Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD21698
2006-11-06 07:56:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:
FATA SECURITY UPDATE: OCTOBER 15-28
how-toVZCZCXRO0255 PP RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #1698/01 3100756 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 060756Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4570 INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9661 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3834 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0856 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1721 RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6429 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4579 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9607 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1000 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 2061 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 3290 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0499 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 8665 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1400
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 021698
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: FATA SECURITY UPDATE: OCTOBER 15-28
REF: PESHAWAR 653
Classified By: Amb. Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
------------------------
Talibanization Spreading
------------------------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 021698
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: FATA SECURITY UPDATE: OCTOBER 15-28
REF: PESHAWAR 653
Classified By: Amb. Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------------
Talibanization Spreading
--------------
1. (C) Embassy contacts in North Waziristan continue to
report "foreigners" departing NWA for other tribal
agencies, apparently a response to the September 5 jirga
agreement. The contacts add that militant commanders who
remain in NWA are "thriving," and that Taliban commanders
are demanding fees and "taxes" from local businessmen. One
journalist tells post that the Taliban is distributing
pamphlets in NWA "requesting" that businesses "fund
jihad." Truck drivers, for example, are asked to
contribute PRs. 15,000 (about USD 250) per six months.
Contacts also report that the Taliban are meting out
punishments for "crimes" like selling video cassettes.
Taliban who had been "hiding in the hills" during Pak-Mil
operations in NWA during much of the last two years now
feel secure visiting Miranshah; the locals report "many new
faces" in the area.
2. (S) A journalist in South Waziristan tells post he has
seen troubling signs of Talibanization spreading to settled
areas of NWFP, particularly Tank district. He reports that
the NWFP police are "losing control of the situation." As
an example, he cites the closure of a police checkpoint
between SWA and Tank that formerly discouraged extremists
from moving from SWA into the rest of NWFP. Several
contacts report that militants "firmly control SWA" and
that SWA young people increasingly find suicide bombings
and other militant activities "inspirational."
--------------
Security Incidents
--------------
3. (C) According to press reports, on October 18, Afghan
security officials paraded three captured self-confessed
Taliban before reporters. Two of the militants were from
Miranshah, NWA. The two Waziris said that Mullah
Saifullah, an NWA militant commander who signed the NWA
peace accord, sent them to fight Coalition forces in
Paktika. The men reported they entered Afghanistan on
October 15 or 16, though they did not say where they
crossed the border. (Note: If Mullah Saifullah encouraged
them to cross the border to attack Coalition forces after
September 5, he violated the jirga agreement. End Note.)
4. (S) Contacts, ODRP, and the press continue to report
that militants from NWA avoid embarrassing or incurring the
wrath of NWA tribal leaders by crossing into Afghanistan
via South Waziristan (primarily) or other FATA agencies.
ODRP and other Embassy officials continue to raise concerns
over this "work around" with Pak-Mil and other GOP
officials.
-------------- --------------
Attacks on Coalition Forces Near the Pakistan Border
-------------- --------------
5. (S) ODRP reports the following security incidents
within five kilometers of the Pak-Afghan border:
--October 15-16: Both nights, Coalition forces observed
anti-Coalition militias (ACMs) crossing into Afghanistan in
the vicinity of Zia Oba and BCP 213, opposite SWA. The
ACMs were attempting to set up rockets to fire at Coalition
targets. U.S. and Coalition forces engaged the ACMs.
--October 17: U.S. forces engaged ACMs after a rocket
attack on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Bermel. The point
of origin of the attack was within 5 km of the Pakistan
border, opposite the NWA/SWA seam.
ISLAMABAD 00021698 002 OF 002
October 21: TF Spartan patrol reported contact with an
ambush of 20-40 ACMs opposite the Chitral and Dir Agencies.
October 22, 23, 26, 27: Rocket fire on FOB Bermel. Fire
originated from within five kilometers of Pakistan border.
October 23: Rocket fire on FOB Tillman. Fire originated
from within five kilometers of Pakistan border.
October 23: RPG and small arms fire on FOB Shkin, opposite
SWA.
October 25: Rockets fired at hospital in vicinity of Nawa
Pass, opposite Bajaur Agency.
