A PRIMER ON BALOCHISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 014349

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015
TAGS: PK PREL PGOV KTER
SUBJECT: A PRIMER ON BALOCHISTAN

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Derived from DSCG 05-01, d


1. (C) Summary: This cable--the first in a series of cables
on the province--is intended to serve as a primer on
Balochistan, Pakistan's largest, least developed, and most
sparsely populated province. Other cables in this series will
cover the tribal and ethnic political dynamics of the
province, the insurgency, and Islamabad's plans for
overcoming the insurgency. This message covers basic
geographical and statistical information, as well as an
ethnic breakdown of the province. The Government of Pakistan
in recent years has invested heavily in the province to tap
its mineral wealth and to turn it into a regional
transportation hub. However, since 1948, Balochistan has been
plagued by an on-again, off-again insurgency led by
ethnically Baloch tribal leaders. The insurgency flared up
again in early 2005 with tribal militants blowing up gas
pipelines and electricity pylons; the GOP began a concerted
crackdown last December after insurgents fired rockets at an
army base near Kohlu that President Musharraf was visiting.
Baloch discontent today centers on what they say is the
unfair distribution of the natural resources and revenue
generated in the province. Baloch argue that the province
should receive a disproportionate share of the revenues
generated by its mineral wealth because it has greater
development needs than the other provinces. For example, the
Baloch point out that pipelines from natural gas fields in
the province were run to cities in Punjab decades before they
reached the provincial capital, Quetta. Most of the recent
fighting has been confined to the eastern portion of the
province, but some high profile violence has occurred along
the Makran Coast, including the killings of Chinese engineers
involved with the construction of a deep sea port at Gwadar.
End Summary.

Geography



3. (U) Balochistan is a parched and inhospitable land. While
rich in minerals, geologists have compared Balochistan's
terrain to Mars. Pakistan's nuclear testing site is in
Balochistan. To the east and northeast, Balochistan borders
all three of Pakistan's other provinces as well as the
southernmost of the seven Federally Administered Tribal
Agencies, South Waziristan. To the north, Balochistan shares
borders with the Afghan provinces of Nimruz, Helmand,
Qandahar, Zabol and Paktika. To the west it borders the
Iranian province of Sistan-va-Baluchestan. On the south,
Balochistan has more than 770 kilometers of coastline along
the Arabian Sea.


4. (U) Area: At 347,190 square kilometers Balochistan is
slightly smaller than Montana, and makes up nearly 44 percent
of Pakistan's total area.

Socio-Economic Indicators



5. (U) Balochistan's population of 7.1 million (according to
May 2003 government estimate) accounts for roughly 5.1
percent of Pakistan's total population. The province's
population density of 19 people per square kilometer compares
to a national average of 166 and an average of 358 in Punjab.


6. (U) The average literacy rate of the province is 31
percent, compared to a national average of 49 percent. Girls
make up less than 37 percent of the primary through high
school enrollment, and according to provincial government
statistics, out of the number of students attending primary
school, less than 16 percent of boys and 13 percent of girls
go on to middle school. Baloch nationalists believe that the
low education levels stem from federal government neglect.


7. (U) Balochistan's per capita income is roughly USD 160,
less than one-fifth of the national average of approximately
USD 850.

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8. (U) Natural resources include gas, coal, gold, copper,
iron, marble, gypsum, and limestone. The province produces
more than 40 percent of Pakistan's primary energy (natural
gas, coal, and electricity),but while natural gas generates
USD 1.4 billion in annual revenues, the province receives
back just USD 116 million a year in royalties, or 8 percent,
one of the major causes of friction between the nationalists
and the federal government. Industries include cotton,
woolen, and leather goods, iron and steel production, silk
and rayon manufacturing, cement factories, and jute
production.

Infrastructure and Reserves



9. (U) The Sui gas field, through 2005, had produced
approximately 45 percent of Pakistan's domestic natural gas,
however remaining reserves at the Sui field are now a third
of the original total, equaling about 12.5 percent of
Pakistan's total natural gas reserves.


10. (U) The Chinese operated copper and gold mine in Saindak,
which has more than 400 million metric tons of reserves,
generated nearly USD 170 million of exportable revenues in

2003. In 2004 the Saindak operation employed nearly 1,200
Pakistani and just over 300 Chinese workers. The federal
government receives a 2 percent annual royalty from the
operation.


11. (U) The recently discovered Rekodiq copper-gold deposit
in northwestern Balochistan near Saindak, with its estimated
940 million metric tons of reserves, is potentially one of
the largest in the world, and is set to be mined by a
Canadian-Chilean joint venture. The Balochistan government
has a 25 percent stake in the project.


12. (U) Reserves at the Dilband iron-ore deposit are
estimated at 200 million metric tons. The province has just
over 200 million metric tons of coal reserves, a fraction of
Punjab's 175 billion tons of reserves.


13. (U) Infrastructure: The USD 1.1 billion Gwadar deepwater
cargo and naval port when completed will provide Pakistan
with its third major port facility and act as a major outlet
for Pakistani trade with Afghanistan and the central Asian
republics. Gwadar will have a dozen multipurpose berths,
including two oil terminals, and the latest generation of
containerized cargo handling facilities. The port opening has
been delayed--it was scheduled to open in June after a
second-stage dredging--and top GOP officials have been unable
to say when the port will open. China has invested heavily in
the project, providing USD 198 million of the USD 248 million
cost of the project's first phase. Analysts have suggested
that this is a strategic investment to enable China to take
advantage of the port's proximity to the Persian Gulf and
China's westernmost province, Xinjiang. The GOP and Beijing
have already discussed building an oil refinery and possibly
a pipeline between Balochistan and Xinjiang. Balochistan is
also a possible transit route for pipelines from Turkmenistan
to the Arabian Sea or India, and from Iran to India.

