Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HILLAH98
2006-06-01 14:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
REO Hillah
Cable title:  

INTERNAL DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTH CENTRAL IRAQ: AN UPDATE

Tags:  PGOV KISL PREF PHUM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4778
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0098/01 1521438
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011438Z JUN 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0632
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0646
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0697
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000098 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/1/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL PREF PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: INTERNAL DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTH CENTRAL IRAQ: AN UPDATE

HILLAH 00000098 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000098

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/1/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL PREF PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: INTERNAL DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTH CENTRAL IRAQ: AN UPDATE

HILLAH 00000098 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: On May 24, Ali Abbass Jahaker, head of the
Wasit Office, Ministry of Displacement and Migration briefed REO
staff on the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) situation in
South Central Iraq. Jahaker provided updated Ministry
statistics for South Central IDPs: Najaf 1600 families, Wasit
1551, Karbala 1393, Qadisiyah 580, and Babil 550 for a total
of 5674 families or an estimated 34,044 individuals. Jahaker
noted that to date, virtually no IDPs have returned to their
homes. He stated there was growing reluctance from provincial
governments to rehabilitate housing and provide long term
assistance that might encourage IDPs to settle permanently in
the region. He characterized his Ministry's assistance as
limited to initial subsistence items, and acknowledged that the
main brunt of assistance in other provinces was being borne by
religious organizations in Najaf and Karbala, and by a
relatively effective Red Crescent in Qadisiyah. END SUMMARY


2. (SBU) Jahaker stated that these figures were somewhat higher
than the number of refugees registered by provincial governments
as they include families seeking assistance, but not yet
registered. He described the situation as tense in many IDP
clusters throughout the region, noting that families would
rather camp in the desert than suffer the humiliation of living
in government-sponsored tent settlements. He said that his
staff found it increasingly dangerous to repeatedly visit IDP
clusters. Displaced families were now less likely to restrain
themselves to questions about when additional aid would arrive,
and were threatening his staff with physical violence if nothing
was done.


3. (C) Jahaker noted that the situation was made more difficult
by the increasing tendency of provincial governments to limit
assistance and find ways of "encouraging" refugees to move on.
He cited the example of Najaf, where the provincial government

had sent up a tent center thirty kilometers from the city that
housed sixty families. No one stayed there long, he said,
because the living conditions were unbearable, citing a lack of
potable water and numerous scorpions. Nonetheless, Jahaker
said, refugees in Najaf were relatively better off than in other
provinces. Religious organizations were providing extensive aid
and because of the tourist infrastructure for pilgrims, there
were sufficient vacant buildings to house IDPs. However, the
Governor had rejected an offer by his Ministry to establish an
office there. Jahaker noted that an episode involving four
terrorists who had allegedly infiltrated refugees in Kufa had
also alarmed the provincial government. He stated that
hardening provincial attitudes throughout South Central toward
IDPs had led to some national political figures in Baghdad
threatening to displace Sunni families in South Central in order
to provide housing for displaced Shi'a families.


4. (C) Jahaker noted that provincial reluctance to begin medium
and long term assistance for IDPs was hampering his Ministry's
operations in the region. He stated that Najaf Governor
Al-Ta'ee had initially refused a Ministry request to open an
office there, and that Qadisiyah Governor Hamza was refusing to
cooperate with the Ministry representative in his province. In
Babil Province, the Ministry had an enthusiastic, but
inexperienced representative who had yet to gain traction in
providing assistance. He stated that Coalition Forces should
consider the Ministry's regional offices as natural partners,
given provincial government reluctance to deepen assistance and
the unreliability of NGOs such as the Red Crescent.


5. (U) Jahaker inquired about the possibility of USAID-funded
assistance in Wasit, stating that because of the province's
proximity to Baghdad and geographic size, the humanitarian
situation there was worse than in other South Central Provinces.
He noted that a substantial percentage of families had serious
medical problems. In addition, children had a high prevalence
of disease and chronic medical conditions, ranging from skin
rashes to cases of typhoid. He said that while some families
had been able to relocate to an apartment complex outside of Al
Kut originally built for Iranian refugees, many were living in
abandoned or heavily damaged buildings, often relying on tarps
and corrugated tin panels for shade. Jahaker also noted that
the province had incarcerated two hundred Afghan families who
had illegally entered Iraq from Iran. According to Jahaker, the
Iraqi government intended to deport the Afghans after they
served a six-month jail term, but so far, the Iranian government
had refused to cooperate.


6. (C/NF) Bio notes: Ali Abbass Jahaker ~ grandfather and
mother born in Iran~ claims to have worked as a representative
of the Marjaya'a (Ayatollah Ali Sistani's religious leadership)

HILLAH 00000098 002.2 OF 002


in Wasit, transferring funds for the Marjaya'a since the fall of
Saddam Hussein~ also claims to have been involved in the
stand-up of an ad hoc local militia, the "Al Mukhtar" battalion
immediately after Saddam's regime collapse~ offered to
facilitate introductions to the Marjaya'a in Najaf.
MEURS