Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD12740
2006-07-06 05:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

PAKISTANI OFFICIALS, JOURNALISTS DISCUSS

Tags:  MOPS PGOV PK PTER 
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3666
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 5703
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 8775
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1858
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 9394
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 7310
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 012740 

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2016
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PK PTER
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI OFFICIALS, JOURNALISTS DISCUSS
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TRIBAL AREAS WITH VISITING S/CT
DELEGATION

REF: ISLAMABAD 12406

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY: DERIVED FROM DSCG 05-01, B, D

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 012740

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2016
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PK PTER
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI OFFICIALS, JOURNALISTS DISCUSS
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TRIBAL AREAS WITH VISITING S/CT
DELEGATION

REF: ISLAMABAD 12406

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY: DERIVED FROM DSCG 05-01, B, D


1. (c) Summary: Visiting S/CT DAS Virginia Palmer, Chief
S/CT Strategist David Kilcullen and SCA DAS John Gastright
met June 22-24 in Islamabad and Peshawar with a range of
officials and journalists to review developments in
Pakistan's troubled tribal region. All interlocutors,
whether civilian or military, in government or in the media
agreed that (1) a multitiered strategy -- addressing
security, political and development needs -- was essential;
(2) that of these three areas, political and development
initiatives should take priority; (3) that stabilizing the
area would require strengthening, for the time being,
traditional tribal and administrative structures, not
replacing them and (4) that in this context the key need
was to establish clear lines of authority, running from the
tribes through the maliks and political agents and
ultimately to the NWFP Governor. While there was broad
consensus on the nature of the challenge and how to address
it, there was less evidence of coordination among the
government agencies involved. The delegation's meeting
with Minister of Interior Sherpao is reported reftel. This
is a joint Consulate Peshawar- Embassy Islamabad cable. End
Summary.

Sahibzada Imtiaz, Advisor to the Prime Minister on FATA
-------------- --------------


2. (c) Sahibzada Imtiaz, who had taken the lead in
developing the Government's overall political strategy for
the FATA, made it clear that having developed the plan, he
was very much in the back seat when it came to
implementation. NWFP Governor Orakzai was the focal point
for implementation, he said, not only for development and
political matters but also on security strategy -- though
tactics would be left to the army. Imtiaz blamed the
instability in the FATA largely on a weakening over time of
the traditional lines of authority; it was important that
clear lines be reestablished. The Governor should be the
focal point with an empowered cadre of Political Agents

reporting directly to him. The Governor should also be the
focal point for the planned tribal jirgas, which could only
succeed if they were inclusive and representative of tribal
interests and figures.


3. (c) Imtiaz stressed that the key on the economic side
was to take account of the region's natural and human
resources. The region had resources, he said, especially
mineral resources, but it was essential to create an
enabling environment for private sector investment. He
expected U.S.-sponsored Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
(ROZs) could catalyze additional investment. Imtiaz
anticipated that the Government would issue a development
masterplan, targeting key sectors that needed additional
investment. The new FATA Development Authority would take
the lead.

BG Nasser and DGMO Pasha
--------------


4. (c) Brig. General Nasser (Director of Military
Operations for the Pakistan Army) briefed the delegation on
developments in the FATA, surveying recent history,
insurgent strategies and the Pakistan Army's evolving
response. The army was now moving away from cordon and
search operations, he explained, and was using "snap"
operations -- smaller lighter units that could be deployed
against targets and withdrawn quickly. The army was using
night operations more, and was focusing heavily on improved
training.


5. (c) Nasser frankly admitted that the obstacles were
daunting. The physical terrain was challenging and the
local population included refugees, religious leaders and
deeply suspicious tribesmen. The popularity of the
Pakistan military had declined at the national level, and
the relationship with the local population in the Tribal
Areas was "in the minus" due in part to collateral damage
from Pakistani attacks. A villager's new road was more
than offset by the new grave for his brother, Nasser

ISLAMABAD 00012740 002 OF 004


observed. Moreover, military checkpoints were demeaning to
a proud people. It was time to pay more attention to
political solutions and economic development, and rely less
on the military he concluded. In particular, it was
important that any political process include local tribal
leaders and give them a sense of ownership.


6. (c) Nasser bridled at suggestions that Pakistan was not
doing enough in the war on terror, pointing to the number
of casualties suffered by the army and underscoring that
Pakistan understood its political and economic interests in
a stable Afghanistan: "When you say we are not doing
enough," we say "go to hell." In a follow-on session,
Director General of Military Operations MG Ahmed Shujat
Pasha, picked up on this theme, observing that critical
comments of U.S. officials, as picked up by the Afghan
press, had been extremely hurtful. While he understood that
the comments had been taken out of context, nonetheless
they had fed perceptions that the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship was strained.

Peshawar Journalists
--------------


7. (c) In a wide-ranging conversation, the bureau chiefs
of The Nation, Mashriq, NNI, Dawn, and Express, opined that
the only areas in the FATA that were problematic were those
that bordered trouble spots in Afghanistan. Khyber,
Mohmand, Orakzai and Kurram Agencies were relatively
peaceful, though the last suffered from sectarian
violence. Bajaur Agency was a potential trouble spot.


8. (c) They maintained the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),
the religious, six-party coalition that governs the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP),had downplayed the
Talibanization of North and South Waziristan, and it's
spillover effect into the settled areas. Unless the
Pak-Afghan border were completely sealed, problems would
continue and possibly spread. The troubles in these
agencies had been exacerbated by a shift in power to the
"mosque." Historically, religious leaders ("mullahs")
played a secondary role to traditional tribal leaders
("maliks"),but after the commencement of the Soviet-Afghan
war, a power shift began that had continued for the last
twenty-five years, with the religious leaders ascending
over the maliks. According to the journalists, for the
region to be stable, the traditional leaders must be
re-empowered.

