Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD16994
2006-08-29 10:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

BALOCHISTAN (4): WHO'S WHO - THE BALOCH TRIBES

Tags:  PK PREL PGOV PTER PINR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 016994 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA MARKINGS)

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015
TAGS: PK PREL PGOV PTER PINR
SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN (4): WHO'S WHO - THE BALOCH TRIBES

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 14349

B. ISLAMABAD 16269

C. ISLAMABAD 16944

D. ISLAMABAD 16962

E. ISLAMABAD 16987

ISLAMABAD 00016994 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 016994

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA MARKINGS)

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015
TAGS: PK PREL PGOV PTER PINR
SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN (4): WHO'S WHO - THE BALOCH TRIBES

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 14349

B. ISLAMABAD 16269

C. ISLAMABAD 16944

D. ISLAMABAD 16962

E. ISLAMABAD 16987

ISLAMABAD 00016994 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and Introduction: The Baloch people give their
name to Balochistan Province in Pakistan, where roughly two
thirds of them live, as well as Sistan-va-Baluchestan
Province in Iran. The Baloch are further spread across the
southern reaches of Afghanistan. Baloch society is tribal,
with power traditionally concentrated in the hands of
autocratic princes, known as "sardars," who have near
totalitarian control over the lives of their tribes. Baloch
nationalist and tribal leaders share a fundamental belief
that the federal government has not given the province its
fair share of the region's mineral wealth, but many
non-sardari nationalists disapprove of the violent tactics
employed by some tribal leaders to wring concessions out of
the federal government. There seems little support in the
province, beyond the Bugti tribe, for the current insurgency.
Nationalist leaders admit that calls for Baloch independence
are nothing more than political rhetoric, and that they
really want a voice in the province,s development and a
greater percentage of the revenues generated by the
province's natural resources. This cable is the fourth in a
series of cables on Balochistan. (Note: This cable was
drafted prior to the reported death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti
on August 26 (Ref C). End note.) End summary.

--------------
Sub-Provincial Cleavages
--------------


2. (C) The concerns and demands of the people of the Makran
Coast, where the seaport of Gwadar is located, differ from
those of the tribes of eastern Balochistan, home of the
province,s natural gas and coal fields. The coastal region
is not dominated by tribal sardars as is the eastern quarter.
It is less tribal, better educated, more middle class and

politically aware than the rest of province.


3. (C/NF) The eastern portion of Balochistan has been dominated
by three sardars (Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Nawab Khair Bux
Marri, and Sardar Attaullah Mengal. These three sardars, out
of more than 60 in the province, have each been alternately
in and out of government and in and out of jail; the common
denominator between them is their militant opposition to the
federal government in Islamabad. The tribal society that
these sardars oversee has been described as "feudal
militarism," in which the sardars call upon tribal militias
to assert their power. The traditional exchange underlying
this system is for the sardars to dispense booty or property
rights in return for support. This system basically remains
intact, but today favors are generally traded for votes. The
system, however, has been criticized for enriching the
sardars but not their followers. There are around 46 Baloch
tribes--he major ones include the Bugti, Marri, Mengal,
Bizenjo, Jamali, and Rind--and roughly 70 sardars in
Balochistan.


4. (C) Some Baloch nationalists, while sympathetic to the
sardars' demands, disapprove of their violence, seeing their
brand of nationalism as self-serving and noting that most
Baloch people would be satisfied with greater home-rule
within Pakistan.

--------------
The Big Three
--------------


5. (C/NF) Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, who was 79 when killed in an

ISLAMABAD 00016994 002.2 OF 003


August 26, 2006 GOP attack on his mountain hiding place (Ref
C),had led his tribe since 1946. He has served as provincial
governor, provincial chief minister and as a member of the
National Assembly as late as 1999. He also led intermittent
armed rebellions against the federal government since the
1970s. Favoring expansive provincial autonomy and open to
independence, Bugti could also be motivated by cash and is
rumored to have been bought off by the government at various
points in his career. Nawab Bugti was widely believed to have
pocketed the vast majority of royalties from the Sui gas
fields on his tribe's territory, rather than spreading the
wealth amongst the tribe or investing in development projects
in his tribal territory. Often mired in local tribal and
honor issues to the detriment of his political goals, he lead
the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP),which has four seats in the
provincial assembly, one in the National Assembly, and two in
the federal Senate. His militia had an estimated 5,000
fighters in 2004, but has been decimated by Pakistani
security forces during recent months of fighting.


