Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HILLAH75
2006-05-01 10:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Hillah
Cable title:  

NAJAF FRIDAY SERMONS: SADRIST SAYS THE JAYSH AL-MAHDI ARE

Tags:  KISL PGOV PINS PTER IZ 
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VZCZCXRO9556
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHIHL #0075/01 1211055
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011055Z MAY 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0613
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0599
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0664
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000075 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/1/2016
TAGS: KISL PGOV PINS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: NAJAF FRIDAY SERMONS: SADRIST SAYS THE JAYSH AL-MAHDI ARE
NOT "MILITIA"

HILLAH 00000075 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000075

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/1/2016
TAGS: KISL PGOV PINS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: NAJAF FRIDAY SERMONS: SADRIST SAYS THE JAYSH AL-MAHDI ARE
NOT "MILITIA"

HILLAH 00000075 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY During Friday sermons in Kufa and Najaf, Sadr
cleric Sayyed Mohammed al-Tabatebaiee rejected the idea of
integrating militias into Iraqi security forces in contrast to
SCIRI preacher Al-Deen al-Qubanji who praised integration. Both
clerics appeared to be reacting to Ayatollah Sistani's April
28th statement putting responsibility for maintaining public
order squarely in the hands of national security forces. The
difference between the two Shi'a religious parties was also
evident in atmospherics; the Kufa mosque was crowded with
1700-2000 young men, most wearing Sadr-black uniforms with green
armbands. By contrast, the 800 strong audience for al-Qubanji's
sermon included many local dignitaries as well as clerics from
SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim's office. A subsequent
Sadrist press conference in Najaf and similar statements from
Sadrist officials in Wasit Province indicate that Sadrists are
presenting a united front on keeping the Mahdi Militia
independent while not openly contradicting Ayatollah Sistani.
END SUMMARY

Background: Ayatollah Sistani's Statement
--------------


2. (U) Both sermons appeared to be in reaction to Ayatollah Ali
Al-Sistani's policy statement the day before. Sistani discussed
his meeting with Prime Minister-designate Norri al-Malaki. He
notably called for domestic security to be in the control of
national security forces with sectarian militia to be folded
into government security units as appropriate. Sistani urged
the new administration to fight corruption and stated that the
marja'iya placed the national interest above sectarian politics.


3. (C) Accordingly, the Sadrist and Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) clerical replies appear to have been
heavily anticipated. Minibuses coming from Baghdad filled a
parking lot outside the Sadrist Kufa mosque. Najaf provincial
council SCIRI party members were in the audience at SCIRI cleric

Al Deen al-Qubanji's sermon. Security was tight at both
mosques, but while both Sadr Madhi Militia and Badr Organization
(the armed wing of SCIRI) militia members provided security at
their respective venues, weapons were not obviously on display.

Sadr Cleric Sayyed Mohammed al-Tabatebaiee: There are no Sadr
Militia
-------------- --------------
--------------


4. (C) Senior Sadr cleric al-Tabatebaiee centered his sermon on
an explanation of why the Mahdi Militia did not fit the
definition of militia as used by Ayatollah Sistani. Militia,
al-Tabatebaiee explained, are organized, well-trained,
well-equipped, well-paid, and well-led. They also receive
support from the outside. An example would be the Kurdish
peshmerga, al-Tabatebaiee stated. On the other hand, he
continued, the so-called Mahdi Militia possess none of these
qualities. Their members were not trained, relying only on
their prior military experience and carrying only personal arms.
They did not receive outside support, received no salary, and
were fighting only for the sake of their religion and Islam.


5. (C) Al-Tabatebaiee attributed the idea of equating Mahdi
members as a militia to Ambassador Khalilzad. Ambassador
Khalilzad sought to end the Sadrist ability to defend
themselves, he said. If the militia are to be eliminated,
Tabatebaiee said, one will have to include the peshmerga.


6. (C) Al-Tabatetaiee also discussed an Iraqi Army raid in Kufa
several nights before, blaming the raid and one death on the
Americans (COMMENT: Our involvement was limited to providing air
cover and back-up. END COMMENT). He mentioned a recent
Al-Zarqawi video, condemning Al-Zarqawi's comments and the fact
that he appeared with terrorists dressed in black (the color of
Mahdi Militia uniforms).

SCIRI Cleric Al-Deen al-Qubanji: Integrate the Militia
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Al-Qubanji's remarks were well attended by Najaf
provincial dignitaries, including Provincial Council members and
senior clerics from the office of SCIRI leader Ayatollah Abd
al-Aziz al-Hakim. Security was tight and roads leading to the
Husiniyia Mosque in Najaf were closed. Badr Organization
militia members provided inner perimeter security and the Najaf
police had numerous police patrols in the neighborhood.


8. (C) In contrast to Sadrist al-Tabatetaiee, al-Qubanji

HILLAH 00000075 002.2 OF 002


expressed optimism concerning the new government, stating that
resolution of the political impasse will help stabilize security
and enable prosperity to develop. He approved of the idea of
merging militia into regular security forces, and demanded that
the international community, including the Arab League, move to
support integration.


9. (C) Like al-Tabataiee, al-Qubanji condemned Zarqawi's
television appearance. Al-Qubanji characterized Zarqawi and his
ex-Baathist allies as an example of mis-guided extremism.


10. (C) COMMENT: In REO's assessment, Sadrist cleric
al-Tabatebaiee was speaking directly for Moqtada al-Sadr. He
was often seen in 2004 standing closely behind and to the left
of MAS during MAS's public sermons in Najaf. Subsequently,
al-Tabatebaiee was arrested by coalition forces and released
seven months ago. During his incarceration, he allegedly led
Sadrist Friday afternoon prayers in the prison, an indication of
his close standing to MAS. Thus, his comments that the Jaysh
al-Mahdi may not tolerate integration into formal Iraqi security
units may prefigure hard political bargaining to come, and
perhaps, future violence in the South-Central region. At the
same time, al-Tabatebaiee took care not to directly contradict
Sistani's call for militia integration.


11. (C) At an April 30th press conference called by Sadrist
after meeting with Moqtada al-Sadr in Najaf, Council of
Representatives member Dr. Bahaa al-Araji stated that the Mahdi
Militia are not connected to a particular party, but are more of
a public movement and therefore do not meet a legal definition
of militia. He also suggested that the Mahdi Militia do not
need integration into public institutions as many members are
already public employees or professionals. Sadr officials in
Wasit Province on the same day offered much the same reasoning
to REO staff, indicating extensive coordination of this party
message. END COMMENT
FONTENEAU