Khyber Political Agent Tashfeen Khan
--------------


9. (c) Khyber Political Agent (PA) Tashfeen Khan, who
previously served as the Development Secretary at the FATA
Secretariat, conceded the political administration had

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"broken down" in North and South Waziristan, but asserted
the civil governance of other agencies continued to work
well. Khan identified development as the immediate problem
in the FATA and he recommended concentrating on three
areas: 1) developing the resource potential of the mineral
industry; 2) agriculture development which would require
consolidation of land, flood protection, and water resource
management; and 3) developing human resources, since 40-50%
of the FATA population is under the age of twenty. Khan
conceded the GOP lacked the expertise to implement new
ideas and was not capable of industrializing the FATA. He
stressed the need for GOP capacity building measures and
stated that once the U.S. demonstrated its commitment to
FATA development, other stakeholders would show similar
resolve. Khan also emphasized the development of trade
linkages with Afghanistan, claiming there were seven better
Pak-Afghan trade routes than the Khyber Pass.


10. (c) Khan asserted that Governor Orakzai's plan to
convene a loya jirga (grand council of elders) to address
the Waziristan security situation was likely to be far more
successful than Pakistani Army operations. In general, the
Frontier Corps should be used in the FATA when military
action was required. Like the journalists, Khan advocated
strengthening the maliks and lowering the status of the
mullahs. The latter had increased their power due to the
Afghan war, failure of the GOP to respond properly to FATA

ISLAMABAD 00012740 003 OF 004


issues, and the imposition of adult franchise in the
region. The push for devolution, local governance, and the
creation of the All Agency FATA Councilors Alliance had
created parallel power structures that diluted the power of
the maliks. "You can't impose a new system without
understanding the old system. If you want to change it,
wipe out the old but you can't have half and half. You
have to strengthen the old and then gradually, over time,
move forward with step-by-step changes," said Khan. After
greater development in the region, the people "will decide
for themselves what changes they want, we shouldn't impose
our views on them."


11. (c) Khan also agreed with a suggestion that the
Political Agents be given more training, possibly at
western universities. He conceded the quality of PAs had
decreased over time, but blamed it on constant
experimentation within the Pakistani civil service. The
best and brightest Pakistanis no longer sought jobs in the
civil bureaucracy, but instead took more lucrative jobs in
finance or with international NGOs. The prospect of western
training would add prestige to the position and help the
government attract better political agents. In addition to
training, Khan stressed that the authority of the PA needed
to be restored, including command over the civil authority,
development projects, and having operational control of the
Frontier Corps.

FATA Secretariat Chief Secretary Arbab Shahzad
-------------- -


12. (c) FATA Secretariat Chief Secretary Arbab Shahzad
maintained that his organization would be strengthened in
the coming months based on the plan put forward by
Sahibzada Imtiaz. However, admitted that Minister of
Industries and Special Initiatives Jehangir Tareen's
economic development proposal had not yet been discussed
with the FATA Secretariat. The agency had not had any
deliberations with the federal government regarding
Tareen's plan and Shahzad was unaware of any implementation
schedule for the proposal.


13. (c) Shahzad hoped that the FATA Development Agency
(FATA DA) would be in place within six weeks, once approved
by the Governor and President Musharraf. An autonomous
agency, the FATA DA would be responsible for implementing
all development projects in the tribal region, focusing on
skill development, mineral and industrial development
(including Reconstruction Opportunity Zones),and the
creation of rural support programs. SAFRON would no longer
be the principal accounting officer for FATA expenditures,
but an Additional Chief Secretary in the Governor's office
would assume that role. Echoing Sahibzada Imtiaz, Shazad
welcomed this change as a necessary corrective to
previously diffuse authority structures.


14. (c) Shahzad shared the Khyber PA's views that the
Waziristan security situation required strengthening the
political administration, and re-establishing the
credibility of the political agents. The tribals had lost
confidence in the current political administration and it
would take years to rebuild it.

Inspector General of the Frontier Corps Major General Alam
Khattak
-------------- --------------


15. (c) Inspector General of the Frontier Corps (FC),
Major General Alam Khattak, reviewed the status of his
36,000 force, noting they man 600 posts and guard a 1200
kilometer border. In the north, the FC was on "high
vigilance alert" and has had some problems in Bajaur.
Khattak expressed his gratitude for the assistance from the
U.S. forces in Kunar, on the Afghan side. In Kurram
Agency, the problems were primarily sectarian in nature,
occasionally resulting in violence.


16. (c) Khattak sought to counter the common perception
that Pakistani security forces were losing the battle in
North and South Waziristan. To the contrary, because of
the military operations in South Waziristan over the last
few years, there was now a measure of control and greater

ISLAMABAD 00012740 004 OF 004


stability in the agency. In North Waziristan, Khattak
stated, the FC had just completed a high operational cycle
that he deemed "successful." He conceded that North
Waziristan was still violent, but the militants were
increasingly frustrated as demonstrated by the evolution of
their tactics. Originally they attacked FC pickets, then
used ambushes, switched to IEDs and now were using suicide
bombers. The militants had lost key commanders, lacked
money and ammunition, and their morale was suffering. With
the militants on the run, Khattak stressed the need to
revive "the political process." The political
administration must be restored, reducing the influence of
the mullahs, and a comprehensive development strategy
introduced.


17. (u) Visiting S/CT del did not have an opportunity to
clear this cable.

CROCKER