Government



14. (U) Like other provinces, Balochistan has a Provincial
Assembly and Chief Minister, with a Governor appointed by the
federal President. Federal level representation consists of
17 Members of the National Assembly (out of 342 seats) and 22
members of the federal Senate (out of 100 seats).


15. (U) Currently the province is governed by a coalition of
the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The MMA contingent is composed almost
exclusively of Pashtun members of the
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam/Fazlur Rehman Faction (JUI/F). The

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Baloch are divided between the nationalist parties and the
PML. The nationalists hold just under a quarter of the seats
in the assembly.


16. (U) The province is divided into 26 administrative
districts. Major cities and towns include the provincial
capital Quetta, Kalat, Khuzdar, Kohlu, Loralai, and Zhob.

Ethnic Snapshot



17. (C) The Baloch, with 45 percent of the population, are
the dominant ethnic group in most of the province. However,
Pashtuns, with 38 percent, are the most populous in the
northeastern quarter. As of December 2005, there were also
683,000 Afghan refugees in the province, according to UNHCR.
Many Baloch nationalists claim that the Baloch make up as
much as 60 percent of the province's population, asserting
such a high percentage because these nationalists fear that
the Baloch are becoming a minority in their own province.
This fear is fueled, in part, by a rising tide of Punjabi and
Sindhi settlers who have entered the province to find work in
projects such as Gwadar. The Baloch and Pashtuns live in
their own "defined areas," according to one Embassy contact.
The majority of Baloch are Hanafi Sunni Muslims. The Baloch
tribal system has been described as "feudal militarism," with
power concentrated in the hands of local tribal leaders or
powerful Sardars. (Note: This contrasts sharply with the far
more egalitarian Pashtun tribal society. End note).


18. (C) Currently, the most powerful sardars--each with a
substanital militia--are those of the Bugti, Marri, and
Mengal tribes, all of whom have been at odds with Islamabad
in recent years. Each of these tribes is based in the eastern
third of the province. (Note: The Sui gas fields are ound in
the tribal territory of the Bugtis. End Note). The Bugtis are
led by Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti; the Marris by Nawab Khair Bux
Marri; and the Mengals by Sardar Atuallah Khan Mengal. The
youngest of the three--Mengal--is about 75. Each of the three
tribes is associated with a different political party: Bugti
founded the Jamhoori Watan Party; Mengal founded the
Balochistan National Party; and Marri is tied to the Baloch
Haq Tawar Party as well as the Baluchistan Liberation Army.
While these three tribes have been behind the insurgency in
recent years, there are at least two dozen other
sardars--some estimates put the number at more than 70--who
are on friendly terms with the government. Most of these
other sardars are found in the western and southern portions
of the province. Major subtribes of the Bugti are the Masoori
and the Kalpars.


19. (C) The Pashtun part of the province includes the
northeastern districts of Quetta, Pishin, Qila Abdullah,
Ziarat, Qila Saifullah, Zhob, Musa Khel, and the northern
portions of Loralai and Sibi. The Pashtun area borders the
Afghan provinces of Zabol, Paktika, and Qandahar. Pashtuns
are predominately Sunni Muslims. Pashtun society, like
Baloch, is tribal but extremely egalitarian: tribal leaders
are considered first among equals.


20. (C) The major Pashtun tribes in Balochistan are the
Kakar, Tarin, Kansi, Shirani, Pani, Dawi, Ghilzai, and Babi.
The Kakar are thought to be the most numerous tribe, and are
found in and around Quetta and throughout the Pashtun
majority districts. The Tarin, and their subtribe the
Achakzai, are historically one of the largest tribes in the
province. The Kansi were the historical fief-holders of
Quetta for the Durrani Kings in Afghanistan and are the most
populous tribe in the city. The Ghilzais in Balochistan are
nomads, many of whom also have homes in Afghanistan, though
many of the Sulemankhel subtribe have settled in and around
Zhob. Key Pashtun leaders in the province include Mehmood
Khan Achakzai, a Member of National Assembly and leader of
the Pushtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP),a Pashtun
nationalist party, that shares many of the grievances of the
Baloch nationalists; Abdul Rahim Khan Mandokhel, a federal

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Senator from PKMAP; Muhammad Sarwar Khan Kaker, a federal
Senator from the PML; and Rehmatullah Kaker, a federal
Senator from the MMA.


21. (C) Comment. Baloch discontent and the province's mineral
wealth are inextricably entwined. The Baloch perceive that
the province's natural resources have been exploited for the
benefit of the people and industries of Punjab. They also
complain that the distribution of federal resources, which is
based on population, puts Balochistan--a thinly populated
province--at a disadvantage. Because of the underdevelopment
of the province, especially in comparison to Punjab, Baloch
argue that the province should receive a greater share of
funds to allow the province to catch up with the rest of the
country. Baloch disgruntlement also stems from what they see
as a lack of adequate representation in the federal
bureaucracy, as well as the military, thus they are demanding
the enforcement of quotas already in federal law. These calls
have strengthened as the Baloch have grown fearful that they
will become second-class citizens in their own province
because of the influx of skilled Punjabis and Sindhis seeking
employment in the province's infrastructure projects such as
Gwadar and the copper-gold mines in Saindak and Rekodiq. A
political settlement that addresses these grievances would
require substantial revisions to Pakistani law and
distribution of royalties, which would depend on high level
backing in Islamabad. End comment.
CROCKER