SOUTH WAZIRISTAN PARLIAMENTARIANS POSITIVE ON LOYA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 015543

SIPDIS

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2016
TAGS: PK PREL PTER PGOV
SUBJECT: SOUTH WAZIRISTAN PARLIAMENTARIANS POSITIVE ON LOYA
JIRGA

REF: PESHAWAR 413

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Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Two senior and well-connected participants in the
North Waziristan jirga expect the assembly to succeed and to
issue binding decisions within 10-15 days. While not
divulging the details of each side's negotiating positions,
they report that if the jirga is successful, it will result
in the expulsion of foreigners from North Waziristan and end
cross-border infiltration into Afghanistan. End summary.


2. (C) On August 4, during a one-week break in the North
Waziristan jirga, Polcouns met in Islamabad with two
participants: South Waziristan Senator Saleh Shah Qureshi and
South Waziristan MNA Maulana Mirajuddin. Both were
optimistic that the jirga would achieve its key objectives
within 10-15 days.

Structure and Participation
--------------


3. (C) Saleh and Mirajuddin confirmed that the jirga
consists of 45 tribal representatives, including at least
three from each of the seven tribal agencies. The majority
of members are from North and South Waziristan. Participants
include three MNAs and one Senator; the rest are a mix of
respected tribal figures. Saleh explained that NWFP Governor
Orakzai had consulted with tribal representatives for two
months before finalizing participation. The resulting group
is truly authoritative; it represents all parties,
controlling both locals and foreigners. Saleh maintained
that with the inauguration of the jirga on July 20,
cross-border infiltration had ceased -- a demonstration, he
asserted, of the jirga's authority. Saleh added that tribal
participants were representative and had the stature to also
speak for tribes on the Afghan side of the border; indeed,
the idea had been discussed in the jirga that if it were
successful, it could be extended to include the Americans and
address the situation in Afghanistan.


4. (C) The two explained that while the jirga was in
session, the 45 members met during the day with militants at
a location in Miranshah, North Waziristan. In the evening,
they retreated to a GOP guest house in Miranshah where they
held meetings with the Political Agent and other GOP
representatives. The group would meet with Governor Orakzai
during the week of August 6, then return to Miranshah. They
expected that jirga would wrap up and start implementing
decisions in 10-15 days (i.e., by August 13-18). The
decisions would be binding on both sides.

Process and Objectives
--------------


5. (C) By way of background, Mirajuddin observed that
current problems in the FATA were largely the consequence of
developments in Afghanistan in recent years. On the one
hand, foreigners had arrived and, in violation of tribal
tradition, they had resorted to violence. On the other hand,
the Pakistan Army had also violated tribal tradition by using
violence, to which the tribes were obliged to respond in
kind. Both Saleh and Mirajuddin insisted that the anti-GOP
militancy was a broad-based tribal response to the army's
incursions and resort to violence; attributing it to
"Taliban" was merely propaganda. They and other tribal
leaders had long urged the government to address the conflict
via a jirga, and they were hopeful that the current jirga
process would resolve matters to the satisfaction of all
parties. If the jirga failed, there could be little hope of
resolving the conflict because no other jirga could match the
prestige of the current one.


6. (C) Saleh and Mirajuddin explained that the current jirga

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is an arbitration mechanism to resolve the dispute between
the militants and the GOP. According to tradition, such a
process could only begin once three conditions are met. The
sides must lay down their weapons, release prisoners, and
return any assets into the custody of the jirga. In the
current jirga, this third condition meant the army must
withdraw from its posts in North Waziristan. This process
has begun: a cease-fire is in place, prisoners have been
exchanged and the army has vacated some positions. The jirga
is now dealing with other substantive demands by the
government. Saleh and Mirajuddin were reluctant to divulge
these demands, saying that the jirga code required
confidentiality. Saleh did volunteer that if the jirga were

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successful, foreigners would be expelled and infiltration
into Afghanistan would stop.


7. (C) When asked what leverage the Pakistan Government
would have to ensure compliance once the jirga's
preconditions were met, they responded that the government
would have the ability to sanction tribes for non-compliance
under the Frontier Crimes Regulations. (Note: The FCR is a
criminal code dating back to the British Raj whereby the
tribes largely govern themselves, but the federal government
has recourse to collective punishment when necessary. End
Note.) Also, if (as they hoped) the Pakistan Army were to
withdraw, the Frontier Corps would remain as a
law-enforcement presence that was acceptable to the tribes.
Moreover, the prestige of the jirga was such that violating
its binding provisions would bring dishonor.


8. (C) According to Saleh and Mirajuddin, the objective of
the jirga is to achieve a reconciliation between the
government and the militants such that no-one will be
threatened, either in North Waziristan, in Afghanistan or in
the international community. The jirga is focusing
exclusively on resolving the militancy in North Waziristan,
they said; if the need arose to resolve disputes in other
tribal areas, the jirga could be reconvened or a new one
could be formed. The jirga is not discussing development
projects or socio-economic incentives that might help
facilitate a settlement.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) President Musharraf has been clear that while he
strongly supports the jirga, his redlines are that the
foreigners must be expelled and cross-border attacks must
stop. This message has clearly sunk in with the jirga
members. The fact that the jirga focuses only on one Agency
certainly leaves open the possibility that these phenomena
might shift to other agencies. Nonetheless, if the jirga is
successful in North Waziristan (the hardest case) it will be
an important signal to the tribes in other Agencies --
especially coming as it did on the heels of Pakistan military
operations (reftel). Orakzai may have constituted the jirga
-- with members from every agency -- with this contingency in
mind, namely that it might be called on to address conflicts
in other agencies as well.


10. (C) The jirga is a tried-and-true mechanism for solving
immediate, discrete problems. It is not/not focused on the
long-term political, security and economic challenges that
must be addressed if the Tribal Areas as a whole are to
evolve into a region less hospitable to militants. We will
continue to work with our Pakistani counterparts as they
develop a comprehensive strategy for the area.
CROCKER