Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HONGKONG2119
2006-05-23 06:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Hong Kong
Cable title:  

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM HALF A YEAR LATER: WHAT

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON PINR HK CH 
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INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 9349
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RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1642
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 1615
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RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0825
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RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 3310
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 3887
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HONG KONG 002119 

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DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/CM
NSC FOR WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PINR HK CH
SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM HALF A YEAR LATER: WHAT
HAPPENED? WHAT'S NEXT?

REF: A. 05 HONG KONG 5625


B. HONG KONG 1816

HONG KONG 00002119 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: Consul General James B. Cunningham. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HONG KONG 002119

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DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/CM
NSC FOR WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PINR HK CH
SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM HALF A YEAR LATER: WHAT
HAPPENED? WHAT'S NEXT?

REF: A. 05 HONG KONG 5625


B. HONG KONG 1816

HONG KONG 00002119 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: Consul General James B. Cunningham. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. The dust has settled since the defeat by
Hong Kong democrats of Donald Tsang's Constitutional Reform
package in December. Tsang's strategy failed because he
didn't anticipate the ability of the pan-democrats to remain
united on the call for a timetable for democracy. He
believed until the very end that he could split off the
minimum votes necessary from the pan-democratic group. He
wasn't willing to make a deal, which might have been done, at
the cost of giving the organized parties in the
pan-democratic group (i.e., the Democratic Party (DP) and the
Article 45 Concern Group) credit for an improved political
reform package that would translate into political strength.
Many Democrats were also unwilling to deal if that meant
preserving a government proposal that would have expanded the
democratic space but probably to their political
disadvantage. In the end, both sides preferred to preserve
the status quo, with the pan-democrats playing to fight
another day and to retain ownership of their only core issue
-- democracy in Hong Kong.


2. (C) They may have overplayed their hand. The failure of
the Government's proposal has put both democratization and
debate on universal suffrage on hold for the time being. The
incrementalist strategy that Tsang sold to Beijing )- we
suspect on the grounds that he could use it to preserve
stability and prosperity, maintain control, build support for
pro-Beijing politicians and undermine the more extreme
democrats )- has been sidetracked by his defeat. But
Tsang's public support, buoyed by a vibrant economy, is

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stronger than ever, as is public confidence in Beijing. The
Democratic Party (DP) is widely blamed for the outcome and is
now limping in the polls, despite predictions in December to

the contrary. Attempts by Beijing to curtail the "future of
democracy" discussion (ref b) may give the pan-democrats an
opening, however.


3. (C) The pan-democrats are working now to prepare to
challenge Tsang in the next round, the election of the Chief
Executive on March 25, 2007, the maneuvering for which is
already beginning. (The members of the Election Committee
will be chosen this coming December.) They have no hope of
defeating him, but hope to provoke a full debate on Hong
Kong,s political future by securing nomination of a
challenger -) which some hope will be the formidable and
popular Anson Chan. A campaign which produced a "win" for
Chan in public opinion polls despite Tsang's (and Beijing's)
control of the CE selection process would be a powerful
symbol.


4. (C) While Tsang may be sincere in his expressed desire to
see movement toward universal suffrage during his time as CE,
given what he himself calls his "masters" in Beijing, his
continuing political priority is likely to be to cow the
unruly pro-democracy forces that Beijing sees as a threat to
Hong Kong,s "harmony," and which some Hong Kong elites see
as a threat to Hong Kong's economic future. As in December,
the struggle between the pan-democrats and Tsang for
political power is likely to take precedence over finding
agreement on a way forward on democracy. End summary

Not prepared for Failure?
--------------


5. (C) The Tsang Government failed both strategically and
tactically: strategically by never articulating a vision and
tactically by seeking to split off the votes of the six
pro-democracy, independent Legco members, rather than seeking
broader support among the pro-democracy legislators,
particularly the two largest organized parties, the DP and

HONG KONG 00002119 002.6 OF 005


the Article 45 Concern Group. Tsang's refusal to articulate
an independent vision, especially when Anson Chan directly
challenged him to do so, only reminded Hong Kong that Beijing
really called the shots and set the limits. All reports
indicate that Tsang only ever made an effort to get the six
independent, pro-democracy votes he needed to secure Legco
passage. This is all the more striking in that the elements
of a compromise, including some sort of agreement on possible
direct election of the Chief Executive in 2012 and agreement
by Beijing to (albeit later, and separate from the reform
proposal) formulate a timetable for universal suffrage,
seemed achievable.


