FORMER NAJAF GOVERNOR ON AL-SADR, IRANIAN INFLUENCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000054

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/5/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER NAJAF GOVERNOR ON AL-SADR, IRANIAN INFLUENCE

REF: A) HILLAH 0046 B) HILLAH 0010

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, RC, REO Al Hillah, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)





1. (S) SUMMARY: Former Najaf Governor and head of the Loyalty to
An Najaf party Adnan Al Zurfi believes Muqtada Al-Sadr wishes to
avoid armed confrontation with coalition forces, but is finding
it difficult to keep Madhi Army militia under his direct
control. Sadr, Zurfi commented, is listening to Sistani and
working to purge radical, unpredictable lieutenants from the
Najaf Mahdi militia. By doing so, he hopes to minimize chances
of an out-of-control incident that could give the Americans an
excuse to attack the Jaysh al-Mahdi. Zurfi warned that JAM
militia in Najaf are stockpiling mortars and may have recently
received anti-tank missiles from Iran (NFI). He described
Iranian influence in Najaf as deep, but limited. While Iranian
intelligence is embedded in many layers of Najaf government,
there has been little Iranian commercial investment.
Consequently, many Najaf citizens remain skeptical of Iranian
intentions and would strongly prefer a continued U.S. presence.
Zurfi described a massive Iranian public relations campaign in
which up to three hundred Najaf business owners, bureaucrats,
teachers, and intellectuals, men and women, are sent on an
all-expenses paid trip to Tehran. Despite the inducements,
Zurfi said, many Najaf citizens return unconvinced. Zurfi also
updated REO Hillah staff on his brother's kidnapping case, and
again called for financial support of his party and related
organizations (reftel B). END SUMMARY


2. (S) Adnan Al Zurfi came to REO Al Hillah to pass along
documents related to his brother's kidnapping, and the arrest of
one of his aides. He said he intended to go to Baghdad in the
near future to meet with the FBI and pass along a dossier on his
brother's case to PM Ibrahim Jafari.


3. (S) Zurfi portrayed himself as a hunted man, continually
under attack by Najaf Governor Assad Al Taee and Deputy Governor
Hassan. He stated that he believed Hassan is holding his
brother, Hussein, based on calls made from Hussein's cell phone
that appeared to originate from government buildings, prisons,
and houses known to belong to Hassan. Zurfi described Governor
Al Taee as more aggressive than DG Hassan. He downplayed
reports of enmity between the two, noting they were moving in
the same direction. Al Taee, he said, had warned Zurfi's
long-standing provincial government and Iraqi police contacts
that they would be fired if they were seen with Zurfi.
"Trumped-up" charges of corruption during Zurfi's tenure as
governor, brought by the Governor, had been dismissed in
Baghdad, Zurfi added.

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Iran: Often thanks, but no thanks
--------------


4. (S) "Najaf belongs to the Iranians," Zurfi said. He stated
that the Governor had told him it was nothing personal, but as
long as Zurfi, a U.S. national, was seen by the Iranians as
someone who could rally anti-Iranian sentiment, the prosecution
would continue. Zurfi urged the United States to pay more
attention to Zurfi's political allies, the sheikhs of major
tribes, such as the Al-Ghazali in Najaf province. Those sheiks,
Zurfi said, saw no commercial advantage in dealing with Iranians
and preferred the status quo, preferably with plenty of U.S.
largesse. Comment: However, tribal-based politicians have
performed poorly in local elections, with SCIRI and Dawa
capturing most votes. End Comment


5. (S) Zurfi claimed that the governor swings all municipal
contracts to Iranian-connected business owners. However, his
power is checked somewhat by Ayatollah Sistani's disinclination
to interact either with the governor or the Iranians. Sistani,
Zurfi noted, meets infrequently at best with Governor Al Taee.


