AMBASSADOR'S OCT 5 MEETING WITH 11TH CORPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 019795

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PK PREL MOPS PTER AF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S OCT 5 MEETING WITH 11TH CORPS
COMMANDER


Classified By: Charge d'Affiares Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (U) Ambassador met with 11th Corps Commander (Peshawar)
LTG Mohammad Hamid Khan on October 5. ODRP Chief MG Helmly,
Islamabad DATT, and Peshawar PO (notetaker) were also
present. Meetings with NWFP Governor Orakzai and FATA
Additional Chief Secretary Arbab reported septels.


2. (C) The 11th Corps Commander told Ambassador that the Army
is concentrating its forces on the border with the Frontier
Corps (FC) taking responsibility for North Waziristan Agency
(NWA) interior posts. This would place additional 4000
regular army troops along the border. Hamid warned, however,
that instability in the tribal areas ultimately required a
political solution. The General recommended establishing a
communication link between posts on either side of the border
via wireless radio. He also suggested a flag meeting between
posts covering the Chitral/Kunar area. Hamid expressed great
concern about the growing number of attacks around Kandahar.
President Karzai, he said, should engage more closely and
regularly with local Pathan leaders. End Summary.

Assessing the Border and the NWA Agreement
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador opened the meeting by noting strong U.S.
support for President Musharraf, particularly as a partner in
stabilizing the border areas with Afghanistan. All parties,
he said, had a stake in the success of the NWA peace
agreement. The U.S. side, Ambassador continued, was ready to
provide an assessment of problem areas along the border and
to discuss how to improve communications. What we have seen
thus far is a continuation of militant activity trough
September at the same level as August, which was very high.
Ambassador asked for the General's perspective one month into
the NWA peace deal.


4. (C) The NWA agreement, Hamid replied, had helped the
military concentrate its forces on the border. The General
attributed the upswing in activity on the border to two
causes. First, autumn is traditionally a period when
"operations" escalate before winter conditions impede
movement. Second, U.S. forces were on the border and
presented an attractive target. The General carefully stated
that he was not denying the possibility of cross-border
filtration from Pakistan. Instead, he continued, it was
simply important to recognize that "miscreants" from both
sides of the border were gravitating toward U.S. forces. The
Pakistani army, Hamid said, had stepped up border patrolling
along NWA, South Waziristan Agency (SWA),and Chitral. There
had been an agreement with Bagram, he pointed out, for
synchronized patrolling, but the Pakistani side needed timing
information to be effective.


5. (C) Reviewing the NWA situation in the run up to the
September agreement, Hamid described January to June in 2006
as "very intense." Mounting casualties among militants, the
General remarked, had contributed to bringing tribal leaders
to the table. Hamid viewed the commitments from NWA tribal
leaders in the September agreement as "genuine." He
understood that if the deal fails greater pressure will fall
on Pakistani forces to take action. Hamid warned, however,
that instability in the tribal areas could not be solved
solely through military measures. The army, the General
maintained, could only contribute to setting the scene for
what was truly required -- a political solution.

ISLAMABAD 00019795 002 OF 002




6. (C) With the army concentrating on the border, Ambassador
asked about security inside NWA. Hamid responded that the FC
was continuing to man NWA interior posts. The option of
additional FC troops for interior duty was under
consideration, he added.

Shoring Up Counter-Insurgency Capabilities
--------------


7. (C) MG Helmly briefed on ODRP's ongoing assessment of
Pakistani counter-insurgency needs. He asked how the U.S.
military could improve information exchange and night-time
operations. Hamid noted that while border posts are able to
communicate with Bagram, there is no communication link with
posts on the Afghan side of the border. The General proposed
using wireless sets as a solution. MG Helmly noted that the
fielding of Harris radios was now complete on the Paksitan
side, which should improve communications. Responding to MG
Helmly's concern over large groups of fighters moving across
the border from Chitral, Hamid recommended a flag meeting
between posts in the Chitral/Kunar area.

Addressing Rising Violence in Afghanistan
--------------


8. (C) MG Helmly noted that the next Tripartite Commission
meeting in late October would take a broad look at the rising
violence in Afghanistan. Hamid acknowledged that incidents
on the border were cause for concern but viewed them
primarily as a distraction. The attacks around Kandahar, he
continued, were more to the point of the Taliban's larger
goal -- re-establishing a permanent foothold in Afghanistan.
Hamid argued that President Karzai should expand his
political influence with Pathans by holding more regular loya
jirgas with local leaders. (Comment: Hamid did not express
an opinion on the proposal for cross-border loya jirgas.
NWFP Governor Orakzai has told us separately that he will be
the point man on this proposal. End Comment.)
BODDE