Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD17547
2006-09-04 07:31:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

BALOCHISTAN (6): THE NATIONALIST INSURGENCY

Tags:  PK PREL PGOV PTER PINR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 017547 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2016
TAGS: PK PREL PGOV PTER PINR
SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN (6): THE NATIONALIST INSURGENCY

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 14349

B. ISLAMABAD 16269

C. ISLAMABAD 16944

D. ISLAMABAD 16962

E. ISLAMABAD 16987

F. ISLAMABAD 16994

G. IIR 6 873 0346 06

H. IIR 6 873 0344 06

I. ISLAMABAD 17546

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 017547

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2016
TAGS: PK PREL PGOV PTER PINR
SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN (6): THE NATIONALIST INSURGENCY

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 14349

B. ISLAMABAD 16269

C. ISLAMABAD 16944

D. ISLAMABAD 16962

E. ISLAMABAD 16987

F. ISLAMABAD 16994

G. IIR 6 873 0346 06

H. IIR 6 873 0344 06

I. ISLAMABAD 17546

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary/Introduction: Despite widespread
disillusionment with Islamabad, the most recent tribal
uprising led by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti is a localized
insurrection, in which the Nawab had rhetorical support from
Baloch nationalists, but little concrete backing in the
province-at-large. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) responded
with a hard line, eschewing negotiations and using the Army
and Frontier Corps (FC) to physically isolate Bugti and his
fighters. Tribal militants relied on sabotage, especially of
gas pipelines, and ambush to attack GOP forces and
development projects. While many Baloch -- and Pashtuns in
the province -- are sympathetic to Nawab Bugti's cause,
support is tempered by the belief that he fought for personal
gain, rather than the province's welfare, and that his
tactics of destroying economic infrastructure hurt the people
of the province as much as the government. This cable on the
insurgency is the sixth in a series on the current political
situation in Balochistan. End summary/introduction. (Note:
This cable was researched before the death of Nawab Akbar
Khan Bugti on August 26, 2006. (Ref C) End note.)


2. (C) The latest Baloch tribal insurrection erupted in early
2005, as Nawab Bugti, leader of the Bugti tribe, used the
rape of a female doctor at the Sui gas facility as a pretext
to attack the government in and around his home district of
Dera Bugti. The government responded with force,
significantly enlarging the Frontier Corps (FC) and Army
presence in the area. A cease-fire was reached and largely
implemented by April 2005, but tribal attacks on gas
pipelines, electricity pylons, train lines, and other
infrastructure continued. The fighting picked up in December

2005, when Marri tribesmen were linked to the December 14
rocket attack on President Musharraf as he visited an FC base
in Kohlu, the proposed site of an Army cantonment in the
heart of Marri territory.

--------------
The Tactics
--------------


3. (S) The paramilitary FC has spearheaded this latest
crackdown, backed by military air power and army artillery.
The security forces first moved to secure the gas fields at
Sui and Loti in Bugti territory. Subsequently, they took
control of coal fields to the northwest. Most fighting has
been confined to the ethnically Baloch districts of eastern
Balochistan, in particular Dera Bugti and the adjacent Kohlu
district. The tribal militants rely on hit-and-run tactics
against "soft targets," especially unguarded stretches of gas
pipeline. According to DAO-Islamabad, the militants do not
have the firepower for a head-on confrontation with the
security forces. (Note: That said, the insurgents can use
their limited arsenals quite effectively, as illustrated by
the December 2005 attack on a helicopter carrying FC
Commander Major General Dar, wounding him in both legs. End
note.) While many attacks on economic installations have
been blamed on the "Balochistan Liberation Army," a
nom-de-guerre associated with Nawab Marri, fighting in recent
months seems to have been conducted exclusively by Nawab
Bugti's fighters.


4. (S) The GOP response to the insurgency has been overseen

ISLAMABAD 00017547 002 OF 004


by the Director General of Military Intelligence, Nadeem
Ijaz, a Musharraf protg Supported by other high-ranking
military leadership, he eschewed calls for negotiations with
Nawab Bugti. The government tactics were to initially attack
the militant hideouts or strongholds with helicopter gunships
and/or fighter-jets, and then to follow up with ground
forces. According to DAO-Islamabad, the military has been
reluctant to engage the militants at night, despite being
equipped with and trained in the use of night-vision devices
and night operations using helicopters.


5. (C) The Army and FC have moved steadily, if slowly, from
road to road, ridge to ridge, to hem in Bugti's forces. The
scarcity of water in the province slowed operations, but the
sustained advance drove many Bugti fighters to surrender.
Throughout the summer, Bugti "commanders" with two or three
dozen men and their weaponry surrendered to the government on
a regular basis. Some Embassy contacts have been skeptical
about the reported surrenders by Bugti's warriors: an
ethnic-Pashtun interlocutor told poloff that the reported
surrenders were "all propaganda," reminding him of the "false
stories" about Bengali militants surrendering to GOP forces
in East Pakistan in the years immediately before Bangladesh's
independence. The August edition of the newsmagazine "The
Herald" asserted that the government has provided cash
payments and renovated homes to entice militants into
surrendering.



6. (S) The government now controls roads and key districts,
through a combination of troop deployments and the
reintroduction of cooperative tribes, many of whom were
driven out of the area by Nawab Bugti during past
insurgencies prompted by GOP moves to tap the region's
natural resources. For example, the Kalpar Bugtis are one of
at least four tribes moving back into the region with GOP
assistance. Originally, the dominant Bugti sub-tribe in Sui,
the Kalpars took advantage of the economic benefits the gas
fields provided. When they began to assert themselves in the
1980s and early 1990s, they ran afoul of Nawab Bugti, who
drove thousands of Kalpars off the land. Now the government
is using the Kalpars and other tribes to back fill the towns
in which they have taken control.


