Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD20836
2006-10-23 13:25:00
SECRET
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:
PAKISTANI CONCERNS OVER SPECULATION ON U.S.
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S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 020836
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2016
TAGS: PK PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI CONCERNS OVER SPECULATION ON U.S.
WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 020836
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2016
TAGS: PK PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI CONCERNS OVER SPECULATION ON U.S.
WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) During an October 20 meeting with the Ambassador on
Indo-Pak relations, National Security Advisor Tariq Aziz
shifted the conversation to ask about press reports that
President Bush had likened the current situation in Iraq to
the U.S. experience in Vietnam. (Note: Aziz's question was
a reference to garbled reporting of the President's remarks
during an ABC News interview when asked to comment on a Tom
Friedman piece comparing Iraq to the 1968 Tet Offensive. End
note. ) These reports have been interpreted in the local
press as a signal that USG policy has reached a tipping point
with regard to the future of the U.S. deployment in Iraq.
Aziz was stark in his commentary, stating plainly that if the
U.S. walks away from the fight in Iraq, moderate Muslim
leaders such a President Musharraf may not survive. "They
day after you leave, the extremists will come for our heads,"
Aziz said. For the sake of its moderate friends and allies,
Aziz pleaded, the U.S. must stay the course in Iraq. The
Ambassador answered Aziz that while tactics may change to fit
the circumstances, our commitment to Iraq remains firm.
2. (U) A day later, during the October 22 launch of the
Urdu-edition of his auto-biography, President Musharraf
rejected the proposal of British General Robert Dannert that
the UK should withdraw its forces from Iraq, saying that
"withdrawal of troops by the U.S. and its allies right now
would have far-reaching impact not only on the region, but
also on the whole world." Musharraf went on to say that the
British general should have should have examined the pros and
cons of a troop withdrawal at this juncture before offering
his policy prescription, concluding by saying that he
"totally disagreed" with the proposal.
3. (S) Comment: Aziz's worried aside to the Ambassador and
Musharraf's forthright criticism of General Dannert's
proposal to quit the field illustrate our Pakistani GWOT
partners' deep concern over the prospect of a premature U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq. As political leaders who face
considerable domestic risks implementing tough policy
decisions to advance our joint counter-terrorism agenda,
uncoordinated talk of withdrawal timetables or references to
the American pull-out from Vietnam must send chills down the
spine of Musharraf and other moderate Muslims leaders in the
region. Our work will be considerably more difficult if
Musharraf and the GOP leadership begin to factor the
probability of an early force withdrawal in Iraq into their
calculus balancing cooperation with the U.S. with Pakistan's
darker domestic political realities. End comment.
CROCKER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2016
TAGS: PK PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI CONCERNS OVER SPECULATION ON U.S.
WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) During an October 20 meeting with the Ambassador on
Indo-Pak relations, National Security Advisor Tariq Aziz
shifted the conversation to ask about press reports that
President Bush had likened the current situation in Iraq to
the U.S. experience in Vietnam. (Note: Aziz's question was
a reference to garbled reporting of the President's remarks
during an ABC News interview when asked to comment on a Tom
Friedman piece comparing Iraq to the 1968 Tet Offensive. End
note. ) These reports have been interpreted in the local
press as a signal that USG policy has reached a tipping point
with regard to the future of the U.S. deployment in Iraq.
Aziz was stark in his commentary, stating plainly that if the
U.S. walks away from the fight in Iraq, moderate Muslim
leaders such a President Musharraf may not survive. "They
day after you leave, the extremists will come for our heads,"
Aziz said. For the sake of its moderate friends and allies,
Aziz pleaded, the U.S. must stay the course in Iraq. The
Ambassador answered Aziz that while tactics may change to fit
the circumstances, our commitment to Iraq remains firm.
2. (U) A day later, during the October 22 launch of the
Urdu-edition of his auto-biography, President Musharraf
rejected the proposal of British General Robert Dannert that
the UK should withdraw its forces from Iraq, saying that
"withdrawal of troops by the U.S. and its allies right now
would have far-reaching impact not only on the region, but
also on the whole world." Musharraf went on to say that the
British general should have should have examined the pros and
cons of a troop withdrawal at this juncture before offering
his policy prescription, concluding by saying that he
"totally disagreed" with the proposal.
3. (S) Comment: Aziz's worried aside to the Ambassador and
Musharraf's forthright criticism of General Dannert's
proposal to quit the field illustrate our Pakistani GWOT
partners' deep concern over the prospect of a premature U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq. As political leaders who face
considerable domestic risks implementing tough policy
decisions to advance our joint counter-terrorism agenda,
uncoordinated talk of withdrawal timetables or references to
the American pull-out from Vietnam must send chills down the
spine of Musharraf and other moderate Muslims leaders in the
region. Our work will be considerably more difficult if
Musharraf and the GOP leadership begin to factor the
probability of an early force withdrawal in Iraq into their
calculus balancing cooperation with the U.S. with Pakistan's
darker domestic political realities. End comment.
CROCKER