6. (C) We believe that until the very end Tsang thought he
would prevail, and so may have considered that allowing the
pan-democrats to take credit for success would be worse
politically than for his proposal to fail outright. Indeed,
an outcome perceived as strengthening Hong Kong's
pro-democracy forces would have been hard to swallow in
Beijing. In the event, Tsang has suffered little politically
from the proposal's defeat, although it may have raised
doubts about his competence and political skills in Beijing,
and it has driven him (at Beijing,s urging, it appears)
closer to the pro-Beijing political parties. The
pan-democrats, on the other hand, are in their customary
disarray. The new Civic Party (CP, formed on the base of the
Article 45 Concern Group),which has positioned itself closer
to the center, may be able to supplant the DP as the core of
the pan-democracy forces.

Why did Tsang fail?
--------------


7. (C) Why did the Government's plan fail? It was striking
that, on a number of occasions, the Government side --
including Beijing representatives -- came within a
hairsbreadth of offering the pan-democrats what they wanted.
Tsang was quoted on a number of occasions as saying he

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personally wanted universal suffrage, as soon as possible,
and would devote his next term to it, if re-elected. Many
speculated about possible universal suffrage for the election
of the Chief Executive in 2012, with the more difficult issue
of elections to the Legco deferred until 2016. And at a
December 2, 2005 Shenzhen meeting, NPC Standing Committee
Secretary General Qiao Xiaoyang told Legco members that

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Beijing would agree to a timetable -- but not to setting a
timetable before the Government proposal passed.


8. (C) It is clearer now that neither the HKG nor Beijing
were ever willing to present these concessions in a way that
the pan-democrats could take as a "victory," nor were they
willing to strengthen them to the point where Beijing really
did appear to be compromising. Nor were the pan-democrats
willing to advance their own proposal for a compromise way
ahead. Tsang's decision to not lobby all 25
democracy-identified legislators, but to focus on the
"undecided" six, indicates that from the outset he did not
need or want majority support from the Democrats, nor want to
share political credit for success. And from the
pan-democrats' perspective, voting down the reform package
and maintaining the status quo was clearly preferable to
allowing Tsang to co-opt their most important, and some would
argue, their only policy position, the fight for universal
suffrage.

Not enough stakeholders in the concept
--------------


9. (C) On the Government side, there was not that much
enthusiasm within Legco among the so-called pro-Government
parties. It was no secret that neither the DAB nor the
Liberals really liked the proposal. In fact, there was real
concern among some of them that the Legco reforms would
actively disadvantage their parties in the next elections,

HONG KONG 00002119 003.6 OF 005


and both parties likely would have lobbied strongly against
any additional concessions to the democrats. (Interestingly,
some younger, non-Legco members of the Democratic Party
wanted to support the Government proposal, since they
believed it would have enhanced their own chances to win
Legco seats in the future. But the party leadership
concluded from the outset that their political influence
would be diluted under the Tsang proposal.) From the
so-called pro-Government parties' point of view, and, many
thought, from Beijing's point of view, it was all the same,
whether the proposal passed, or whether the status quo was
unchanged. (Some here believe, however, that at least some
senior leaders in Beijing were unhappy with the proposal,s
failure, and wanted to see some limited movement.) But only
the Tsang administration had prestige or power at stake in
the success of the proposal.


10. (C) The large turnout at the December 4 march was
important, and the united appearance of the pro-democracy
legislators was probably even more important in cementing
their commitment. The unexpected participation of former
Chief Secretary Anson Chan, who had not previously identified
herself with pro-democracy efforts, transformed the dynamic,
placing at the movement's head a figure as clearly
"mainstream" and popular as the CE himself. This had a
powerful impact on public opinion and provided pro-democracy
legislators with broad political cover.

Counting the votes
--------------


11. (C) The Government needed to secure six votes in addition
to the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
(DAB) and Liberal Party (LP) members that Beijing presumably
told to line up behind Tsang. Those votes existed in a block
of six pro-democracy but independent Legco members, where
Tsang focused all his lobbying effort. To prevail, the

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Democrats merely needed to hold at least one of them. The
pro-democracy independents, who had been elected by tying
themselves to the slogan of democracy, feared betraying their
constituents. If they stayed in opposition to Tsang, they
could be seen as standing for a simple, clear principle:
universal suffrage, as soon as possible. But Tsang worked
hard to win them over to his incrementalist approach, arguing
that defeat of a proposal that Beijing accepted would be a
serious setback to democracy in Hong Kong. Before the vote,
the mainstream Democrats were keeping watch on the waverers,
ready to intervene at the slightest sign of weakness.


