Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HILLAH31
2006-02-27 17:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Hillah
Cable title:  

CAR BOMB IN KARBALA KILLS EIGHT, CLERICS CONDEMN ACT BUT

Tags:  KISL PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ 
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VZCZCXRO0322
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHIHL #0031/01 0581718
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271718Z FEB 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0558
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0543
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0605
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000031 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/2016
TAGS: KISL PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: CAR BOMB IN KARBALA KILLS EIGHT, CLERICS CONDEMN ACT BUT
CALL FOR PEACEFUL RESPONSE, SOME RESIDENTS BLAME U.S.

REF: A) HILLAH 0029 B) HILLAH 0028 C) HILLAH 0026

HILLAH 00000031 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: AFRED FONTENEAU, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO,
AL-HILLAH, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000031

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/2016
TAGS: KISL PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: CAR BOMB IN KARBALA KILLS EIGHT, CLERICS CONDEMN ACT BUT
CALL FOR PEACEFUL RESPONSE, SOME RESIDENTS BLAME U.S.

REF: A) HILLAH 0029 B) HILLAH 0028 C) HILLAH 0026

HILLAH 00000031 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: AFRED FONTENEAU, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO,
AL-HILLAH, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (SBU) SUMMARY: A February 25 car bomb in Karbala killed
eight and wounded 31. An impromptu protest after the incident
at the site of the attack included chants of "No, no America."
Religious leaders in Karbala and Najaf were quiet after the
incident, with no reports of calls from the mosques for
demonstrations. When contacted by local REO staff regarding the
Karbala bombing, a representative of the senior Shi'a religious
leaders in Najaf called for a non-violent response and did not
place blame on the United States. However, two political
leaders in Najaf - one a SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq) member and one a Sadrist -- did fault the
U.S. for the bombing. The link, if any, between the Karbala
attack and the February 22 bombing of the Al-Askariyah shrine in
Samarra is unclear at this point in time. END SUMMARY.

--------------
KARBALA CALM AFTER DETONATION OF CAR BOMB
--------------

2. (SBU) According to the Iraqi Police (IP) in Karbala, at
approximately 10:55am on February 25, a vehicle concealed
improvised explosive device (VCIED) was detonated in a
neighborhood in southwestern Karbala city. The neighborhood is
outside the city center, where the twin shrines of Imams Hussein
and Abbas are located. The VCIED was parked near a market and a
Shi'a mosque. It was also approximately 50 meters from a police
checkpoint and 250 meters from an IP station. Eight people were
killed and 31 wounded. One IP officer reported that two
policemen were among those killed. There was no substantial
damage to nearby buildings. The bomb was remote controlled and
had been placed in a Chevrolet sedan. Local residents saw the
bomber leaving the area after the explosion. They seized and
beat him before the police arrived and took him into custody.

IPs and the Iraqi Army closed off streets in the neighborhood
shortly after the incident.


3. (U) The Karbala Governor, Dr. Aqeel Mahmoud Al-Khaz'ali,
appeared in a live interview on Al-Arabiya satellite television
channel within an hour of the bombing and gave the basic facts
on the incident. After the attack, a small demonstration broke
out near the site of the bombing. Protestors chanted "No, no to
terrorism," "No, no America," "No, No Saddam" and "Sayyid
Sistani is a crown on our heads."


4. (C) Karbala IP Chief Colonel Razzak Abed Ali informed REO
Hillah staff on February 25 that the suspect had an outstanding
arrest warrant. Iraqi Security Forces had previously seized
weapons and explosives at the man's house. The police have not
yet indicated if the man is affiliated with any terrorist or
other violent organization. IPs believe the man is Shi'a.


5. (U) After the detonation of the VCIED on the morning of
February 25, there were no calls from the twin shrines or from
other mosques in Karbala for demonstrations against the attack.
On February 26, Karbala was quiet. Local REO staff reported
there were no demonstrations, or speeches or statements from
religious leaders. IPs and IA members prevented people from
entering the city center, where the twin shrines are located.

