Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD18708
2006-09-21 13:12:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

EMBASSY ISLAMABAD-EMBASSY KABUL-CFC-A

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON PREF PTER EAID MASS PINR AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211312Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0941
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 6199
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 9320
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 1853
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY IMMEDIATE 9600
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0911
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE 7106
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 1644
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 2828
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 0148
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 8178
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 018708 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PREF PTER EAID MASS PINR AF
SUBJECT: EMBASSY ISLAMABAD-EMBASSY KABUL-CFC-A
CONSULTATIONS READ OUT

REF: A. GRENCIK-AGUILAR E-MAIL 09/14/06

B. ISLAMABAD 17766

Classified By: CDA Peter W. Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 018708

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PREF PTER EAID MASS PINR AF
SUBJECT: EMBASSY ISLAMABAD-EMBASSY KABUL-CFC-A
CONSULTATIONS READ OUT

REF: A. GRENCIK-AGUILAR E-MAIL 09/14/06

B. ISLAMABAD 17766

Classified By: CDA Peter W. Bodde, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is a joint Embassy Islamabad-Embassy Kabul-CFC-A
cable.


2. (S/NF) Summary. On September 12, select Embassy
Islamabad, Embassy Kabul and CFC-A personnel met to discuss
the security situation in the border areas and ways to
improve the political, economic and social ties between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Participants focused on President
Musharraf and President Karzai's upcoming visits to the U.S.
Both Embassies were encouraged by recent high-level meetings
between Pakistani and Afghan officials, but agreed that much
work remained to improve relations. Participants greeted the
North Waziristan agreement between the Government of Pakistan
(GOP) and tribal elders with cautious optimism, recommending
that the USG aggressively monitor the situation for the
presence of foreign fighters in North Waziristan and the
number of anti-coalition and ISAF incidents across the
border. Prior to the next consultations, participants will
promote further political exchanges between the Government of
Afghanistan (GOA) and GOP, monitor potential harmful elements
in refugee camps, and work to encourage economic ties between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. End summary.

Overview and Introduction
--------------

3. (C) On September 12, Ambassador Crocker, U.S. Ambassador
to Afghanistan Neumann, CFC-A Commander LTG Eikenberry, and
their senior staffs met at Embassy Islamabad. The group
discussed upcoming bilateral and trilateral meetings between
POTUS, President Musharraf of Pakistan, and President Karzai
of Afghanistan; assessed the Afghan-Pakistan relationship;

reviewed the border security situation; and discussed ways to
improve USG efforts in promoting economic, social, and
political development in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.


4. (S/NF) In his opening remarks Ambassador Crocker outlined
developments in Pakistan-Afghan relations, including recent
meetings of senior officials. He said that the working
groups would have a special responsibility to develop ideas
that could be forwarded to Washington to consider while
preparing for upcoming bilateral and trilateral meetings in
the U.S. (REF A)


5. (S/NF) Ambassador Neumann reported that President Karzai's
approach towards Pakistan had changed recently. President
Karzai was much more focused on assuring President Musharraf
that both Pakistan and Afghanistan had a common enemy.
Ambassador Neumann said Karzai "was not an instrumentalist.
He is not taken with organizational structures or confidence
building measures." President Karzai was concerned that
President Musharraf would not support a secular Pashtun-led
Afghan government over the long-term and noted Karzai needed
to be reassured in this regard. Ambassador Neumann described
the insurgency as getting worse in Afghanistan, with fighting
picking back up in the east and south, with Zabol
increasingly threatened.


6. (S/NF) LTG Eikenberry said that the political situation in
Afghanistan looked much better than the security situation.
He described the seriousness of the security challenges in
Afghanistan and the effort to neutralize mid-level Taliban
commanders, who used Pakistan both for sanctuary and as a
command and control base.

Update since previous consultations in June
--------------

7. (C/NF) Participants were encouraged by several important
developments in the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship since

ISLAMABAD 00018708 002 OF 004


the last consultations on 7 June. Both countries' national
security advisors, intelligence chiefs and presidents had met
since then. Although GOA and GOP relations had improved
since February/March, participants agreed much work remained
to eliminate lingering suspicions each government had of the
other. The group recommended continuing to encourage
exchanges between GOP and GOA political leaders.
Participants agreed to engage both governments to
reinvigorate an apparently dormant agreement between the GOP
and GOA to have regular ministerial-level meetings.

Upcoming Washington visits
--------------

8. (S/NF) Much of the discussion focused on preparing ideas
to send to Washington in the lead-up to President Musharraf's
and President Karzai's upcoming visits to the U.S. The
bilateral and trilateral meetings with President Bush will
provide an excellent opportunity to address and advance
important USG strategic interests, including the significant
upswing in violence in Afghanistan; questions concerning
President Karzai's leadership abilities; and Pakistan's
agreement with militants in North Waziristan. (Note: Ref A
were specific recommendations for POTUS bilateral and
trilateral meetings to SCA. End note.)