12. (C) Most of our sources agree that Tsang had long
believed he would get the six additional votes, and in fact
had convinced 5 of the 6 to support him. One of them,
pro-democracy Tsang confidante Albert "Taipan" Cheng, on the
eve of December 4 pro-democracy march, published a thinly
veiled protest at pressure from within the democracy movement
to maintain a united opposition to the plan.
Then-independent, now Civic Party member, Mandy Tam, who
represents the accountancy functional constituency, was the
sixth vote and seemed just before the vote to be moving to
the Tsang side. But at the last minute she withdrew from
negotiations with the Government after an emotional meeting
with a close Democratic colleague. Tam has confirmed this to
us, adding that the Government seems to blame her above all
others for the proposal's defeat. When it became clear that
her vote would defeat the government, the other five moved
back into opposition so as not be charged with betraying
their democratic principles.

Who won, who lost?
--------------


13. (C) Immediately after the December 21 failure of the
Government's plan (ref a),the conventional wisdom was that
Chief Executive (CE) Donald Tsang had been hurt, and that the

HONG KONG 00002119 004.2 OF 005


Democrats had only won a "small victory." In retrospect,
Tsang has emerged unscathed and even strengthened. He

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retains his public popularity and has been able to win
convincing testimonials of support from key tycoons, as well
as the Beijing leadership, including an endorsement from the
newly arrived Foreign Ministry Commissioner in Hong Kong.
His greatest political challenges have come from his putative
supporters, in the "pro-Beijing" parties, who have objected
to some of his personnel decisions and his "go-it-alone,"
autocratic governing style. The DP and Civic Party are not
enthusiastic about being pushed into opposition status, as
Tsang seems tempted to do, and have demonstrated that they

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will support the government on specific issues.


14. (C) Within the pan-democrat camp, the initiative and lead
seems to be slowly but surely passing from the Democratic
Party to the newly formed Civic Party. The Civic Party is
consciously positioning itself closer to the center, and is
also presenting itself as a potential negotiating partner for
Beijing. It pointedly omitted criticism of the June 4 1989
Tiananmen massacre from its founding platform, and withheld
criticism of the HKG's budget, even as all other parties
argued that the proposed tax cut was too small. Thus, if
this process continues, we can expect the Civic Party to seek
to lead the majority of pro-democracy voters towards a better
relationship with Beijing -- assuming that Beijing
reciprocates in some way.

What does this mean for future of Hong Kong's democracy?
-------------- --------------


15. (C) No one has yet offered a concrete vision of what
universal suffrage and democratic politics in Hong Kong might
look like, although Tsang is on the hook to propose a
"roadmap" for universal suffrage late this year or early in

2007. That report is likely to present a series of issues
which need to be resolved, and may be either obstructionist
or constructive. In part because of the conflictual nature
of the discussion, there is little emerging consensus.
Because the pro-democracy camp has the simpler, clearer
position -- despite their own lack of concrete detail -- they
are likely to retain the initiative in the overall debate.
But it is also not very likely that either side will be able
to propose reforms that are acceptable to the other.


16. (C) The Democrats will try to deflect Tsang's reelection
campaign, and force him to address political reform and the
future of Hong Kong. For now they seem confident that they
can get the 100 out of 800 votes in the CE Election Committee
needed to nominate a challenger. Anson Chan is probably the
candidate who could best confront Tsang on both political and
governance issues and efforts are underway to persuade her to
run (in public she says she's not interested). The
pan-democrats' goal will be to turn the reelection into a
virtual referendum on universal suffrage. Beijing apparently
is already working to thwart this by trying to stack the
Election Committee membership even more strongly in Tsang's
favor. Tsang will probably be able to win reelection without
making any specific commitments. Tsang will instead seek to
strengthen ties with the pro-Government parties. Beijing,
Hong Kong's tycoons, and other players as well, appear
satisfied with the status quo.


17. (C) We expect the democrats will again attempt to force
Tsang and Beijing to make a commitment to a timetable for

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universal suffrage. If they were to succeed in fielding a
strong candidate and campaign which triumphs in the public
opinion polls even as the Chief Executive is securing
re-election in the Beijing-dominated Election Committee, that
would provide a powerful symbol of the political limitations
under which Hong Kong operates. Tsang and Beijing will
continue to undermine Democrats who they regard as opposing
them. As in December, Tsang and Beijing will not want to
reward their political opposition and a continued struggle

HONG KONG 00002119 005.2 OF 005


for political power is likely to take precedence over finding
a compromise to move forward on democracy.
Cunningham