BOUCHER AND KASURI COVER F-16S, JIRGAS, NORTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 021947

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2016
TAGS: AF MASS PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: BOUCHER AND KASURI COVER F-16S, JIRGAS, NORTH
WAZIRISTAN AGREEMENT AND FENCING THE BORDER


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On November 6, Assistant Secretary for
South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher met with
Foreign Minister Kasuri. In the meeting, Kasuri asked for
consideration on F-16 payments and previewed Pakistani
thoughts on the joint jirgas announced after President
Musharraf and President Karzai met in Washington. Kasuri
expressed frustration over Pakistan's being blamed for
problems in Afghanistan and explained Pakisitan was committed
to making the jirgas a success. Each side had a different
vision, and Assistant Secretary Boucher recommended that the
two sides talk soon to find common ground. Kasuri asked for
the U.S. assessment on the North Waziristan Agency agreement
and also explained Pakistan's intent to fence part of the
border and possibly use mines, which Boucher cautioned
against. End Summary.


2. (U) On November 6, Assistant Secretary for South and
Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher called on Pakistani
Foreign Minister Mian Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri. U.S.
participants included Ambassador Crocker, South and Central
Asian Affairs Executive Assistant Caitlin Hayden, and Embassy
notetaker. Government of Pakistan participants included
Director General of the Foreign Minister's Office Khalid
Mehmood, , Additional Secretary for Americas Shahid Kamal,
and Director General for Americas Sohail Mahmood.


3. (C) Foreign Minister Kasuri opened by discussing the
recently-signed Letter of Agreement to purchase 18 new F-16s.
Kasuri asked that terms be changed to allow the Government
of Pakistan to pay for the aircraft upon delivery. If that
was not possible, the Government of Pakistan wished to
back-load the payment schedule, so that most of the payments
would not be due until nearer the delivery date.
Additionally, the Government of Pakistan would be grateful
for assistance securing a commercial loan and, if a
commercial loan were not available, then some type of U.S.
Government guarantees. The Government of Pakistan also wanted
a promise of a full refund if the project were canceled for
some reason. Ambassador Crocker replied the U.S. was
studying the possibility of back-loading payments within
limits, subject to Lockheed-Martin's cash-flow requirements.

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Parallel Jirgas
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4. (C) Foreign Minister Kasuri reported that Afghan Foreign
Minister Spanta had telephoned to ask for a bilateral meeting
in November to discuss the parallel jirgas. Due to other
commitments, early December was the best Kasuri could do.
Before meeting with Spanta, Kasuri wanted to meet with "all
the key stakeholders" in the jirga process. Stressing the
need for a successful enterprise, Kasuri said a jirga failure
"would be a disaster, because there would be no hope left."
He said President Musharraf's plan to strengthen the tribal
system should theoretically work, but money and development
assistance would be the key.


5. (C) Kasuri strongly believed jirga participation should
be limited to Pashtuns. He hypothesized that President
Karzai might be under political pressure to include
non-Pashtuns, but Kasuri worried that non-Pashtun
participation would change the character of the meeting.
"Afghanistan's problem is with the Pashtuns. The jirga
should not become a second National Assembly." Assistant
Secretary Boucher suggested that, while deciding

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participation and geographic scope, Kasuri and Spanta could
consider inviting non-Pashtuns as observers or guests.


6. (C) Kasuri did not want the United States to
misunderstand Pakistan's insistence on limiting jirga

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participation to Pashtuns. He said the Government of
Pakistan also wanted to increase contacts with non-Pashtuns
in Afghanistan, especially those associated with the former
Northern Alliance. For example, Pakistan hoped to increase
bilateral interaction with Speaker of the Afghan Assembly
Yunus Qanooni, who led the Northern Alliance Delegation at
the Bonn talks.


7. (C) Boucher encouraged the two Foreign Ministers to
establish a jirga timeline and to discuss third party
assistance or participation. He knew the United Nations
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan was involved. He offered
that the U.S. was ready to help and looked to the Afghans and
Pakistanis to tell us how we might support them.
Additionally, Pakistan and Afghanistan should decide on
desired outcomes and should consider having Pakistan's jirga
point-man, Northwest Frontier Province Governor Orakzai, meet
with his Afghan jirga counterpart before the foreign
ministers met.


