Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD22023
2006-11-16 10:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

PAK-AFGHAN JIRGAS: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF

Tags:  AF PK PREL PTER 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 022023 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: AF PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: PAK-AFGHAN JIRGAS: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF
RESPONDS TO AFGHAN NON-PAPER

REF: A. KABUL 5270

B. ISLAMABAD 21073

C. KABUL 5218

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 022023

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DEPT - PLEASE PASS TO EUR/PRM
KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: AF PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: PAK-AFGHAN JIRGAS: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF
RESPONDS TO AFGHAN NON-PAPER

REF: A. KABUL 5270

B. ISLAMABAD 21073

C. KABUL 5218

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and introduction: In a October 30 meeting,
Presidential Chief of Staff Hamid Javaid shared with
Ambassador a non-paper passed to Government of Pakistan (GOP)
from the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) via the UN Mission
in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Javaid noted that the GOP
envisioned something quite different from the description in
GOA paper when President Musharraf agreed to the parallel
jirgas during the September 27 Trilateral Iftar at the White
House. Javaid also questioned why the GOA elected to pass
the paper via UNAMA, rather than through bilateral diplomatic
channels, stating that the two governments need to deal with
each other directly to reconcile their diverging views of the
jirga process. End summary and introduction.


2. (C) The Ambassador opened his call on Javaid by noting
that the GOA is under the impression that the GOP does
not/not want to move forward with the two jirgas discussed at
the Trilateral Iftar hosted by President Bush. (Ref C)
Javaid responded that this was not true: the GOP remains
ready and willing to engage the GOA on the jirga proposal.
He suggested that the two sides engage in planning sessions
to consider the most appropriate parameters and timing to
ensure a successful outcome.


3. (C) Having expressed Pakistan's support for the jirga
concept, Javaid said that an Afghan non-paper on jirga
organization (text in para. 8) had been delivered by UNAMA
D/SRSG Chris Alexander delivered to National Security Advisor
Tariq Aziz. The non-paper proposed a much larger, broader
gathering than that contemplated by the GOP. The GOA appears
to be committing to a large-scale, all-encompassing event
drawing participants from the central government and all
Afghan provinces. Such a scope would be inappropriate in
Pakistan, which intended to draw participants from only from
geographic areas populated by Pashtun tribes -- i.e., along

the Pak-Afghan border. Rather than focusing on Pashtun
tribal leadership, Javaid said that Kabul appears to want a
to use the jirgas as a grand modern-day state-to-state darbar.


4. (C) According to Javaid, the asymmetries between the
Pakistani and Afghan visions for the jirgas extends beyond
the breadth of participation. In response to a question by
the Ambassador, Javaid affirmed that President Musharraf had
asked NWFP Governor Orakzai to coordinate and implement the
jirga on the Pakistani-side. The GOP subsequently learned
that President Karzai had appointed FM Spanta to coordinate
the Afghan jirga, which would require Pakistan to shift at
least some aspects of jirga planning to the MFA to maintain
parity; unfortunately, as the MFA is staffed by Pakistanis of
all ethnic backgrounds, finding an appropriate Foreign Office
interlocutor with the requisite knowledge of Pashtun customs
could be a challenge. These are matters that the sides
should discuss directly before proceeding further, Javaid
concluded.


5. (C) Comment: The GOA non-paper describes "joint jirgas"
that reach far beyond the leaders of the Pashtun tribes that
span the Durrand Line -- the concept that the GOP carried
home from the White House Trilat Iftar. Without dwelling on
any particular issue, Javaid expressed minor annoyance that
the GOA non-paper views jirga details as settled matters,

ISLAMABAD 00022023 002 OF 003


rather than as propositions for GOP consideration. Javaid
betrayed the same irritation displayed by other Pakistani
interlocutors in reaction to perceived GOA overreaching. For
example, on question of who would represent Pakistan at the
Afghan jirga, it appears that the GOA intends for the GOP
delegation to include all participants in the Pakistani
jirga; presumably, the GOA would want the GOP to extend
reciprocal invitations to all 180-200 participants in the
Afghan jirga, a prospect that may daunt even the most
hospitable GOP host. The GOA non-paper declares that
President Karzai has solicited the assistance of UNAMA in
organizing the jirgas (emphasis on the plural, indicating
both the Afghan and Pakistani events),presenting the GOP
with a de facto third-party facilitator without prior
consultation. While not knowing what additional messages the
D/SRSG may have personally delivered to NSA Tariq Aziz, post
believes that the GOA would have solicited a more positive
reaction had it pulsed the GOP reaction to using UNAMA as an
emissary and interlocutor.


6. (C) Comment (cont): The GOA non-paper unfortunately
arrived as the GOP is trying to contain public reaction to
the security operations against an extremist madrassa in
Bajaur Agency. Also, President Karzai's personal outreach to
ANP leader Asfandyar Wali Khan and JUI-F leader Maulana Fazl
ur-Rehman has drawn media attention, prompting public
grumbling about perceived Afghan meddling in Pakistan's
internal affairs. While post is encouraged by Emb Kabul's
report that President Karzai reached out directly to
President Musharraf with an Eid telephone call (Ref A),The
USG must encourage both sides to begin direct discussion of
their jirga options as soon as possible. End comment.


7. (C) Text of GOA Non-Paper:

(Begin text.)

Jirgas on Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Current Status of Initial Planning

-- The purpose of these jirgas is to generate structured
discussion and decisions by national political and civil
society leaders from both countries of measures to end
terrorism as a major factor fueling insecurity in the region.

-- The Government of Afghanistan is planing to host the first
joint jirga will full Pakistani participation before the end
of 2006.

-- The current proposed composition of the Afghan jirga is as
follows:

Speakers and Vice Speakers of the Meshrano and Wolesi Jirgas
(6)
Chairs of Wolesi Jirga Commissions (18)
Chairs of Meshrano Jirga Commissions (18)
Chairs of Provincial Councils (34)
Members of the Ulema Council of Afghanistan (34)
Two respected elders or representatives from each province
(68)
Further Parliamentary, political, women's or civil society
representatives (10 )
Total Afghan participants: 180 - 200
Total Pakistani participants: (to be determined)

-- In addition, the President of Afghanistan and two Vice

ISLAMABAD 00022023 003 OF 003


Presidents would participate. The members of the cabinet
(25) would take part as observers, as would representatives
of UNAMA and the international community.

-- President Karzai is currently considering several
candidates for membership in an organizing committee for the
Afghan jirga, but they have not yet been selected.

-- National regional and tribal balance will be respected and
preserved but it is not now anticipated that additional
representation to be given to border provinces.

-- President Karzai intends to invite President Musharraf and
the members of the Pakistani jirga to participate in the
Afghan jirga. It has not yet been determined whether the
presidents would preside, participate or observe.

-- President Karzai has asked UNAMA to assist the Afghan
government with the preparations and monitoring of the jirgas.

-- Exact timing and location have not yet been determined.
Given that security is the primary issue, the most probable
feasible locations in Afghanistan are Jalalabad and Kandahar.
Kabul is also an option.

(End text.)




CROCKER