HCMC CONTACT ON CHINA, INTERNAL CPV POLITICS AND PRESSURE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 001404

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2016
TAGS: PREL CH PGOV PHUM PINR VM
SUBJECT: HCMC CONTACT ON CHINA, INTERNAL CPV POLITICS AND PRESSURE ON
MEDIA AND DISSIDENTS

REF: HANOI 2996

HO CHI MIN 00001404 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Chern, Acting Consul General, EXEC,
ConGen Ho Chi Minh City, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C/NF) Summary and Comment: On December 12 we met with Huy
Duc (protect),a well-placed HCMC media contact, to review the
results of the APEC Leaders' Summit, media issues and internal
political developments. Duc reportedly is close to Politburo
member Truong Tan Sang, head of the Communist Party's Standing
Committee of the Politburo's Secretariat. The U.S.-educated Duc
(University of Maryland) also is an advisor and ghostwriter for
former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet. (Kiet has been one of the
leading proponents of accelerated political and economic reform
within the Party.)


2. (C/NF) Duc complained about the extent of Chinese influence
in Vietnam and within the Party, but noted that the Chinese were
miffed by a series of perceived slights at APEC. He said that
Vietnam's Communist Party is pushing hard to reinforce control
over the media, to reestablish Party discipline and strengthen
Hanoi's authority over provincial leaders. Duc he was concerned
that, post-APEC and post-PNTR, pressure on the Party to reform
will cease and Party leaders will "do what they want." We note
that this message is based primarily on the reporting of only
one contact and could be driven by factionalism within the Party
or other motivations. However, Duc's fretting about China, his
comments on a tightening of Party control over the media and
increased pressure on dissidents dovetail with those of other
HCMC-based contacts. End Summary and Comment.

APEC and China: Beijing Slighted?
--------------


3. (C/NF) According to Duc, Prime Minister Dzung was caught off
guard by President Bush's query to him about the educational and
other links of his adult children to the United States.
(Biodata and information on the activities of the families of
high-ranking officials is considered very sensitive in Vietnam.)
But, according to HCMC contacts reportedly close to Dzung,
Dzung's two adult children studied in the United States.
Although both his son and daughter have since returned to
Vietnam, his daughter reportedly has a romantic link with an
unidentified "resident of the United States." A third, younger
son, reportedly is in high school in the UK. Although some
Vietnamese took the President's question to be a social "ice
breaker," many, including the PM, saw it as a subtle warning
that the United States "continues to watch Vietnam very
carefully," our contact said.


4. (C/NF) Turning to China and APEC, Duc said that the Chinese
delegation was miffed over perceived slights from the Vietnamese
during the APEC Leaders' meeting. President Nguyen Minh Triet's
decision to wear gold-colored traditional dress reportedly
offended because gold is the color of the Chinese kings. Hu
Jintao and his wife reportedly saw this as misplaced Vietnamese
arrogance. Truong Tan Sang reportedly told our contact that
Triet was aware of the sensitivities of his Chinese guests but
decided to forge ahead.


5. (C/NF) The Chinese also reportedly were rankled by the lack
of popular enthusiasm and media coverage for the Chinese
President in Vietnam. He and another media contact told us that
the Chinese advance team had requested that the GVN organize a
"proper public reception" for Hu Jintao. While the GVN bussed
in some participants to line the Chinese President's route in
Hanoi, the reception was seen as desultory and paled with warm
welcome that President Bush was accorded, especially in HCMC,
one contact noted.


6. (C/NF) Separately, other HCMC media contacts told us that
newspapers had been heavily criticized by the Party's Ideology
and Culture Committee -- the press watchdog -- for "skewing"
APEC press coverage in favor of President Bush and the United
States. One contact, Nam Dong, the senior editor of Phap Luat
(Law) newspaper (protect) told us that he pushed back by telling
the Committee that the President actually made news and had
events the press could cover. Nam Dong also noted
parenthetically that Vietnamese newspapers had more interest in
covering the activities of the U.S. President in any case.

All eyes on China?
--------------


7. (C/NF) Referring to an earlier (NFI) visit that Truong Tan
Sang made to Laos, Sang reportedly told Duc that his visit was

HO CHI MIN 00001404 002.2 OF 003


designed to strengthen the pro-Vietnam faction of the Laotian
Communist Party against Chinese inroads. He noted that Sang
believed that all of his activities and conversations were being
closely monitored by the Chinese in Laos. Sang also reportedly
observed that he and other Politburo members believe that the
same Chinese scrutiny is the norm inside Vietnam. Duc added
that, from his experience, the Chinese modus operandi in Vietnam
is to "quietly encourage" a desired outcome, but that they would
"pull all strings" to get what they want. He said that the
Chinese "were pleased" with the selection of Dzung as Prime
Minister and sought that outcome. Sang and President Triet do
not have the "blessings" of the Chinese, he added.

