AFGHAN AMBASSADOR ON FM SPANTA'S JUNE 23 VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 012211

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2016
TAGS: PK PREL AF IN
SUBJECT: AFGHAN AMBASSADOR ON FM SPANTA'S JUNE 23 VISIT TO
ISLAMABAD

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and Introduction: On June 25, Afghan
Ambassador Tarzi offered poloff a read-out of foreign
Minister Spanta's June 23 visit to Pakistan, his first
bilateral foreign travel since assuming office. While in
Islamabad, Spanta was received by President Musharraf, Prime
Minister Aziz and Foreign Minister Kasuri, who had personally
invited Spanta to visit following their bilateral discussions
on the margins of the June 19-21 OIC Ministerial in Baku.
According to Tarzi, the themes of economic and security
cooperation dominated all official meetings. Although the
meetings were cordial, neither side appeared satisfied with
the other's response on two core issues: for Afghanistan,
cross-border terrorism; for Pakistan, the fear of India using
Afghanistan as a base for nefarious operations in Balochistan
and the Tribal Areas. The parties agreed to a schedule of
follow-up diplomatic and security meetings to build momentum
for improved bilateral relations, but overcoming mutual
suspicion and mistrust will clearly require substantial
effort. End summary and introduction.


2. (C) Tarzi characterized the meetings between FM Spanta
as cordial, noting that the two foreign ministers appear to
be developing a solid working relationship. In addition to
maintaining mil-mil contacts through Tripartite Commission
mechanisms, the sides agreed to energize bilateral Pak-Afghan
interaction through quarterly meetings of the Foreign
Ministers and bi-monthly consultations between intelligence
agencies. Without disclosing much detail, Tarzi said that
Spanta's talks with the Pakistani leaders included economic
issues such as trade corridors with Central Asia and a
potential Turkmenistan-Afghanistan gas pipeline, but
discussion of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) was
deferred for a future meeting. (Note: Post has forwarded MFA
press release no. 222 describing Spanta's visit to SCA/PB.
End note.)


3. (C) Tarzi became visibly excited when recounting a
briefing by the Pakistan side objecting to the proliferation
of Indian consulates and other official establishments in
Afghanistan, an issue that figured prominently in all three
of FM Spanta's official meetings. According to Tarzi, the
Pakistani side insisted that there are twelve (12) official
Indian posts in Afghanistan, refusing to accept the Afghan's
reassurance that India has been allowed to open only four (4)
lightly-staffed consulates, two of which -- Kandahar and
Jalalabad -- have served nearby Sikh and Hindu communities
since Partition. (Note: Tarzi said that the two other
Indian consulates -- Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif -- were opened
in the early 1990s during the mujahideen government. End
note.) Responding to Pakistani angst that Indian agents
are using these diplomatic missions to launch mischief in
Balochistan, the Afghan officials assured their hosts that
Kabul will not allow India or other foreign elements to
conduct anti-Pakistan operations from Afghan territory.
That said, Spanta told the Pakistanis not to drag Afghanistan
into its decade-long conflict with India-- a message that he
repeated publically upon his return to Kabul. (Note: Tarzi
confessed his personal frustration at his inability to
disabuse the GOP of its misimpression regarding the nature
and extent of the official Indian presence in Afghanistan,
saying that Pakistani diplomats in Kabul are fully aware of
the size and location of India's diplomatic missions. Post
is not surprised that the "Indian consulate" conspiracy took
up much of Spanta's visit, as Pakistani interlocutors at
every level subscribe to the theory. End note.)


4. (C) Tarzi was also concerned that Pakistan's oft-voiced
commitment to prevent cross-border terrorism will not
translate into action. Although FM Spanta received strong
messages in each meeting regarding Pakistan's resolve, Tarzi

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said that the Afghans were looking for concrete results.
When poloff pressed on what those results might be, Tarzi
offered nothing more specific than saying that Kabul had been
pleased by Pakistan's security cooperation during the 2004
presidential election. When the Pakistani side raised its
own concerns with terrorist/militants entering Pakistan from
Afghanistan, Tarzi said that the Afghan side repeated its
assurance that the Karzai government has no interest in
destabilizing Pakistan. Discussion during Spanta's visit did
not specifically address the GOP's three-tiered strategy to
stabilize the tribal areas along the Pak-Afghan border,
although Tarzi suggested that this could be the subject of
subsequent consulations.


5. (SBU) Post has sought appointments with MFA officials to
gauge the Pakistani assessment of Spanta's visit, only to
have its requests deferred until the conclusion of the MFA's
annual Chief of Mission convocation on June 29.


6. (C) Comment: Conveying skepticism regarding the GOP's
commitment to improving bilateral relations, Tarzi speculated
that FM Kasuri had quickly arranged Spanta's visit so that he
could report that he had "checked the box" during his
upcoming visit to Washington in July. Tarzi was as quick to
ascribe responsibility to (and insinuate direct support by)
the GOP for Taliban and anti-Coalition militants crossing
into Afghanistan as he was to distance the Karzai government
from any responsibility for cross-border activity (whether
sponsored by al Qaeda, the Taliban or India) in the other
direction. Overcoming these mutual suspicions and mistrust
to energize this most recent rapprochement between Kabul and
Islamabad will continue to require active USG engagement and
counsel.
CROCKER