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Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
--------------


8. (C) Kasuri said a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would
be "a disaster for Pakistan. It would strengthen extremist
Pashtuns." He continued by oserving that failure to defeat
the Taliban would "lead to trouble all of the Muslim world,
but especially in Pakistan." Boucher replied that the United
States believed the war in Afghanistan was "definitely
winnable." Development and security projects were helping
the situation. Boucher admitted that some people in the
region questioned the United States' staying power, because
the U.S. left Afghanistan after the Soviets pulled out. The
United States was trying to prove through its budget
commitments that the U.S. was committed to staying the
course. The February NATO summit in Riga and the European
Union's seven year budget for Afghanistan also would indicate
the Coalition's long-term intentions. Kasuri replied that
extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan were claiming that the
United States was fed up with wars and would pull out if the
Democrats did well in the November 7 election. The Muslim
world needed a signal that the United States remained
committed to victory in Iraq. Boucher assured Kasuri that
both political parties were committed to success in
Afghanistan and Iraq and to assisting the tribal areas of
Pakistan.


9. (C) Kasuri expressed annoyance with Western observers
blaming Afghanistan's security problems on Pakistan. ("We
are fed up with allegations against us.") He believed that
fencing the border might lessen the criticism, as it would
prove Afghanistan's problems were not because of cross-border
infiltration. ("Afghanistan's problems are in Afghanistan,
not in Pakistan.") Kasuri also noted that some people in the
United States thought that Pakistan was "keeping the Taliban
option open" in case the Taliban retook Afghanistan. He
thought that fencing the border would prove Pakistan was not
preparing to work with the Taliban in the future. He
suggested initially fencing a 70 kilometer section that had
been particularly problematic, then extending the fence
later. He also suggested mining the border, though he noted
"the Europeans" would be opposed to mines. Boucher replied
that the U.S. military was skeptical on the efficacy of
fencing the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Kasuri replied that
the Indians had fenced their border with Pakistan. "They
wouldn't have done it if it didn't help." Kasuri asked again
if a fence might not be effective. "We thought your Bajaur
operation was effective," replied Assistant Secretary
Boucher.


10. (C) Kasuri said it "was ridiculous" to think that

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Mullah Omar might be hiding in Quetta. He also questioned
news reports that attacks on Coalition forces near the
Pakistan border had increased since the North Waziristan
Agency jirga agreement. Kasuri said his advisors believed
attacks had not increased and that tribal elders were working
to enforce the agreement. He said the problem was that,
since the North Waziristan Agency agreement covered only
that agency's part of the border, the government needed to
move ahead with other jirga agreements covering, for example,
South Waziristan Agency and Bajaur Agency. Boucher replied
that the United States so far believed the North Waziristan
Agency agreement was not succeeding at lowering militant
infiltration into Afghanistan but that it was still too early
to tell. Ambassador Crocker explained that Coalition forces
tracked a substantial increase in cross-border incidents
between the June North Waziristan Agency cease-fire and the
September 5 jirga agreement. Since then, attacks had
remained at the same high level. Boucher noted it was
important for Pakistan to maintain the ability to carry out
military operations and to keep pressure on tribal leaders to
fulfill their agreements.


11. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher said that all the
parties faced "two big problems" in Afghanistan. First,
coalition partners had failed to provide the benefits of good
governance -- roads, justice, police, development -- to many
parts of Afghanistan. "We need to extend the benefits of
good governance to them." Second, the Taliban were able to
use Pakistan for sustenance. Even with fencing, Taliban
would find a way to move back and forth across the border.
"You need a comprehensive strategy on the tribal areas.
Pakistan needs to extend the authority of the government into
the border areas and provide a way for residents there to
participate in the international economy. Fixing Pakistan
won't fix Afghanistan, but we can't fix Afghanistan without
fixing the problem on the Pakistan border."


12. (C) This cable was coordinated with SCA - Caitlin Hayden
CROCKER