Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD17548
2006-09-04 07:38:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

BALOCHISTAN (7): FINDING A SOLUTION

Tags:  PK PREL PGOV PTER PINR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4086
OO RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #7548/01 2470738
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 040738Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9573
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 9581
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 1079
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 3785
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0891
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1619
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 6103
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7016
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9197
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 1763
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 2627
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 9990
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 7981
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 017548 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2016
TAGS: PK PREL PGOV PTER PINR
SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN (7): FINDING A SOLUTION

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 14349

B. ISLAMABAD 16269

C. ISLAMABAD 16944

D. ISLAMABAD 16962

E. ISLAMABAD 16987

F. ISLAMABAD 16994

G. IIR 6 873 0120 96

H. IIR 6 873 0140 93

I. IIR 6 873 0104 93

J. IIR 6 873 0142 92

K. ISLAMABAD 17546

L. ISLAMABAD 17547

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 017548

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2016
TAGS: PK PREL PGOV PTER PINR
SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN (7): FINDING A SOLUTION

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 14349

B. ISLAMABAD 16269

C. ISLAMABAD 16944

D. ISLAMABAD 16962

E. ISLAMABAD 16987

F. ISLAMABAD 16994

G. IIR 6 873 0120 96

H. IIR 6 873 0140 93

I. IIR 6 873 0104 93

J. IIR 6 873 0142 92

K. ISLAMABAD 17546

L. ISLAMABAD 17547

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: To bring peace to the restive province of
Balochistan, Islamabad must overcome pervasive distrust and
skepticism toward the central government and its proposed
development projects by ensuring the people of the province
-- Baloch and Pashtun alike -- are the first and main
beneficiaries of development. To accomplish this, Islamabad
must improve education in the province so that the youth of
Balochistan will be able to eventually take advantage of the
employment opportunities development offers. Long-term
government financial schemes that would help soothe
provincial hostility toward Islamabad remain bogged down in
inter-provincial rivalries. End summary. (Note: This cable,
the last in post's Balochistan Primer series, was researched
before the death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti on August 26 (Ref
C). End note.)


2. (U) Quetta journalists and NGO representatives in August
were adamant that the dispute between Balochistan and
Islamabad goes beyond the three big tribal sardars (leaders),
citing widespread alienation in Balochistan -- among both
Baloch and Pashtuns. Palwasha Jalalzai, a Pashtun working for
the NGO SEHER, said that youngsters across the province are
"really angry...they have had a long history of having
nothing." The main issue is the lack of job opportunities,
which stems, in part, from the poor educational institutions
in the province. Despite some grumbling that "it is better to
live in the stone age than to stay in Pakistan," Jalazai said
that youth support for the Baloch and Pashtun nationalist
movements is not enthusiastic. Balochistan's population

already sees jobs in the government's development projects
(e.g., the Gwadar port expansion),going to outsiders,
leading to fears that a flood of new (and better qualified)
Punjabi and Sindhi job-seekers are ready will pour into
Balochistan.

--------------
Parliament Tries to Appease
--------------


3. (C) Many Baloch and Pashtun nationalists see increased
autonomy and control over natural resources as the only means
to get a fair deal from Islamabad, because "so far, no
federal government has ever satisfied the Baloch people,"
Senator Shahid Hassan Bugti, Jahmhoori Watan Party. He noted
that "East Pakistan became Bangladesh because of suppression,
not because of autonomy." After the Bugti insurgency erupted
in early 2005, a parliamentary committee was formed to
resolve the dispute. The committee's November 2005 report
recommended steps to (a) increase economic opportunity in
Balochistan, (b) invest in social infrastructure, (c) limit
settler influence in elections, and (d) increase provincial
autonomy and control over gas revenues. Dr. Hayee Baloch,
Balochistan National Movement, told poloff that the
parliamentary committee recommendations were "not serious,"
as illustrated by the GOP's minimal implementation effort.

