Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HOCHIMINHCITY957
2006-08-25 02:01:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Cable title:  

MILITARY OWNED ENTERPRISES IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM

Tags:  ECON PGOV EIND KCOR PINR VM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0524
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHHM #0957/01 2370201
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250201Z AUG 06
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1353
INFO RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 0948
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/ISA/AP//
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC//J2/J3/J5//
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-3//
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//J00/J2/J3/J5//
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 1421
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 000957 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON PGOV EIND KCOR PINR VM
SUBJECT: MILITARY OWNED ENTERPRISES IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM

REF: HCMC 0411 B) IIR 6 950 0015 06 C)IIR 6 950 0014 06

HO CHI MIN 00000957 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 000957

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON PGOV EIND KCOR PINR VM
SUBJECT: MILITARY OWNED ENTERPRISES IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM

REF: HCMC 0411 B) IIR 6 950 0015 06 C)IIR 6 950 0014 06

HO CHI MIN 00000957 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) Summary: Military Owned Enterprises (MOEs) in southern
Vietnam are tied in with the Ministry of Defense (MOD) much as
other State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) interact with their
respective owner/ministries, according to HCMC officials. The
economic impact of MOEs is hard to gauge due to the wide range
of their activities, murky corporate governance structures and a
general unwillingness by the MOD to discuss its role in the
economy of southern Vietnam. The justification for MOEs is
derived from Vietnam's military doctrine, which emphasizes
self-reliance for critical warfighting production. However, our
discussions suggest that MOE activities go far beyond defense
industries and are equally important as a source of financing
for the military. This sector also reflects the Communist
Party's policy of maintaining the "leading role" of the
State-owned sector in the national economy. As with SOEs, MOE
managers see the merits in equitizing smaller subsidiaries, but
do not foresee the equitization of MOE holding companies or any
changes to the fundamental ownership structure of the Ministry
of Defense. And like the SOEs, resistance to reform and
privatization appears to be driven as much by management
self-interest as by ideology. End Summary.

The Reach of Military Owned Enterprises
--------------


2. (SBU) The Department of Economics of the Ministry of Defense
(MOD) lists 141 military-owned enterprises (MOEs). This is not
an all inclusive list. The number of MOEs is likely much
higher, depending on source material and how individual entities
are classified. According to Mr. Duong Cong Minh, a partner of
Him Lam Company, a private firm with significant MOD contacts,
the military owns small, medium and large companies. The MOEs
operate in fields in line with the military's doctrine of
self-reliance including agriculture, construction,
telecommunication, and textiles, but their output is not limited
to military goods or military customers. Most of these

companies market products and services in multiple sectors. Per
refs B and C, the relationship between MOEs and the MOD is
complex. Not all MOEs fall under the General Departments of the
MOD; some fall under regional military commands or branch
commands. (Note: Him Lam participates in several large-scale
projects involving military-owned properties and Mr. Minh, owner
of Him Lam, a former member of the military, is said to have
high level family contacts within the MOD. End Note)


3. (SBU) According to Minh, the MOD's role in the Vietnamese
economy can be broken down into several broad categories:

--ammunition and most weapons are produced by MOD-owned and
MOD-operated facilities that do not follow SOE laws and
regulations;

--MOEs whose activities have dual-use applications, such as
explosives producers; and,

--enterprises without any clear national security purpose, such
as hotels and construction firms. While MOEs such as printing
houses are not traditionally identified as national
security-related industries, they are often classified as such.
By being included as national security exemptions, these MOEs
can avoid equitization and remain wholly controlled by the MOD.

The Financial Relationship Between MOEs and the MOD
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) Our contacts at the Saigon New Port and Him Lam
Company tell us that some MOEs contribute a portion of their
earnings directly to the MOD, although they all pay taxes to the
GVN. MOEs, like SOEs, are exempt from paying rent when
occupying MOD properties, a cost-saving advantage over private
enterprises. Rent exemption, as an indirect subsidy to MOEs,
deprives the GVN of rental income normally gathered when private
companies operate on MOD owned properties.


