WASIT SADRISTS: SISTANI EDICT ON MILITIAS DOES NOT APPLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000076

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/2/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PTER KISL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: WASIT SADRISTS: SISTANI EDICT ON MILITIAS DOES NOT APPLY

REF: A. 2005 HILLAH 262 REF B. 2006 HILLAH 74

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY. The head of the Wasit Sadr Office, Bashaar
Al-Mousawi, in an April 30 meeting with Regional Embassy Office
(REO) Al-Hillah staff, insisted that the April 27 statement on
militias from Grand Ayatollah Sistani does not apply to Sadrist
Jaysh Al-Mahdi forces in the province. JAM forces are too
disorganized and poorly armed to be properly considered a
militia, according to Al-Mousawi. Therefore, Sistani's statement
was applicable only to the Badr Organization and Kurdish
Peshmerga militias. Al-Mousawi was confident that the "Sadrist
Current" would continue to gain in influence and power in Wasit.
Relations between Wasit Sadrists and local branches of the Badr
Organization and Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SCIRI) would remain stable, Al-Mousawi said, but violence
between the two remained a possibility. END SUMMARY.

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WASIT SADRISTS CONFIDENT SISTANI'S MILITIA EDICT DOES NOT APPLY
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2. (C) The April 30 meeting, held at the request of Al-Mousawi
in the Wasit Provincial Council Building in Al-Kut, was the
first face-to-face contact in over ten months between Wasit
Sadrist representatives and Regional Embassy Office staff. Also
present at the meeting were Sadrist Provincial Council members
Ahmed Hussain Abrrah and Ahmed Shebab Hamad. They were joined by
Nassar Al-Husseini, who identified himself as the
"Administrative and Financial Manager" for the Sadr Office in
Wasit.


3. (C) Al-Mousawi said he interpreted Grand Ayatollah Sistani's
declaration that weapons must be only in the hands of
"government forces" (ref A) as applying exclusively to the Badr
Organization and the Kurdish Peshmerga. The Wasit Jaysh Al-Mahdi
(JAM),according to Al-Mousawi, are "disorganized" and focused
solely on protecting themselves. Further, since the JAM are not
supported by "a foreign state", they could not be considered a
militia. Al-Mousawi, backed enthusiastically by Sadr Office
administrator Al-Husseini, said the JAM would continue to bear
arms and "resist" as long as foreign forces were present in
Iraq.

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SADRISTS EXPECT LARGER ROLE IN FUTURE
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4. (C) The tensions-occasionally violent--that characterize the
relationship between Sadrists and members of SCIRI/Badr in Wasit
have largely subsided, according to Al-Mousawi. He admitted that
while Sadrists were responsible for the last major outbreak of
violence in August, 2005 (ref B),relations between the two
groups would hinge largely on national-level developments. So
long as Sadrists are treated fairly and with respect in the
national government, Al-Mousawi said, he did not foresee
problems in the near-term. NOTE: Al-Mousawi originally described
SCIRI and Badr organization officials in the province as his
"enemies," then immediately corrected himself and used the more
neutral "other groups." To the amusement of his colleagues,
Al-Mousawi then said, "When I say enemies, I only mean the
American occupation forces." END NOTE.


5. (C) Al-Mousawi, supported by PC members Abrrah and Hamad,
predicted that provincial elections, regardless of when they are
held, will lead to a much more powerful role for the Sadrists in
Wasit. One of the Sadr Office's largest problems is that some
independent members of the PC pretend to speak on behalf of the
Sadr Office to Coalition Forces in the province, according to
Al-Mousawi. Abrrah and Hamad both asserted that only the Sadr
Office and its sympathizers have a successful record of helping
the poor and disadvantaged in the province. In their opinion,
when voters compare the track record of the allegedly
"incompetent" SCIRI-dominated PC to the Sadrists, sentiment will
overwhelmingly favor the Sadrists.


6. (C) Sadr Office administrator Al-Husseini and PC member Hamad
both asserted that the presence of Coalition Forces in the
province was hurting the security situation. Al-Husseini in
particular protested that Coalition Forces do not respect the
Sadrists and have repeatedly tried to provoke a confrontation
between the Coalition Forces and JAM. Hamad angrily questioned
why there are still foreign military forces in the province. In
his opinion, U.S. forces are intentionally allowing terrorists
to cross into Iraq through Syria to provide a base for the
insurgency, and thus a rationale for the continued presence of
U.S. and Coalition Forces. NOTE: Husseini insisted that U.S.
forces "raided" his office during the week of April 25th and

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that only his "restraint" prevented a larger conflict. According
to U.S. military contacts and in the judgment of REO staff, this
"raid" did not occur as Husseini described. END NOTE.


7. (C) COMMENT: Wild conspiracy theories and unwarranted
allegations notwithstanding, the April 30 meeting provided a
clear picture of the growing confidence of the Sadrist movement
in Wasit province. Previously, Sadrist contacts in the province
would cancel planned meetings at the last second, or refuse
outright to speak to REO personnel. However, this meeting took
place in the heavily trafficked Provincial Council building.


8. (C) Though Al-Mousawi is respected as the political "face" of
the Sadrist movement in the province, it is unclear what
standing he has in the broader, Najaf-based Sadrist hierarchy.
The Sadrists assessment of their provincial election prospects,
while optimistic, has some basis in fact, as there is widespread
discontent with the current provincial government. Less
believable, however, is Al-Mousawi's optimistic assessment of
Sadrist relations in the province with SCIRI/Badr. Regardless of
the situation in Baghdad, it is difficult to imagine that
SCIRI/Badr will stand idle to Sadr's challenge when maneuvering
for the provincial election begins in earnest. END COMMENT.
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