Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD19124
2006-09-27 13:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:
PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (4): THE UNIFORM
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 019124
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (4): THE UNIFORM
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 19121
B. ISLAMABAD 19122
C. ISLAMABAD 19123
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 019124
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (4): THE UNIFORM
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 19121
B. ISLAMABAD 19122
C. ISLAMABAD 19123
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) This cable, the fourth in a series mapping the
political terrain as Pakistan approaches nationwide elections
in 2007, reviews a uniquely Pakistani issues that will color
the run-up to presidential, provincial and federal
parliamentary elections: whether President Musharraf will
relinquish his post as Chief of Army Staff before seeking
re-election as President. Subsequent installments will
consider Musharraf's coalition options and recommendations
for U.S. assistance and political support for credible and
open elections.
2. (C) To the dismay of most Pakistani democracy activists
and opposition politicians, for seven years, Pervez Musharraf
has remained Chief of Army Staff (COAS) while serving as
Pakistan's Chief Executive and President. Whether Musharraf
must retire from the Army before seeking re-election as
President is a frequent topic of debate by Pakistan's
intelligentsia, as "the uniform" symbolizes both Musharraf's
core source of power and the military's recurrent domination
of the Pakistani body politic.
3. (C) Many Pakistani political analysts believe that
Musharraf is constitutionally barred both from (a) continuing
to serve concurrently as COAS and President beyond 2007 and
(b) seeking re-election to another term as President. The
first interpretation stems from the 17th Amendment to
Pakistan's Constitution, which specifically extended the time
that Musharraf may hold both offices until 2007. The second
rests upon a constitutional prohibition against Army officers
serving as elected federal officials until two years after
retiring from military service.
4. (C) Attorney General Makhdoom Ali Khan and other GOP
legal minds have offered alternative readings of the
Constitutional imperatives and prohibitions; not
surprisingly, their readings have not persuaded Musharraf's
opponents. A case now pending before the Supreme Court may
lead to a ruling on the uniform issue, but the Court will be
subject to intense pressure to rule in favor of the
President. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) could bypass the
Supreme Court and extend Musharraf's dual office role through
legislation. It would be difficult for the government to
pass a constitutional amendment to surmount barriers to
Musharraf serving another term as president, given its slim
majority; privately, however, leaders of the PPP and PML-N
have indicated significant flexibility on this issue if
Musharraf retires as COAS.
5. (C) Conversations with presidential advisors and family
members lead post to conclude that Musharraf is inclined to
relinquish his Army billet. Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed,
Secretary General of the governing Pakistan Muslim League
SIPDIS
(PML),has told post that Musharraf sought his counsel more
than a year ago on what is locally known as the "uniform
issue." Hussain prepared a two-page written recommendation
for Musharraf's personal review. The President subsequently
called Hussain to an intimate meeting joined by National
Security Advisor Tariq Aziz, whom the President had
separately tasked to draft his own a two-page paper.
According to Hussein, Musharraf said that he was uncertain
about the best way forward: even his family was divided on
the issue, with his daughter telling him to take off the
uniform, his son urging him to keep it. As it turned out,
both Hussein and Aziz gave him the same advice: the uniform
should go.
6. (C) Whatever his private inclinations, whether Musharraf
ISLAMABAD 00019124 002 OF 002
retires as COAS will depend on political developments over
the next year. Post expects that he will defer this decision
until late in the process, possibly after parliamentary
elections, to avoid becoming a lame duck in the interim and
creating an potentially unstable political environment.
Given the concentration of power in the Office of the
President over the recent years, even without his uniform,
President Musharraf would retain far more power and influence
than any of his civilian predecessors.
BODDE
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINR PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN ELECTIONS (4): THE UNIFORM
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 19121
B. ISLAMABAD 19122
C. ISLAMABAD 19123
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) This cable, the fourth in a series mapping the
political terrain as Pakistan approaches nationwide elections
in 2007, reviews a uniquely Pakistani issues that will color
the run-up to presidential, provincial and federal
parliamentary elections: whether President Musharraf will
relinquish his post as Chief of Army Staff before seeking
re-election as President. Subsequent installments will
consider Musharraf's coalition options and recommendations
for U.S. assistance and political support for credible and
open elections.
2. (C) To the dismay of most Pakistani democracy activists
and opposition politicians, for seven years, Pervez Musharraf
has remained Chief of Army Staff (COAS) while serving as
Pakistan's Chief Executive and President. Whether Musharraf
must retire from the Army before seeking re-election as
President is a frequent topic of debate by Pakistan's
intelligentsia, as "the uniform" symbolizes both Musharraf's
core source of power and the military's recurrent domination
of the Pakistani body politic.
3. (C) Many Pakistani political analysts believe that
Musharraf is constitutionally barred both from (a) continuing
to serve concurrently as COAS and President beyond 2007 and
(b) seeking re-election to another term as President. The
first interpretation stems from the 17th Amendment to
Pakistan's Constitution, which specifically extended the time
that Musharraf may hold both offices until 2007. The second
rests upon a constitutional prohibition against Army officers
serving as elected federal officials until two years after
retiring from military service.
4. (C) Attorney General Makhdoom Ali Khan and other GOP
legal minds have offered alternative readings of the
Constitutional imperatives and prohibitions; not
surprisingly, their readings have not persuaded Musharraf's
opponents. A case now pending before the Supreme Court may
lead to a ruling on the uniform issue, but the Court will be
subject to intense pressure to rule in favor of the
President. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) could bypass the
Supreme Court and extend Musharraf's dual office role through
legislation. It would be difficult for the government to
pass a constitutional amendment to surmount barriers to
Musharraf serving another term as president, given its slim
majority; privately, however, leaders of the PPP and PML-N
have indicated significant flexibility on this issue if
Musharraf retires as COAS.
5. (C) Conversations with presidential advisors and family
members lead post to conclude that Musharraf is inclined to
relinquish his Army billet. Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed,
Secretary General of the governing Pakistan Muslim League
SIPDIS
(PML),has told post that Musharraf sought his counsel more
than a year ago on what is locally known as the "uniform
issue." Hussain prepared a two-page written recommendation
for Musharraf's personal review. The President subsequently
called Hussain to an intimate meeting joined by National
Security Advisor Tariq Aziz, whom the President had
separately tasked to draft his own a two-page paper.
According to Hussein, Musharraf said that he was uncertain
about the best way forward: even his family was divided on
the issue, with his daughter telling him to take off the
uniform, his son urging him to keep it. As it turned out,
both Hussein and Aziz gave him the same advice: the uniform
should go.
6. (C) Whatever his private inclinations, whether Musharraf
ISLAMABAD 00019124 002 OF 002
retires as COAS will depend on political developments over
the next year. Post expects that he will defer this decision
until late in the process, possibly after parliamentary
elections, to avoid becoming a lame duck in the interim and
creating an potentially unstable political environment.
Given the concentration of power in the Office of the
President over the recent years, even without his uniform,
President Musharraf would retain far more power and influence
than any of his civilian predecessors.
BODDE