5. (SBU) For example, Lt. Col. Tran Khanh Hoang, manager of the
Operation and Planning Department of MOE Tan Cang, or Saigon New
Port (SNP),told us that his company pays "less than five
percent of total revenue" directly to the MOD. SNP is one of
Vietnam's leading container terminal operators. In 2005, SNP's
container volume reached 1,086,242 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent
units) or approximately 40 percent of the national market. A
U.S. naval facility during the Vietnam War, the complex was
underexploited and in disrepair until 1989, when the GVN
established SNP and granted it use of the port's property and
facilities.

HO CHI MIN 00000957 002.2 OF 002




6. (SBU) According to these contacts, the MOD does not exercise
direct influence over the operation and management of MOEs. For
example, the GVN and MOD have given SNP relative freedom with
regard to daily operations, management, and even long-term
planning, allowing it to function as a traditional commercial
enterprise. By comparison, HCMC municipal authorities play a
much larger role in the planning and strategic development of
the Saigon Port Authority, often complicating matters and
hindering foreign investment (ref A).


7. (SBU) Mr. Minh of Him Lam told us that one of the primary
sources of off-budget revenue for the MOD comes from land and
property rents. The MOD contracts the management of its
designated commercial properties to separate management
companies, and these third-party entities receive 10 percent of
the total rent. The real estate market in Vietnam has
experienced a boom over the past several years, fueling demand
for property and elevating average real estate prices. Real
estate management contracts, often large in value, are awarded
at the discretion of the MOD. As with other SOEs, lack of
transparency in awarding contracts provides ample opportunity
for graft.

Corporate Structure of MOEs
--------------


8. (SBU) According to the MOD's Department of Economics
website, MOEs vary in size and structure. Some have a specific
manufacturing base, but many operate multiple subsidiary
companies. Company 32, also know ASECO, is the MOD's "showcase"
enterprise, and is included on every official U.S. military
college visit to southern Vietnam. ASECO has six subsidiaries
specializing in the production of footwear and garments and is
one of the companies specifically mentioned in the EU's
anti-dumping case on shoe imports from China and Vietnam. The
company has 5,000 employees and is managed by a team of twelve
military officers. These officers continue to belong to the
General Department of Logisitics chain of command, but they are
paid by the MOE. According to Mr. Nguyen Xuan Binh, Deputy
Director of Company 32, many of these officers have been at the
company for several years, with no intention of returning to
active duty and lower MOD salaries.


9. (SBU) Other companies such as Thasimex (or Thaison) operate a
broad range of entrepreneurial activities, including
joint-ventures with foreign-owned enterprises. These firms
resemble holding companies with many independent operating
subsidiaries, often horizontally and/or vertically integrated
with each other. Compared with ASECO's 5,000 employees,
Thasimex officials told us that they employ only 1,000 workers,
but the company has greater capitalization and is financially
stronger. According to Deputy Director Dr. Pham Gap, Thasimex
subsidiaries operate in construction, chemical and fertilizer
production (including a joint venture with the Norwegian firm
Yara); real estate development (including the Long Binh Hi-Tech
Park in association with a Japanese company); educational
training centers; and even include a supermarket in Russia.
Each of these entities functions independently, with Thasimex
holding majority stakes in each subsidiary. Dr. Gap noted that
Thasimex hoped to equitize some of its smaller companies in the
future. Dr. Gap said that the MOD has no plans to change its
relationship with Thasimex, despite the claim that the company
does not directly contribute revenue to the MOD.


10. (SBU) Comment: ConGen's contacts with the military
establishment in southern Vietnam are limited and our
discussions are generally anodyne. MOD officials in HCMC have
rebuffed overtures to discuss the role of MOEs. While the
information provided by our contacts modestly expands our
understanding of the role of these enterprises, it is noteworthy
that the discussions are happening at all. The overall impact
of MOEs on the Vietnamese economy remains opaque, but the MOD is
clearly influential in key sectors of the economy, including
telecom and infrastructure. The MOD is likely to resist
equitization of MOEs, using national security exceptions as its
justification, and also following Party directives to protect
the "leading role" of the State-sector in the economy. The
MOD's self-reliance doctrine is used to justify MOD holdings in
non-defense sectors even as other SOEs in those sectors
equitize. As in all SOEs, MOE managers have defacto ownership
of their firms and can profit handsomely from their positions.
End Comment.WINNICK