargai attack
could make officials particularly sensitive to complaints
that the Government of Pakistan (GOP) "could do more" in the
War on Terror. The United States should continue to affirm
our appreciation for GOP commitments and sacrifices. End
Summary.


2. (C) Outside of the NWFP, the October 30 attack on an
extremist madrassa that served as a militant training camp in
Bajaur Agency generated less public outcry than initially
expected. Conversely, the subsequent suicide bombing of an
Army training facility for new recruits in Dargai, NWFP -- an
attack that killed 42 young men -- also failed to generate
widespread angst or public calls for retaliation. Among the
educated elites, both events are being debated in living
rooms and in the English language press. Consulates Karachi
and Lahore nonetheless confirm Embassy Islamabad's impression
-- except as noted in paragraph 3, neither incident has
garnered much popular attention outside of NWFP, where the

attacks remain emotional issues. A telling point is that the
Jamaat-i Islami (JI) had some success calling a few hundred
supporters to the streets in NWFP to protest the air strike,
but did not bother to organize public demonstrations in
Lahore, where its highly-active, highly-organized student
wing dominates campus politics at the local universities.

--------------
In Salons and Reading Rooms
--------------


3. (C) Pakistani elites -- particularly those who talk with
the Embassy and those who publish English language newspapers
-- continue to debate the Bajaur attack on both moral and
political terms. Several have described the Bajaur air
strike as a form of extrajudicial punishment. Embassy and
Consulate contacts argue that a ground assault on the
madrassa, in which militants could be arrested and tried in
court would have been preferable. The logistical
difficulties in carrying out such an operation -- and the
concomitant hazards to Pak-Mil troops -- have not been part
of the conversation. ConGen Karachi reports that contacts
there are asking whether a less confrontational, "more
Pakistani," approach to dealing with miscreants might have
been more successful and less costly in terms of collateral

ISLAMABAD 00022024 002 OF 003


damage. Similarly, Pakistani People's Party - Sherpao
(PPP-S) leader Sikander Sherpao told Peshawar PO on November
13 that peace accords, like the September 5 North Waziristan
Agency agreement, would be more effective at marginalizing
militants than violent attacks.


4. (C) While some elites focus on rule-of-law issues,
others keep an eye on the political. Mainstream politicians
worry that Bajaur will strengthen religious parties,
particularly in NWFP. Such concerns were raised by many of
the mainstream political party representatives who attended a
November 7 dinner in honor of visiting SCA Assistant
Secretary Richard Boucher. Despite worries that Bajaur and

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Dargai would strengthen religious parties, the PPP and
Pakistani Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) have been quick to
join with the Mutihida Majlas-e-Amal (MMA) to criticize the
Bajaur attack. On November 14, opposition parties in the
Senate -- including the PPP, PML-N and MMA -- submitted a
joint request to devote a session to debating the Bajaur and
Dargai events. Perhaps more telling is that the political
opposition reacted to the suicide bombing at the Dargai Army
base by issuing point-scoring statements blaming the
Musharraf-Aziz government -- rather than the extremist
perpetrators -- for the attack.

--------------
Meanwhile, on the Frontlines. . . .
--------------


5. (C) On the margins of the November 11
ISAF-Afghan-Pak-Mil Tripartite Commission Plenary, a
mid-level Pak-Mil Army officer assigned to General
Headquarters wondered whether Bajaur had been "worth it,"
telling poloff this question was being quietly debated within
the officer corps. He said some officers were questioning
whether the loss of 42 young soldiers in a single attack was
a justifiable in a war "that is not our war." On November
14, an ISI operations officer told poloff that his colleagues
were asking the same questions. "Seeing those boys die was
painful for us," he said. Pakistan's Ambassador to
Afghanistan, who also attended the Tripartite Commission
Plenary Session, told poloff the West had established and
strengthened religious extremists on the Pak-Afghan border
during the anti-Soviet jihad and now had unrealistic
expectation about how quickly they could be contained. "We
are the ones paying for your decisions of 30 years ago," he
said. While retired officers publishing letters in national
newspapers have been quick to decry the lack of physical
security at Dargai, they also have complained that the
Government should have known that retaliation to Bajaur would
be painful and asked whether it would be worth it.


6. (C) Comment: Office of Defense Representative -
Pakistan (ODRP) notes that it is not surprising that the
officer corps, who were genuinely pained by Dargai, is
debating the precipitating event. Power and decision making
authority in the Pakistan military is concentrated at the
very top, and the concerns of more junior officers normally
do not affect the decision making processes. That said, it
is reasonable to assume that GOP civilian and military
officials --at the best of times defensive over suggestions
that Pakistan could do more the War on Terror -- will be even
more sensitive to such criticism since Dargai. End Comment.

--------------
And in the NWFP

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--------------

7. (C) Consulate Peshawar reports that public opinion on
the Bajaur strike was molded by early reporting that
characterized the Pak-Mil operation as an attack on a
"religious school" that was full of "young children." The
angry rhetoric of local politicians and the absence of a
strong and coordinated message from Islamabad in the first
hours after the operation reinforced negative public
perceptions that have been difficult to overcome. The
Consulate adds that the suicide bombing at Dargai may have
blunted some of the public anger over Bajaur, reporting that
Dargai has caused some in the NWFP to revise their opinion of
the activities and associates of the "madrassa."

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) Comment: Emboffs and other non-Pakistani
observers have quietly shared their surprise over the secular
opposition's rush to blame the deaths of 42 soldiers at
Dargai on the government, rather than on the extremist
terrorists who carried out the attack. Without discounting
the passionate op-eds on the Bajaur airstrike and Dargai
suicide bombing that have filled local newspapers, it is
equally striking that neither Bajaur nor Dargai has resonated
deeply enough in the general population to produce much in
the way of public demonstration or street-level outcry.
While the PPP, PML-N, and MMA have tried to score political
points through their responses to the Bajaur and Dargai
attacks, their attempts so far have fallen flat. Similarly,
outside of military circles, outrage over the Dargai tragedy
have been muted...perhaps out of shock that militants could
and would directly target the core of central government
authority. While theories on why the public has been so
quiet abound, no one we speak with believes that a sea change
is imminent. Had the optics been different, or if the
religious parties were not still recovering from financial
and political backlash following the violent and destructive
"Danish cartoon" riots in February 2005, we could have
witnessed much noisier reactions to these incidents. End
Comment.
CROCKER