-------------- --------------
NAJAF CLERICS, LOCAL LEADERS CALL FOR CALM; SOME BLAME U.S.
-------------- --------------

6. (C) Local REO staff contacted several Najaf religious and
political leaders on the afternoon of February 25 to get their
reaction to the car bombing in Karbala. Sheikh Ali Rubaiee, the
office manager for Ayatollah Mohammed Ishaq Al-Fayadh (one of
the four high-ranking Marja, or senior Shi'a clerics, in Najaf,
of which Sistani is the leader) condemned the attack, blaming
Wahhabis and other extremists who he said were using the
security situation to attack the Shi'a. He stated that the
Ayatollahs (the four senior Marja) always call for peace among
all Iraqis, and offered that Sistani said, "that even if half of
the Shi'a were killed, he [Sistani] will not legitimize the
killing of one Sunni." The office manager said the Ayatollahs
always call for peaceful protest and mourning, and for respect
for the property and lives of all Muslims.


7. (SBU) Sheikh Khalid Al-Noumani, a member of SCIRI and the
Deputy Chairman of the Najaf Provincial Council, condemned the
attacks and placed blame on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Al-Noumani said he wanted "the people" to protect holy sites if
the government could not do it. He also criticized U.S. forces
for poor coordination and information sharing with the ISF, and
argued that this "crippled" the latter, preventing it from doing
its duty. Al-Noumani asked that the U.S. government take a

HILLAH 00000031 002.2 OF 002


clear position on the authority of the ISF and on Iraqi
sovereignty.


8. (SBU) Sahib Al-Ameri, a Sadrist political leader who is the
head of the Shaheed Allah (God's Martyr) organization,
criticized the Iraqi government for its handling of the
situation. He said that the Sadrists will continue protesting
in order to apply pressure on the national government to require
"the invaders" to withdraw from Iraq "after all the crises this
country has witnessed because of them." Al-Ameri blamed Zarqawi
for the attack in Karbala, calling him an "American agent."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------

9. (SBU) COMMENT: Given that the South Central region of Iraq
is still tense after several days of large-scale protests and
scattered violence after the February 22 attack in Samarra,
which seriously damaged the Al-Askariyah shrine but resulted in
no casualties, the lack of any substantial demonstrations
despite the killing of eight people in Karbala highlights the
fact that the Shi'a region's response will be most forceful when
terrorists target significant holy sites.


10. (C) Responses from political and religious leaders to the
Karbala attack mirrored those after the February 22 bombing of
the Al-Askariyah shrine in Samarra. The Marja'iyah in Najaf
condemned the attack in Karbala and called for a non-violent
response. In addition, the senior Shi'a clerics around Sistani
did not fault the U.S. for the February 25 bombing. In
contrast, two political leaders in Najaf placed at least partial
blame on the U.S., with a local Sadrist blaming Al-Qaeda in Iraq
leader Zarqawi for the VCIED in Karbala and declaring him to be
an "American agent," much as Sadrists faulted the U.S. for the
Samarra attack.


11. (C) The extent to which the Samarra bombing and the
resulting violence has affected Iraqis' - both leaders and
regular citizens - views of the Coalition is unclear. The
impromptu demonstration after the Karbala bombing with its
anti-American message is likely an indicator of the increasing
frustration Iraqis feel with the continuing violence and the
slow pace of reconstruction, among other things, with the U.S.
carrying a substantial portion of the blame for these problems
among Iraqis. The Samarra bombing seems to have substantially
increased the level of frustration and anger among the Shi'a,
who feel the things they value the most - key holy sites and the
past and current religious leaders they represent - are under
siege.


12. (C) Local political leaders seem increasingly willing to
tap into this anger by blaming the Coalition for problems in
order to appear more independent and to raise their own
profiles, with Moqtada Al-Sadr serving as a successful model for
this approach. Increasingly, local leaders - even if they are
on very good terms with the U.S. - see close relations with the
U.S. as a political liability. As an example, a senior member
of the Karbala Provincial Council recently (prior to the Samarra
bombing) asked REO staff to visit him in the governate complex
only on Saturdays, when there would be few people in the
building. This PC member, an independent Islamist, has been and
remains on very friendly terms with U.S. civilian and military
officials in the region. With provincial elections just over
the horizon, Iraqi officials, and the religious leaders they are
close to, will likely seek to put additional distance between
themselves and the U.S., at least in the eyes of voters. END
COMMENT.
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