--------------
Comment
--------------
6. (C) As the Mullah Saifullah incident illustrates,
mechanisms to enforce the September 5 jirga agreement are
either barely functional or do not exist. Security
officials tell post they are committed to enforcing the NWA
agreement and to attacking militants when opportunities
arise, as occurred in Bajaur Agency on October 30
(Reftel). Officials add that developing enforcement
infrastructure and capacity "takes time." Post continues
to stress to the GOP that the difficulty of the proposition
makes it all the more imperative that enforcement and
capacity building begin immediately. End Comment
CROCKER
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: FATA SECURITY UPDATE: OCTOBER 15-28
REF: PESHAWAR 653
Classified By: Amb. Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------------
Talibanization Spreading
--------------
1. (C) Embassy contacts in North Waziristan continue to
report "foreigners" departing NWA for other tribal
agencies, apparently a response to the September 5 jirga
agreement. The contacts add that militant commanders who
remain in NWA are "thriving," and that Taliban commanders
are demanding fees and "taxes" from local businessmen. One
journalist tells post that the Taliban is distributing
pamphlets in NWA "requesting" that businesses "fund
jihad." Truck drivers, for example, are asked to
contribute PRs. 15,000 (about USD 250) per six months.
Contacts also report that the Taliban are meting out
punishments for "crimes" like selling video cassettes.
Taliban who had been "hiding in the hills" during Pak-Mil
operations in NWA during much of the last two years now
feel secure visiting Miranshah; the locals report "many new
faces" in the area.
2. (S) A journalist in South Waziristan tells post he has
seen troubling signs of Talibanization spreading to settled
areas of NWFP, particularly Tank district. He reports that
the NWFP police are "losing control of the situation." As
an example, he cites the closure of a police checkpoint
between SWA and Tank that formerly discouraged extremists
from moving from SWA into the rest of NWFP. Several
contacts report that militants "firmly control SWA" and
that SWA young people increasingly find suicide bombings
and other militant activities "inspirational."
--------------
Security Incidents
--------------
3. (C) According to press reports, on October 18, Afghan
security officials paraded three captured self-confessed
Taliban before reporters. Two of the militants were from
Miranshah, NWA. The two Waziris said that Mullah
Saifullah, an NWA militant commander who signed the NWA
peace accord, sent them to fight Coalition forces in
Paktika. The men reported they entered Afghanistan on
October 15 or 16, though they did not say where they
crossed the border. (Note: If Mullah Saifullah encouraged
them to cross the border to attack Coalition forces after
September 5, he violated the jirga agreement. End Note.)
4. (S) Contacts, ODRP, and the press continue to report
that militants from NWA avoid embarrassing or incurring the
wrath of NWA tribal leaders by crossing into Afghanistan
via South Waziristan (primarily) or other FATA agencies.
ODRP and other Embassy officials continue to raise concerns
over this "work around" with Pak-Mil and other GOP
officials.
-------------- --------------
Attacks on Coalition Forces Near the Pakistan Border
-------------- --------------
5. (S) ODRP reports the following security incidents
within five kilometers of the Pak-Afghan border:
--October 15-16: Both nights, Coalition forces observed
anti-Coalition militias (ACMs) crossing into Afghanistan in
the vicinity of Zia Oba and BCP 213, opposite SWA. The
ACMs were attempting to set up rockets to fire at Coalition
targets. U.S. and Coalition forces engaged the ACMs.
--October 17: U.S. forces engaged ACMs after a rocket
attack on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Bermel. The point
of origin of the attack was within 5 km of the Pakistan
border, opposite the NWA/SWA seam.
ISLAMABAD 00021698 002 OF 002
October 21: TF Spartan patrol reported contact with an
ambush of 20-40 ACMs opposite the Chitral and Dir Agencies.
October 22, 23, 26, 27: Rocket fire on FOB Bermel. Fire
originated from within five kilometers of Pakistan border.
October 23: Rocket fire on FOB Tillman. Fire originated
from within five kilometers of Pakistan border.
October 23: RPG and small arms fire on FOB Shkin, opposite
SWA.
October 25: Rockets fired at hospital in vicinity of Nawa
Pass, opposite Bajaur Agency.
--------------
Comment
--------------
6. (C) As the Mullah Saifullah incident illustrates,
mechanisms to enforce the September 5 jirga agreement are
either barely functional or do not exist. Security
officials tell post they are committed to enforcing the NWA
agreement and to attacking militants when opportunities
arise, as occurred in Bajaur Agency on October 30
(Reftel). Officials add that developing enforcement
infrastructure and capacity "takes time." Post continues
to stress to the GOP that the difficulty of the proposition
makes it all the more imperative that enforcement and
capacity building begin immediately. End Comment
CROCKER