--------------
A Bigger Slice of the Federal Pie
--------------

ISLAMABAD 00017548 002 OF 003




4. (C) A central issue between the federal government and the
smaller provinces has been the distribution of federal funds
based solely on provincial population. In its final
recommendations, the parliamentary committee on Balochistan
stated that "level of development and degree of backwardness
should be foremost among the criteria" for distributing
federal funding. Since 2002, Islamabad has proposed amending
the distribution formula to take in other factors, such as
provincial backwardness/poverty. So far, the four provinces
have not agreed on a formula: while Balochistan and the NWFP
have excepted a multiple-factor formula that included
"backwardness/poverty," the dominant Punjab province wanted
population to be the sole criterion; Sindh, in a unique
twist, sought to include revenue collection as part of the
equation, because so much of the GOP's revenues are generated
in Karachi. Despite the backing of PML President Chaudhry
Shujaat, a Punjabi, for including "backwardness/poverty" in
the mix, the distribution formula has yet to be modified.

--------------
No Negotiations with Nawab Bugti
--------------


5. (S) In contrast to Islamabad's efforts to broker a new
finance deal with the provinces, the GOP was unwilling to
negotiate with Nawab Bugti, both the linchpin of armed Baloch
opposition to the GOP but also a leader who had been bought
off by previous governments. Both President Musharraf and
Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz have said that the government
will not allow sardars like the late Nawab Bugti to hinder
development or stop the government's effort to extend its
writ over Balochistan.


9. (C) Many Embassy contacts noted the advanced ages of the
three rebel sardars, arguing that Islamabad could wait for
them to die of natural causes, while whittling down tribal
power so their successors inherit weakened fighting forces.
The GOP could simultaneously exploit the anger among the
common people of Balochistan over the insurgents destruction
of provincial infrastructure. When the militants blow up
electric pylons or gas pipelines, people in Balochistan
suffer along with people in Punjab. The sardars have often
been derided by those outside their tribes for failing to
develop the province when they held political power. Rahila
Durrani, PML, asserted that Nawab Bugti and Sardar Attaullah
"did nothing when they had the chance."

--------------
No Baloch in the Army
--------------


10. (C) In a country in which the Army is an avenue to social
advancement and power, Baloch are chronically under
represented in its ranks. Many potential Baloch recruits do
not meet the military's minimum education requirements.
Others countered that Baloch do not join because they do not
want to become "servants of Punjab." According to DAO
reporting (reftels),the Pakistan Army has tried since the
early 1990s to redress its ethnic imbalance, but had
difficulty recruiting Baloch with at least an eighth grade
education (a lower standard than applied to other recruits).

--------------
Talibanization Doubtful
--------------


11. (C) Poloff's interlocutors were nearly unanimous in
doubting that "Talibanization" could take root in
Balochistan. The most vulnerable demographic, as in other
parts of the Muslim world, is the province's alienated,
unemployed youth, who might be attracted to the appeal of
religious extremism. Even so, post's interlocutors believe
that there is a limit to religious political influence in the
province, noting that the JUI has been a major political

ISLAMABAD 00017548 003 OF 003


party in the province since the early 1970s, but today holds
only a quarter of the seats in the provincial assembly.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) To ease provincial tension and implement its
development plans smoothly, Islamabad must overcome decades
of mistrust. Baloch mistrust of Islamabad runs very, very
deep: contacts in Quetta told poloff to expect very little
celebrating on August 14 -- Pakistan's Independence Day --
because the Baloch view the date as "the day that all our
troubles started." Almost all opposition political leaders
related stories of how Punjabis or Sindhis were given
preference in government hiring in Balochistan, and of the
government using "the agencies" -- shorthand for intelligence
services such as Military Intelligence and Inter-Services
Intelligence -- to pressure them. To overcome Baloch
skepticism, the government must bolster the province's
education system, so that local people can compete for the
jobs. GOP leaders are already proceeding along this path,
separating recalcitrant sardars from the general population
by promising education, development and employment. End
comment.
BODDE