Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HILLAH53
2006-03-31 18:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Hillah
Cable title:  

MUQTADA AL SADR MEETS WITH AYATOLLAH AL SISTANI: OFFERS

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM IZ 
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DE RUEHIHL #0053 0901818
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311818Z MAR 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0584
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0568
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0633
C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000053 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: MUQTADA AL SADR MEETS WITH AYATOLLAH AL SISTANI: OFFERS
"ASSISTANCE"


CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, RC, REO Al Hillah, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000053

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: MUQTADA AL SADR MEETS WITH AYATOLLAH AL SISTANI: OFFERS
"ASSISTANCE"


CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, RC, REO Al Hillah, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (U) This is a SET Najaf Cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY. According to two independent sources, on March
30, in a hastily arranged meeting, Muqtada Al Sadr met with
Ayatollah Al Sistani to discuss recent events and solicit the
Ayatollah's advice. Sistani reportedly told Sadr that he had to
remain peaceful and continue to help Iraqis, particularly those
displaced by sectarian violence. Sadr offered to provide
security for important Shi'a sites throughout Iraq. Sistani
declined the offer. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) SET Najaf staff spoke with a contact working in Muqtada's
retinue as well as a contact close to Ayatollah Fayyad (strictly
protect both sources). SET Najaf's sources told us that on the
evening of March 30, Muqtada Al Sadr met with Ayatollahs
Sistani, Al Najafi, and Al Hakim at Sistani's home. Sadr had
requested the meeting earlier that day.


5. (C) Reportedly, Sadr opened the meeting by requesting advice
on how best to respond to recent "attacks" on Sadrists in
Baghdad and Najaf. Sistani told Sadr that he "must remain in
peace in order to serve Islam and Muslims."


6. (C) Sadr reportedly offered protection for holy shrines and
also for the assembled Ayatollahs' homes. He stated that he
could offer a level of protection greater than that of the Iraqi
police or private security forces. According to SET Najaf's
sources, Sistani declined with thanks to Sadr's offer, noting
that the present level of security was adequate and there did
not seem to be a present threat that would require a change.


7. (C) Comment: It is no coincidence that Sadr would meet with
the Marjaya'a at this point. There are numerous reports of Sadr
moving "forces" into the province as part of the commemoration
of the death of Mohammed. The recent conflicts between Mahdi
militia and coalition forces have clearly gotten Sadr's
attention. It is likely that he went to the Hawza for tacit, if
unwitting approval of action against Coalition Forces. This
suggests a scenario of Sadr loyalists becoming a regularized
extra-governmental security force in Najaf province, undertaking
manning checkpoints (an effort already underway) and openly
guarding large parts of Najaf city. If the Ayatollahs were to
legitimize these "forces", any perceived provocation would
elicit a violent response by Sadrist forces. It appears that,
for the time being, the Hawza are not comfortable with lending
their reputation to Sadr's power consolidation tactics. End
Comment

FONTENEAU