Internal Political Developments
--------------


8. (C/NF) Duc told us that he had recently received a copy of a
draft Politburo decision document proposing internal changes to
the Communist Party. The proposal was drafted by a committee of
25 "scholars" organized by Sang and the Party Secretariat, and
calls for reversing government decentralization and local
autonomy. One proposal calls for the Prime Minister to be given
the power to name the Chairmen of the provincial People's
Committees, stripping that (nominal) prerogative away from the
local People's Councils. Another proposal calls for courts to
be centralized under the Party in Hanoi and to remove the
influence of the provincial party committees over the courts.


9. (C/NF) The document did not broach the idea of merging the
positions of the President and Party General Secretary,
following the Chinese model. However, this idea is still under
unofficial discussion, Duc said. The complexities in arranging
a meeting between President Bush and Party General Secretary
Nong Duc Manh during APEC helped strengthen the position of
proponents of a merger, our contact noted. He commented that PM
Dzung is best positioned to benefit from a merger of the two
positions. Manh was irreparably weakened by the PMU-18
corruption scandal and Triet is not considered a candidate for
further advancement. At this point, the only other viable
competitor is Sang, who has shown that he "knows how to play
chess."

Press and Dissident Restrictions
--------------


10. (C/NF) We asked our contact if he thought authentic a
Politburo document circulating on Vietnamese expat dissident web
sites entitled "directives for increasing leadership in assuring
national security in new circumstances." The document,
allegedly promulgated on October 14, outlines efforts to
reinforce Party discipline on contact with foreigners, oversee
NGOs, and control the press and Internet. The document also
calls on the party to deal more forcefully with independent
labor organizers, land rights movements and "hostile external
forces." Duc said that he had not seen the document, but
thought that its tone and content were consistent with what he
had heard emanating from Hanoi.


11. (C/NF) One such indication is the separate decision by the
Prime Minister to issue in November "Instruction 37" tightening
controls over the press (Reftel). According to our contact,
this decision came at the recommendation of the Chinese
Communist Party and the internal urging of MPS Vice Minister
Nguyen Van Huong and Minister of Culture and Information Le Doan
Hop. Instruction 37 precludes privatization of the media and
empowers Party administrative bodies -- such as the Youth Union
-- to exert more control over personnel and financial decisions
of their subsidiary newspapers. It also calls on the State
Inspectorate and the Ministries of Finance and Culture and
Information to continue their financial audits of every media
outlet.


12. (C/NF) Instruction 37 also calls on all newspapers to report
to Party culture and ideology supervisors how they have
implemented and adhere to Politburo directives 41 and 162 of

2004. These directives reportedly call on the press to strictly
adhere to culture and ideology guidelines and instructions, to
be vigilant against "hostile forces," to combat efforts to
promote "peaceful evolution" and to enforce Party discipline
within the press.


13. (C/NF) In this context, Duc noted that it seems certain that
the chief editors of the reformist HCMC-based Tuoi Tre and Thanh
Nien newspapers will be replaced. The editor of Tuoi Tre is
vulnerable because the newspaper has been too aggressive
reporting on corruption and other government lapses. Although
Thanh Nien has been more careful, Chief Editor Nguyen Cong Khe
is vulnerable because of a longstanding dispute with MPS Vice

HO CHI MIN 00001404 003.2 OF 003


Minister Huong. According to contacts in the HCMC press corps,
Huong sees this as his time to exact revenge for Khe's role in
breaking the "Nam Cam" organized crime case in 2003 in HCMC,
which brought down a police general closely allied with Huong.


14. (C/NF) Separately, the editor of Phap Luat, Nam Dong,
confirmed that the Party is trying to clamp down on Tuoi Tre.
He told us that, as a result of Tuoi Tre's unwillingness to
follow strictly GVN and censor instructions on the coverage of
State Bank of Vietnam problems in printing Vietnam's polymer
currency and allegations of malfeasance and nepotism against the
Governor of the State Bank, the two senior reporters who covered
the story were censured and prevented from being promoted to the
newspaper's editorial staff. According to this contact,
instead, the HCMC Youth Union, which oversees Tuoi Tre, will
place two of its staff on the editorial board.
CHERN