6. (S) Zurfi characterized Iranian influence as deep, but
limited. The Iranians work through "their man", Deputy Governor
Hassan, but also control most intelligence functions in the
province. Zurfi noted that this is a important reason why
Iranian public relations often fails to capture hearts and
minds; the blatant exercise of power by local intelligence
personnel cuts too close to the excesses of the Saddam era for
most local residents. Teachers, former Baathists, clerks
believe they could be dismissed at any time for no reason. As
an aside, Zurfi commented, many intelligence operatives from the
Saddam days are back in action and manipulating Sadr militia
units, or alternatively influencing Sadrists through relatives
embedded in the militias. They have just swapped green shirts
for black, Zurfi concluded. Zurfi also claimed that in the past
two months, the price of weapons has surged in the Najaf area as

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JAM members stock up. They are particularly interested in
mortars and have received anti-tank missiles from Iran, Zurfi
asserted.


7. (S) Zurfi contrasted Iranian pull in the Najaf provincial
bureaucracy with their limited commercial clout. Many Najaf
businessmen would prefer dealing with the Americans who at least
bring aid dollars to the table, Zurfi said. To counter this,
Zurfi claimed that the Iranians are giving out all-expenses-paid
tours to Teheran on a grand scale. Up to three hundred local
residents a month from all works of life are bused or flown to
Iran. The particularly influential are sometimes taken to meet
Ayatollah Khata or Rafsanjani


8. (S) Zurfi asserted that the Governor of Qom Province had
recently secretly traveled to Najaf during Arba'een, staying in
a small house adjacent to the main shrine for Hussein. He
related how an acquaintance had had business dealings with a
relatively high-profile Iranian intelligence agent "Hammad" who
made it a point to seek out Iraqi businessmen and offer them
Iranian imports at close to or below cost ("Hammad" had
allegedly worked in the Sudan during the Eighties). The
Iranians, Zurfi claimed, were also assisting SCIRI in gradually
removing police chiefs one by one around the region, replacing
them with SCIRI members. In these small ways, Zurfi stressed,
the Iranians steadily accumulated influence.

--------------
Muqtada Al-Sadr: A Fearful Moderate?
--------------


9. (S) Zurfi claimed that Al-Sadr had met with Ayatollah Ali
Sistani one-on-one just days before, in a two hour meeting. Sadr
"knows what is going on," Zurfi says, and does not hesitate to
demonstrate his willingness to cooperate with Sistani. Zurfi
characterized Al-Sadr as wanting to stay engaged in the
political process. Accordingly, Zurfi commented, Al-Sadr is
fearful that uncontrollable elements of the JAM will jeopardize
his political gains by provoking the Americans into attacking
and crushing the militia. Therefore, in Najaf, Al-Sadr is
sending away more radical members of his entourage and turning
over militia groups to more reliable or at least predictable
lieutenants. He noted that after a recent Badr-instigated
attack on his compound, Al-Sadr's first reaction was to restrain
militia members who had rushed to the scene, encouraging them to
stay calm. Zurfi commented that Sadr's support is not as
monolithic as commonly portrayed in the media. The Americans,
Zurfi commented, should attempt to reach out to older, "simple"
Sadr members who have automatically, but at best only
half-heartedly, transferred their allegiance to the son.
Comment: Reftel A reports on a meeting between Al-Sadr and
Sistani. Zurfi may or may not be referring to the same meeting.
His account of the meeting differs substantially from reftel.
End Comment

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Zurfi's perilous place
--------------


10. (S) As per reftel B, Zurfi continues to emphasize that his
party and other secular parties in Najaf (including the
Communist Party) are losing ground as supporters abandon hope
that they can influence events. He stated that he himself is
only staying in Najaf because of the disappearance of his
brother. He also asked for U.S. intervention in the trial of a
former assistant who has been transferred to Babil Province to
face multiple charges of murder and extortion. Zurfi claims
that the charges are based on a confession extracted by torture.
Comment: Regardless of the validity of Zurfi's accusation,
there have been repeated accounts of human rights abuses by the
defendant End Comment


11. (S) Zurfi said his finances are dwindling and he has yet to
receive the salary he is entitled to as an ex-governor. Still,
he commented, he remains politically active, most recently
organizing a teen sports and culture association as an
alternative to joining the militias. He optimistically
commented that while many of his supporters may have gone
underground, they yearn for leaders who can deliver normalcy,
and not rely on partisan religion for their base of support.
FONTENEAU