6. (C/NF) Nawab Khair Bux Marri, an octogenarian, lives in
Karachi and has the reputation of being a leftist and an
uncompromising hardliner. Although he publicly demands
complete independence for Balochistan, he may also negotiate
with the government to avoid being left out on development
funds and royalties. According to one Embassy interlocutor,
Marri is able to rule his tribe from Karachi because he has
built a tribal "institution" that does not depend on his
presence. Like Bugti, he has fought the government
intermittently over the decades. His tribal territory
includes the mountainous stretches of Kohlu and Loralai
districts, an area thought to have oil reserves, but in which
Marri has blocked exploration. He heads the Baloch Haq Tawar
party, which only has representation at the district level.
His militia is also estimated at roughly 5,000 men, and is
usually considered the have the best-trained and most
hardcore fighters. Many believe that the elusive Balochistan
Liberation Army (BLA) is actually an avatar of Marri's
militia.


7. (C/NF) Sardar Attaullah Mengal, age mid 70s, is the most
politically active and astute of the three rebel sardars,
leading the militarily weaker but more numerous Mengal tribe.
He served as Balochistan's Chief Minister in 1971-73. Unlike
Nawabs Bugti and Marri, Mengal has sought to broaden his
nationalist appeal beyond his tribe. He controls the areas of
Khuzdar, Kharan, and parts of Bolan and Sibi. He has provided
political support to the current uprising; some evidence
indicates that his tribe has supplied guns and funds to Bugti
and Marri. His roughly 4,000-strong militia has not joined in
the 2005-06 insurgency. He leads the Balochistan National
Party-Mengal (BNP-M),which has two seats in the provincial
assembly, one in the National Assembly, and one in the
federal Senate. His son Akhtar Mengal was Balochistan's chief
minister in 1997.

--------------
Other Major Baloch Players
--------------


8. (C) Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch, president of the National
Party, trained as a medical doctor but made his career in
politics. Born in Bolan, he entered politics in the Gwadar
area. His National Party represents the non-sardari Baloch
middle class in urban areas, and the coastal Makran
population. He favors the abolition of the sardari system,
believing that the sardars are fighting for their own
financial benefit and not the province's. He believes
increased provincial autonomy is critical for the
Balochistan's development and opposes political rights for
Settlers, but condemns violence. The National Party has four
seats in the provincial assembly and one in the federal
Senate.


9. (C) Mohim Khan Baloch is a middle class politician who

ISLAMABAD 00016994 003.2 OF 003


heads the Balochistan National Party-Awami (BNP-A). He favors
provincial autonomy but opposes independence. He lost much of
his popular credibility when he broke ranks with the other
nationalist leaders and joined the Musharraf government in
2002, largely to obtain a Senate seat. His condemnation of
GOP actions during the current insurrection cost him his
Senate seat earlier this year. The BNP-A's five seats in the
provincial assembly are part of the ruling coalition, and the
party has one seat in the federal Senate, which it picked up
in the election that Mohim Khan Baloch was defeated.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C/NF) Currently, there is little unity among the Baloch
nationalists or among the sardars. In the provincial assembly
the nationalist and sardar parties hold just ten of 65 seats;
the Pakistan Muslim League, which President Musharraf relies
on to run the country, has 23 seats in the assembly, and
rules in tandem with the religious coalition Muttahida
Majlis-i-Amal, which has 17 seats. In the national assembly
the nationalist and sardari parties hold a handful of the 342
seats. Fractured by tribal affiliation, geography, political
orientation, and personal rivalry, Baloch are unlikely to
make common cause against the Government--which explains the
Army's emerging strategy of taking on the sardars one by one,
while concurrently promising to address the overall
grievances of the Baloch tribes. End comment.
BODDE