MOQTADA AL SADR ISSUES STATEMENT ON RECENT FIGHT WITH ISF

S E C R E T HILLAH 000052

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL IZ
SUBJECT: MOQTADA AL SADR ISSUES STATEMENT ON RECENT FIGHT WITH ISF
AND U.S. AND ON ALLEGED MORTAR ATTACK ON HIS HOME

CLASSIFIED BY: ALFRED FONTENEAU, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO,
AL-HILLAH, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (U) This is a SET Najaf cable.


2. (C) Summary: Radical anti-American cleric Moqtada Al Sadr
met March 26 in Najaf with clerics from his organization and
members of his Mahdi Militia. He called on them to be calm and
show restraint in the wake of renewed fighting with Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) and U.S. forces in the Sadr City section
in Baghdad on March 26. This meeting came on the heels of a
reported mortar attack near Sadr's residence in Najaf on April

26. Sadr told his followers to remain vigilant, however, and be
prepared to combat any action by the "invaders." Finally, he
dispatched a group of Mahdi Militia members to Baghdad to help
secure Sadr City and to provide protection for pilgrims headed
south to Najaf to commemorate the death of the prophet Mohammed.
End summary.


3. (C) On March 26, an explosion occurred in the Al Hannah
quarter of Najaf near the Qumail shrine and the residence of
Moqtada Al Sadr. Initial reports from Sadrists who were near
Sadr's house stated that there had been a mortar attack on his
residence. There have been press reports describing the
incident as a mortar attack, with one report from an Iraqi news
outlet stating that Sadr's office and the Iraqi Police (IP)
Chief in Najaf were the sources for this information (with a
quote to that effect from the IP Chief). However, according to
an Iraqi Army Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) officer, when
the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) responded to the scene, they
were not allowed near the site. The Iraqi Army EOD officer
asked for fragments of the "mortar." None were turned over and
at least some of the Iraqi Army officers involved are
unconvinced that there had been a mortar attack. Instead, an
Army officer speculated that a "flash/bang" grenade had been
responsible for the explosion. Sadr's security personnel are
known to possess flash/bang grenades and the reluctance to allow
inspection of the mortar round(s) caused some suspicion among
the ISF.


4. (S) Moqtada Al Sadr called a meeting late on the evening of
the March 26 with his clerics and security forces. During this
meeting he insisted that all Mahdi Militia show restraint, but
maintain vigilance. Sadr placed these forces on "high alert."
He also ordered members of the Mahdi Militia to travel north to
help secure Sadr City and roads likely to be used by pilgrims
headed south to Najaf to mark the death of Mohammed. Sadr also
said that it was time to apply pressure to the national
government to condemn the acts of aggression against his
followers and to act to stop such attacks. Sadr's comments were
relayed to SET Najaf local staff by a source familiar with the
contents of the meeting.


5. (C) In the late night meeting, Sadr condemned the recent
alleged actions of Coalition Forces both in Sadr City and in
Najaf. Sadr noted that during the coming anniversary of the
prophet's death, these acts are an insult. He asserted that he
would like to see loyalist clerics renew the emphasis on this
anniversary to make it a more important date in Shi'a Islam.
And finally, at the conclusion of the meeting Sadr released a
statement.


6. (C) Begin statement: By the name of God, we have been
informed that the invaders want to lead the Iraqi people to war
and into crisis, especially those from the so called Sadrist
entity. So I call on my brothers not to be dragged into western
schemes, especially on the anniversary of the martyrdom of the
prophet of Allah. Therefore, I want everyone to maintain calm
and I call on the armed forces to protect the pilgrims,
cooperate, and increase their efforts because our enemies are
waiting for us. End statement.


7. (C) Comment. Sadr's summoning of clerics and militia members
in Najaf and the dispatch of forces to the North point out a
need to preserve political influence by appearing strong in the
face of "incidents." While recent reports indicate Sadr's
willingness to take part in the political process, his base is
and will be for the near future, the 18 to 30 year-old males who
have joined him in his "struggle" and who will expect a resolute
response. Sadr will have to walk a tight rope, perhaps
responding in kind, but avoiding a repeat of his August, 2004
fight with Coalition forces. Recently, south-central Iraq has
been relatively quiet. Sadr may decide to stir the pot here as
a reminder that he is still the tough kid on the block. End
Comment.

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