7. (U) On August 24 (two day's before Nawab Bugti's death in
an assault by GOP security forces),government-allied Bugti
sub-tribes held what was described as a "first-ever" tribal
jirga in Dera Bugti. Thousands of tribesmen attended the
jirga, at which they declared the end to the Nawabi system
and pledged their support to the government, according to
press reports. Traditionalists have rejected the jirga's
declaration: the hereditary Khan of Kalat asserted that the
jirga's declarations would have no impact on tribal
traditions and that the tribal system was becoming stronger
with the passage of time, not weaker.

--------------
Development as a Weapon
--------------


8. (C) The DGMI has told DAO that an important element in
marginalizing the militants is the construction of
infrastructure in the province, including roads. The FC has
plans to build school in the Balochistan. The military is
pressing forward with the construction of cantonments at Dera
Bugti, Kohlu, Sui, and Gwadar. These cantonments are a major
source of antagonism between the Baloch tribes and Islamabad,
as they provide a base for the GOP to assert authority in the
province. Akhtar Mengal, a former chief minister in the late
1990s and son of nationalist leader Sardar Attaullah Mengal,
said that "the cantonments are there to crush Baloch
nationalists."


9. (S) The GOP sought to isolate Nawab Bugti and the other
sardars politically, even as it waged a ground-and-air war

ISLAMABAD 00017547 003 OF 004


against the insurgents. The DGMI provided DAO with a gruesome
pictorial report titled "Terror in Balochistan," documenting
those killed and injured -- including young children -- by
insurgent attacks, as well as sabotage to infrastructure such
as gas pipelines, electricity pylons, and train tracks.
President Musharraf has publicly accused Nawab Bugti and the
two other sardars selfishly opposing provincial development
that would benefit Balochistan and the nation. In his July 20
televised speech to the nation, Musharraf indulged in an
extended tirade against Nawab Bugti, signaling his disgust by
saying that he would no longer accord Bugti the title of
Nawab (prince). Musharraf vowed that Baloch militants would
not derail development, saying, the GOP must "establish the
writ of the government and end the writ of the
sardars...security is paramount to our development schemes."

--------------
Alliance with Taliban or al-Qaeda?
--------------


10. (C) Embassy contacts were nearly unanimous in stating
that Nawab Bugti and the other Baloch sardars would not form
an alliance with either the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Poloff was
repeatedly told that the Baloch are secular and liberal,
including the sardars. "Our national interests clash with the
mullahs," said Dr. Hayee Baloch, a non-tribal nationalist
leader from the Makran Coast. "We are 100 percent against the
mullahs." This antipathy stems, in part, from the perception
among the Baloch that the ulema either are supporters of
Pashtun interests or are backers of Islamabad's interests.
Even Sarwar Kaker, a moderate Pashtun PML Senator,
acknowledged that the GOP has used the mullahs over the years
to undercut Baloch nationalist political parties...a tactic
the Baloch will not forget.

--------------
The Baloch Weapons' Suppliers
--------------


11. (S) The Baloch militias appear to be buying their weapons
from smugglers from Afghanistan, according to Embassy
contacts. These weapons are being run into the country by
hard-core criminal gangs, said Director General of the
National Police Bureau Muhammad Shoaib Suddle, who served
three tours with the police in the province. "They are not
doing it for tribal affinity; they are doing it for money."
The DGMI says it is easy to get weapons from narcotics
traffickers in the region. The GOP worries that Afghanistan
and India, the latter through its consulates in Afghanistan
and Iran, are providing funding and lethal aid to the Baloch
insurgents. (Note: Embassy has no evidence that India is
providing support to the Baloch insurgency through its
consulates in Afghanistan and Iran. End note.) Indian
financial assistance to the Baloch nationalists, if it
exists, could also be funneled through Baloch expatriates in
the Persian Gulf states who remit funds to the province.

--------------
Support for Nawab Bugti -- How Broad?
--------------


12. (C) While many in the province understood Nawab Bugti's
battle against the central government, not all supported his
methods. Some embassy contacts noted that, in an
underdeveloped province, the militants were destroying what
little economic infrastructure existed. Journalists in Quetta
told poloff in August that common people believe that Nawab
Bugti exploited national grievances for his own purposes,
hindering development to maintain his control over his tribe.
A contact in the National Police Bureau described Bugti as
fighting by himself, with the support of only a few Marris;
the Mengals had already distanced themselves from him.


13. (C) Senator Mahmood Khan Achakzai of Balochistan of the
Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP),thinks that Nawab

ISLAMABAD 00017547 004 OF 004


Bugti miscalculated in challenging the government, saying
that the Bugtis were not prepared for a sustained fight.
Given the Nawab's history of switching to the government's
side, Achakzai believes that the Nawab expected a minor show
of force would lead to more government concessions. (Note: In
2005, the Pakistani military's top spokesman said the
government paid Nawab Bugti millions of rupees annually, as
well as fringe benefits, because of the gas fields in Bugti
tribal territory. End note.)

--------------
Comment
--------------


14. (C) Comment: Only a few weeks before his death, Embassy
interlocutors portrayed Nawab Bugti as a revered nationalist
leader, but one on the verge of passing from the political
scene. Even Baloch nationalist leaders, while praising
Bugti's leadership over the decades, had little positive to
say in early August about his last battle against the
government. While some in Balochistan believe the GOP
intentionally picked a fight with Bugti, all understood that
Islamabad intended to subdue him first, before turning to the
Marri and Mengal tribes, in order to ensure that federal
development projects and foreign investment could move ahead.
End comment.

BODDE