Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD19125
2006-09-27 13:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (5): MUSHARRAF'S COALITION

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PINR PK PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 019125 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PK PREL
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (5): MUSHARRAF'S COALITION
OPTIONS...

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (5): MUSHARRAF'S COALITION OPTIONS
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 19121

B. ISLAMABAD 19122

C. ISLAMABAD 19123

D. ISLAMABAD 19124
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 019125

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PK PREL
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (5): MUSHARRAF'S COALITION
OPTIONS...

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (5): MUSHARRAF'S COALITION OPTIONS
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 19121

B. ISLAMABAD 19122

C. ISLAMABAD 19123

D. ISLAMABAD 19124
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and introduction: Pervez Musharraf has three options for ensuring a solid political foundation for his moderate and progressive agenda as he prepares for 2007 elections. He can stand by the present Pakistan Muslim League (PML) coalition and leadership; stick with the PML, but ditch its current leadership; or build a new coalition that includes mainstream oppostion parties the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and perhaps the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). While the latter would be the most compatible with Musharraf's agenda, it entails the greatest risk, including the possible return of exiled PPP and PML-N leaders.


2. (C) This cable, the fifth in a series mapping the political terrain as Pakistan approaches nationwide elections in 2007, assess President Musharraf's policy goals and political options. The final installment in the series will outline post's recommendations on how the U.S, can best support credible elections in 2007 and stable governance thereafter. End summary and introduction.


3. (C/NF) Setting aside his personal ambitions, as President Musharraf looks to the 2007 elections and beyond, his fundamental objective is ensuring the political stability necssary to continue sound and progressive government policies. Musharraf's priorities have not signficantly changed since his first address to the nation after taking power in October 1999: good governance, sound economic management, improved relations with India and an end to corruption and Islamic extremism. (Note: Musharraf would likely now add success in the GWOT and extending the writ of state to Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to his list. End note.) Musharraf has pursued these objectives with evident sincerity, but varying degrees of success. A bitterly contested, venomous election cycle would lead to post-election instability that would threaten progress on all fronts. This is undoubtedly a significant consideration for Musharraf as he considers his options, including the direct participation of Pakistan's exiled opposition party leaders.



4. (C/NF) Musharraf can, of course, stay the course. Under this scenario, Musharraf would stand by the PML, its current leadership and the existing coalition. The PML would expand its electoral base to capture what Musharraf has described as a ""big thumping victory"" in 2007. This is a highly optimistic scenario, as the current PML leadership -- Chaudhary Shujaat Hussein, who leads the party in the National Assembly, and his cousin, Punjab Chief Minister Chaudhary Pervez Elahi -- are widely seen as corrupt and autocratic; both are unpopular even within their own party.
More importantly, the Chaudharies do not share Musharraf's progressive inclinations. Alternatively, Musharraf could conceivably stick with the PML, but with new party leadership. Although there has been much speculation over this option in the last six months, many observers have discounted it as increasingly unlikely as elction day approaches. Whatever their faults, the Chaudharies are undeniably ruthlessly effective ward-style politicians.


5. (C/NF) Musharraf could also seek an accommodation with the mainstream secular parties headed by Benazir Bhutto (Pakistan People's Party - PPP) and Nawaz Sharif (Pakistan Muslim
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League-Nawaz - PML-N). There is much to be said for this option -- especially as it relates to the PPP and Pakistan's smaller regional parties, such as the MQM and Awami National Party -- as it would unite Pakistan's moderate forces in a post-election coalition, providing a stable political base for progressive policies. The risk Musharraf faces would be high however, as the price of a coalition could be opening the door to the exiled leaders to return to Pakistan to lead their parties' campaigns. Musharraf has a strong personal antipathy to both leaders, with particular disdain for Nawaz Sharif; he views both as unalterably corrupt and blames them for gross mismanagement during their administrations in the 1990s. From Musharraf's perspective, Benazir and Nawaz have had their chance to lead...and they failed. It was with these two in mind that Musharraf included a term-limit clause in a 2003 Constitutional amendment -- a clause that would need to be annulled if Nawaz or Benazir is ever to serve as Prime Minister again. In the case of Nawaz, there is also considerable tension relating to the circumstances of his ouster in 1999, with Musharraf blaming Nawaz for putting his life at risk and Nawaz blaming Musharraf for the subsequent coup.


6. (C/NF) The PML-N poses a serious threat to Chaudharies and the ruling PML, as it has a strong base in the Punjab and represents similar constituencies. A senior PML-N insider confirmed to poloffs that his party has continues to discuss possible pre- and post-election arragements with government and Musharraf representatives, even as it considers an alternative alliance with the coalition of Islamic parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e Ammal (MMA),to bring the PML government down and force early elections. (add para from lahore)


7. (C/NF) Of the PPP and PML-N, the PPP is either Musharraf's greater electoral threat or, conversely, his most lucrative coalition partner, as the party retains a national base and populist appeal. Musharraf would have good reason to fear that if the PPP has a strong showing at the polls, an emboldened Benazir could very well turn on him. Musharraf has had feelers out to the PPP for many years, hoping to entice Benazir into a deal akin to his pact with the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM),wherein Benazir would lead her party from abroad but the party would participate in governance: joining the coalition, taking seats in the Cabinet and leading the Sindh Government. PPP insiders have told post that one iteration of this offer would permit Benazir to return to Pakistan after an undefined period following the 2007 election, possibly taking a Senate seat in a by-election. A key sticking point has been Benazir's insistence that pending corruption charges in domestic and international courts be stayed -- something that may not be within the GOP's power to guarantee with respect to cases pending in Switzerland and Spain. (Note: A senior PPP figure has told us that Benazir believes she is also positioned to press the United States to help her escape from her legal entanglements. End note.) Benazir's intransigence has dismayed many party members, who fear that the party faces severe electoral challenges absent a deal with the GOP.


8. (C/NF) Musharraf will find it difficult to reach an agreement with the exiled leaders if they continue to make such a deal contingent on their return to Pakistan in advance of elections - although both have recently expressed some flexibility on this point. Musharraf has every reason to expect that, even if a deal is struck, the exiled leaders would still campaign on an anti-Musharraf, anti-Army platform. Under a worst-case scenario, they could generate precisely the kind of pre-election unrest that he hopes to avoid.

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