NORTH BABIL SUNNI SHEIKHS CALL FOR RETENTION OF IP CHIEF,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000082

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR NCT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL IZ
SUBJECT: NORTH BABIL SUNNI SHEIKHS CALL FOR RETENTION OF IP CHIEF,
PREDICT SECTARIAN VIOLENCE OTHERWISE

REF: HILLAH 0080

HILLAH 00000082 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, RC, REO Al Hillah, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)





1. (C) SUMMARY: During a recent meeting with the Regional
Coordinator (RC) nine Sunni Sheikhs and tribal leaders from
northern Babil Province made a passionate appeal for the REO to
prevent the termination of Provincial Police Chief General Qais
Hamza Aboud Al-Momouri (ref). The Sheikhs argued that Babil is
a strategically important province in Iraq and that the removal
of the General would adversely affect the already deteriorating
security situation. Moreover, the Sheikhs predicated that if
the Provincial Council (PC) successfully fires Qais (who is a
secular Shi'a),an increase in sectarian violence would be the
result, specifically in northern Babil. Without direct
intervention by the Embassy, they contended, the United States
would be morally responsible for any further bloodshed. The RC
noted that while General Qais is well respected and a dedicated
professional it is not USG policy to intervene in internal Iraqi
political matters. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The strategic importance of Babil, the group noted,
cannot be underestimated. First, the province is located only
sixty miles south of Baghdad and any security problems in the
region will directly affect the capital. Second, Babil connects
Baghdad with the southern portion of Iraq. If Babil descends
into sectarian violence this will impact the ability of
Coalition Forces and the Iraqi Army to intervene in southern
provinces, according to the Sheikhs. The significance of the
province therefore demands a professional Police Chief who is
able to effectively deal with the insurgency, terrorists and
sectarian violence.


3. (C) The Sheikhs stated that the PC and the governor are
attempting to fire the General for purely political reasons.
General Qais, they argued, incurred the fury of the PC because
he specifically refused to allow the SCIRI (Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq) dominated PC to control the Babil
police forces. During a recent Iraqi Police (IP) graduation
Qais unveiled a lottery system designed to randomly disperse
freshly graduated IPs to assignments. As a large number of
these IPs possessed strong ties to Shi'a militias and were
handpicked by the PC and governor to deploy in one coherent
unit, Qais' approach calculatedly ensured their dispersion. The
PC and the governor, according to reports, are attempting to
rescind the deployment and reassign the IPs in support of SCIRI
objectives.


4. (C) The Sheikhs unanimously expressed their desire that
General Qais remain in his position as the Babil Police Chief,
noting that he is fair, professional, uncorrupted, loyal to Iraq
and dedicated to his mission. One member noted that the police
departments in northern Babil "were built upon the shoulders of
the General." Others stated that although the IPs had
previously arrested their family members, Qais' forces conducted
themselves with the highest level of professionalism, and even
earned the admiration of the Sunni population in northern Babil.



5. (C) The group warned that if the PC sacks Qais, sectarian
violence will erupt, especially in northern Babil. Currently,
they claimed, cooperation with Coalition and Iraqi security
forces remains positive, but without a police leader they can
trust it will be difficult to work with the provincial
government. One Sheikh noted that if Qais is removed "we will
have to take a different stand." The implication being that
this "stand" would be against Iraqi and Coalition forces.


6. (C) REO staff asked the Sheikhs if they had contacted the
Ministry of the Interior (MOI) to voice their concerns about
this pressing issue. The Sheikhs responded that they have so
far failed to reach individuals in the MOI capable of making
decisions concerning Qais. They further argued that talking
with MOI is not important or even necessary because the
Coalition forces are the "highest authority" in Iraq. Based
upon this logic, they cautioned that if the PC is successful in
removing Qais, they intend to blame the United States. The RC
enunciated to the group that he agreed with their assessment of
the General, but that the competent and legal authorities of
Iraq are responsible for determining the General's future as the
Babil Police Chief.


7. (C) COMMENT: This meeting is highly significant because it
marks the first time that tribal leaders from northern Babil
approached the REO and voiced their concerns about a political

HILLAH 00000082 002.2 OF 002


issue in the province. It also demonstrates that the Sunni
minority in the province is willing to participate in the
political process. However, if the PC is able to fire General
Qais it is likely the Sunni population in the north will feel
increasingly isolated from governmental institutions. Also,
there is little doubt that the PC will replace Qais with a
SCIRI/Badr figure loyal to the current provincial
administration. Such an appointment may intensify the cycle of
sectarian violence south of Baghdad that is already proving
difficult to break. END COMMENT.
FONTENEAU