Border Security and North Waziristan Agreement
--------------

9. (S/NF) Presentations by CFC-A and Office of Defense
Representative Pakistan (ODRP) detailed the increase in
anti-coalition incidents along the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border in recent months. The command and control operations
for many of the anti-coalition incidents emanated from
Pakistan, particularly the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA). Key insurgent command and control nodes also
existed in Quetta, Peshawar and Miram Shah. Insurgents
exploited the Durand Line's porous nature to conduct
cross-border hit-and-run attacks from their sanctuary inside
Pakistan and used Pakistan as a base for recruiting new
militants, notably from border-area madrassas. ODRP briefed
that the GOP deployed 74,000 troops in the FATA. The
majority of the troops were not/not a part of the regular
army, but were poorly trained, ill equipped paramilitary
forces, including the Frontier Corps and civil armed forces.
Following the North Waziristan jirga agreement the GOP will
redeploy some forces from deep inside North Waziristan to
areas closer to the border, to be used at checkpoints and as
'rapid reaction forces.'


10. (S/NF) Meeting participants discussed at length the
strategic implications of the September 5 North Waziristan
Agency (NWA) jirga agreement between the GOP and tribal
elders (REF B). A CFC-A briefer presented diagrams showing
that, since the June cease-fire between the GOP and militant
groups operating out of NWA, attacks on coalition forces near
the NWA border had actually increased in frequency. Analysts
thus concluded that the cease-fire had not led to a decrease
in cross-border militant activity from the NWA. Some
analysts questioned whether the jirga agreement would succeed
in lowering anti-coalition militant support from the NWA,
since the cease-fire had failed to do so. Although
participants ultimately were cautiously optimistic that the
agreement could lead to improvements in border security,
there was consensus on the need to strongly emphasize to the
GOP that interested parties needed to see measurable results,
most importantly a decrease in attacks on coalition and ISAF
forces. Estimates of how long it would take to assess the
success of the agreement varied from sixty days to one year.
The group agreed there should not be a specific timetable for
judging the success of the agreement, but the USG would
continue to monitor the anti-coalition activities that
emanated out of Pakistan and the presence of foreign fighters
in the FATA. If anti-coalition activities near the Afghan
border did not drop, the USG would press the GOP for a

ISLAMABAD 00018708 003 OF 004


different solution.

Status of Afghan Refugees
--------------

11. (C/NF) The GOP was now focused on the mandatory
registration of Afghan refugees who were counted in the 2005
census and did not plan to close any more camps this year.
The participants recommended close monitoring of the
activities taking place in the remaining camps. Ambassador
Crocker noted that some of the refugee camps are breeding
grounds for unwelcome elements, including terrorists and
narco-traffickers. Islamabad RefCoord was making make
discreet inquiries with IO and NGO officials about the
security situation in the camps and would have a report by
November 1. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was now
manning check posts at large camps such as Girdi Jungle. Both
Ambassadors noted that an inter-agency effort was needed to
gain accurate USG reporting of activities in the remaining
refugee camps.

Economic and Social development
--------------

12. (SBU) Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) and FATA
development figured prominently in the discussions of
economic and social development. An ROZ assessment team
recently conducted a study in Pakistan and was currently in
Afghanistan. A final report covering both Afghanistan and
Pakistan was expected by late October. The USG seemed much
more interested in promoting the ROZ idea than either the GOP
or GOA. To make the ROZ concept successful, the GOP and GOA,
needed to take greater ownership of the ROZ proposal. Many
Afghans were very suspicious of the whole concept, assuming
that most of the economic benefits would flow to the
Pakistani side. Pakistan, in particular the private sector,
had to help convince their Afghan counterparts of the
economic benefits of working together. Participants proposed
supporting possible joint or parallel visits by Pakistani and
Afghan trade officials to study existing Qualified Industrial
Zones in Egypt and/or Jordan.


13. (SBU) USAID Pakistan had recently re-opened its office in
Peshawar after twelve years. The USAID development program
in the FATA mirrored national programs in terms of activities
related to health, education, and economic growth. USAID and
the UK's Department For International Development (DFID)
supported the FATA Secretariat in its efforts to develop a
FATA development strategy, which was expected to be finalized
in September. Capacity and ownership remained as two vital
concerns to FATA development and implementation of programs;
while the GOP had been increasing allocations in recent years
for development in the FATA, these funds had not been fully
spent because of a lack of capacity.


14. (C) There was discussion about moving a trilateral
economic process forward in a less formal way than through
U.S. participation in the Afghan-Pakistan Joint Economic
Commission, which meets infrequently and was not particularly
productive. Finally, USAID Afghanistan mentioned working
with the new Afghan Education Minister Atmar, perhaps jointly
with Minister Ghazi, to promote more moderate curricula in
the madrassas.

Conclusion
--------------

15. (S/NF) Participants agreed that the consultations were
productive in generating ideas to improve the political,
economic and security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan
and agreed to meet again in a few months. In the interim they
agreed to do the following:


-- Work towards increasing the number and frequency of
meetings between Pakistani and Afghan political leaders.

ISLAMABAD 00018708 004 OF 004



-- Aggressively monitor the North Waziristan jirgra
agreement for the presence of foreign fighters in North
Waziristan and cross border attacks on coalition and ISAF
forces.

-- Monitor the presence of unwanted elements, such as
terrorists and narco-traffickers, in refugee camps in
Pakistan.

-- Support possible joint or parallel visits by Pakistani
and Afghan trade officials to study existing Qualified
Industrial Zones in Egypt and/or Jordon.

-- Work with the new Afghan Education Minister and the
Pakistani Education Minister to promote moderate curricula in
Afghan madrassas.
BODDE