Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD13801
2006-07-19 14:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

MUMBAI BOMBINGS: PAKISTAN SEES POSTPONEMENT OF

Tags:  PREL PTER PK IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 013801 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PK IN
SUBJECT: MUMBAI BOMBINGS: PAKISTAN SEES POSTPONEMENT OF
COMPOSITE DIALOGUE TALKS AS A NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 13519

B. NEW DELHI 5036

Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 013801

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PK IN
SUBJECT: MUMBAI BOMBINGS: PAKISTAN SEES POSTPONEMENT OF
COMPOSITE DIALOGUE TALKS AS A NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 13519

B. NEW DELHI 5036

Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, d


1. (C) Summary. Pakistani leaders, including President
Musharraf, regret India's cancellation of the Foreign
Secretary level Composite Dialogue talks planned for July

SIPDIS
20-21. They confirm that Indian counterparts informed them
over the weekend that the talks would not be taking place.
Although they had anticipated India's decision, they are
nonetheless disappointed, with President Musharraf observing
that stalling the talks plays into the hands of terrorists
who oppose the peace process. End Summary.


2. (U) President Musharraf, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and
Foreign Minister Kasuri have all expressed concern in recent
days over India's cancellation of the Foreign Secretary level
Composite Dialogue talks planned for July 20-21. The talks
were to have been the conclusion of the third round of the
Dialogue, addressing a range of possible Confidence Building
Measures that have been raised in lower-level negotiations
over the past six months. Following Musharraf's July 18
meeting with the National Security Council, the GOP issued a
news bulletin reporting that he had cautioned that stalling
the peace process would be "unfortunate" and would play into
the hands of terrorists. "We must not allow such terrorist
acts to undermine the historic opportunity for lasting peace
between Pakistan and India." Musharraf went on to regret the
"unsubstantiated allegations" emanating from India and
renewed his earlier offer to "help with the investigation" if
India were to share concrete information.


3. (U) According to press reports, Prime Minister Shaukat
Aziz has also urged that the peace talks should continue,
despite the Mumbai blasts. "We should carry on," he said,
adding that India had not responded to Pakistan's offer of
cooperation in the investigation. Foreign Minister Kasuri is
also reported to have weighed in, characterizing the
postponement of the talks as a "negative development," and
complaining that India was making unhelpful "spontaneous
allegations" and turning Pakistan into a "scapegoat." Kasuri

went on to question what interest the Pakistan Government
could possibly have in supporting terrorism and promoting
instability when Pakistan's future lay in its role as a "hub"
between South and Central Asia. Pakistan wanted stability in
the region, and was working hard to that end.


4. (U) On July 19, Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan convened G-8
and EU Ambassadors to confirm that Pakistan had received
notice from India that his meetings scheduled for July 20-21
were not possible because of the environment surrounding the
Mumbai blasts. New dates had not been floated, but he
interpreted Manmohan Singh's comments in the wake of the
blasts as an encouraging indicator that the peace talks were
not stalled. Khan repeated Pakistan's offer to assist in the
investigation on the basis of solid evidence. Pakistan was a
part of the cadre of nations fighting the war on terror, he
observed, and would certainly act if given specific
information. Pakistan took the position that there should be
no activity from its soil that was harmful to another nation.
Khan hoped that CBMs would remain in place, because the
process was important for the two nations, for the region and
for the world. Moreover it would be constructive to devote
renewed efforts on long-stalled issues like the Siachen
Glacier and Sir Creek. The "ultimate CBM is the ability to
resolve problems," he observed. Khan acknowledged, however,
that he had no idea when the talks would reconvene or where.



5. (C) In a July 19 meeting with Polcouns, DG for South Asia

ISLAMABAD 00013801 002 OF 002


Jalil Jilani said that India's postponement of the talks was
not a surprise. Indeed, even before the attacks he had
noticed a surge in unsubstantiated allegations of Pakistan's
involvement in terrorism. These allegations were
inconsistent with the evidence, as acknowledged by third
parties and even by some Indian officials, that levels of
infiltration had dropped by as much as 80 percent. At the
"highest level" even Indians were aware of Pakistan's
efforts. The Indian Home Secretary, after a visit to
Pakistan in June, had publicly acknowledged that the number
of incidents had dropped significantly. Jilani said that in
Pakistan's view it would be impossible to reduce the number
incidents to zero because there were highly motivated
"disgruntled elements" that would continue trying to mount
operations, whether from Indian Kashmir or elsewhere.
President Musharraf and Prime Minister Aziz had assured
Indian leaders that there was no official support from
Pakistan and National Security Advisor Tariq Aziz had
discussed the issue at length with his Indian counterpart
last month in Dubai.


6. (C) Echoing Musharraf and Riaz Khan, Jilani stressed that
Pakistan was eager to assist India in the investigation. But
it needed clear information. Unfortunately, India was
historically very reluctant to share such information out of
fear that it would reveal sources. But in Jilani's view there
was also a political dimension; he suspected that India
welcomed the excuse to officially postpone the talks because
they were in a stalling phase anyway on virtually all
significant issues. Nonetheless Jilani regretted the
postponement, saying that he thought the sides were close to
agreement on a CBMs relating to nuclear accidents, prisoners
and visas. Jilani characterized Pakistan's reaction to
Indian accusations and implications as "very moderate, very
mature." There had been no counter accusations following the
postponement of the talks. Pakistan had simply said it was a
"negative development." "Pakistan's goal is to get back to
the dialogue process," he concluded, "that is the bottom
line."

Comment
--------------


7. (C) We understand that postponement of these talks was
all but inevitable, given Indian public sentiment in the wake
of the Mumbai bombing -- specifically the public perception
that Pakistan must have been involved. However, these talks
and the modest CBMs emerging from them, are one of the few
bright spots in the relationship and they have had a
significant impact in shaping Pakistani perceptions of India.
Musharraf is correct in observing that the sides should not
allow terrorists, who have long opposed peace efforts, to
hold the process hostage.


CROCKER