JAFARI NOMINATION VARIOUSLY GREETED WITH PRAISE, DISBELIEF,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000024

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL IZ
SUBJECT: JAFARI NOMINATION VARIOUSLY GREETED WITH PRAISE, DISBELIEF,
DEBATE IN SOUTH CENTRAL IRAQ

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CLASSIFIED BY: GARY ANDERSON, ACTING REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO,
AL-HILLAH, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (SBU) Summary: The selection of Ibrahim Jafari as the choice
of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) to serve as Prime Minister of
the new Iraqi government was greeted by widely divergent
reactions across South Central Iraq. Most Shi'a Islamist
contacts praised Jafari, even as some UIA constituent group
partisans, such as members of the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),expressed their surprise.
Many contacts praised the man Jafari bested for the post, SCIRI
Official Adel Abdul Mehdi. Most contacts credited Sadrists for
securing the candidacy for Jafari, while Islamists and
secularists differed widely on Jafari's prospects in the Council
of Representatives (CoR) and his job performance to date. End
summary.

NAJAF: UIA ACCEPTS JAFARI, DEBATES MINISTERIAL ASSIGNMENTS
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2. (C) Najaf Shi'a Islamists view the Jafari nomination as a
victory for the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and the Shi'a, and
most treat his confirmation by the Council of Representatives
(CoR) as a foregone conclusion. Najaf Islamic Dawa Member Dr.
Majeed Zaini praised Jafari and maintained that the current
Prime Minister enjoys widespread popular support. Sayid Riyadh
Baher Al-Aloum, a Najaf Provincial Council (PC) member, credited
Jafari's attempts to bring the Sunnis into the political process
with creating "widespread acceptance" for his candidacy. The
head of the student union in the College of Economics at Kufa
University, Firas Abdul Ameer, a moderate Sadrist, praised
Jafari and related that Adel Abdul Mehdi's perceived support for
semi-autonomous regional governments made him less popular than
Jafari, who supports maintaining one united Iraq.


3. (C) The Najaf spokesman for the Fadhila Party, Hassan Hussein
Allwan, praised the selection process as "legal and democratic."
Allwan reported that the withdrawal of Fadhila Party Leader Dr.
Nadim Al-Jabiri, who, he said, ceded the nomination rather than
make broad ministerial concessions, sealed Jafari's bid for the
Prime Minister post. Allwan maintained that support for Jafari
within the UIA was "widespread." He argued that those unhappy
with the current state of Iraq generally blame difficult
circumstances rather than Jafari's personal performance.


4. (C) One secular politician, however, citing the close vote
within the UIA to select Jafari and what he described as
Jafari's poor performance as Prime Minister to date, speculated
that the "fragile" UIA consensus on Jafari might not hold. Abdul
Al Al-Essawi, the Najaf leader of the Iraqi National Accord
(INA),offered that, "we still believe that Jafari's selection
will cause friction within the UIA." He maintained that Mehdi
was more popular outside of the UIA, especially among the Kurds,
and that Jafari's selection would exacerbate sectarian tensions,
particularly between Sunni and Shi'a.


5. (C) With most Islamists resigned to Jafari's assumption of
the Prime Ministership, much speculation focused on ministerial
portfolio assignments. Zaini, the Dawa representative, reported
that the UIA had already formed committees to both internally
vet minister candidates and to negotiate assignments and
candidates with other parties in the CoR. Allwan, the Fadhila
spokesman, avowed that Jalal Talabani had already been selected
to serve as President, that Iyad Allawi was likely to become
Defense Minister, that the UIA would maintain the Interior and
Oil posts, with Oil going to Fadhila, and that a Kurd would
become Minister of Foreign Affairs. Al-Aloum predicted that the
UIA would maintain Interior, that Defense and Trade would go to
the Sunnis, Oil would go to an independent such as Mithal
Al-Alousi, and that a Kurd would become Vice President. The
moderate Sadrist Ameer offered that the Shi'a and Kurds would
retain all key ministries with minor posts such as those of
Transportation and Human Rights left to the Sunnis.

KARBALA: JAFARI'S BID LIKELY SECURE
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6. (C) Karbala contacts reported that the selection of Jafari is
likely to hold, but that intense jockeying would ensue over
support for Jafari in exchange for ministerial appointments.
Shaykh Ali Komonna, a former governor, political independent and
prominent tribal leader, pointed to the Sadrists as the key to
Jafari's selection. He reported that Sadrists used harsh
propaganda to discredit Jafari competitors Mehdi and Al-Jabiri
of the Fadhila Party, such as the circulation of documents
alleging a connection between Mehdi and the Baathists and
pro-Saddam Hussein articles allegedly written by Al-Jabiri.
Komonna predicted that in spite of alienating Fadhila members

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with such tactics, Jafari would remain the UIA's choice. Karbala
Editor Ali Al-Janabi, also an independent, argued that Jafari
will become the next Prime Minister and offered that the UIA
would control over half of the ministerial positions.


DIWANIYAH: SCIRI SHOCK AT JAFARI SELECTION
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7. (C) In Diwaniyah, surprise, and in some cases shared
condolences, greeted the selection by the UIA of Jafari to be
Prime Minister. Shaykh Hussein Al-Khalidi, Diwaniyah Head of the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),
allowed that "of course I cannot deny that all indications were
giving the [nomination] to Dr. Adel [Abdul Mehdi.]" Dr. Haider
Hamza Obaid, a religious independent, maintained that "many
people were surprised, because the media and the public pointed
to Mehdi as the most likely candidate." Obaid said that many of
his friends with close ties to SCIRI offered one another
condolences upon hearing the news. Obaid also reported that
Diwaniyah tribal leaders were unsatisfied with the selection.
Liberals concurred. Dr. Mazen Lilo, a law professor at Qadisiyah
University, offered that "most of the people were looking for
another person."


8. (C) All contacts, religious and secular, credited the
Sadrists with offering Jafari the support he needed to outpoll
Mehdi among the UIA. Farhan Murad, the political editor of
Diwaniyah newspaper, cited the connection Sadrists feel with
Jafari's Dawa Party because Dawa's founder, Mohammed Baqr
Al-Sadr, is an uncle of Moqtada Al-Sadr. Others cited the belief
that Mehdi, were he to become Prime Minister, would grant Kirkuk
to the Kurds, an act opposed by Sadr. And many contacts,
religious and secular, noted their belief that Mehdi was the
early favorite because of widespread public perceptions that he
would be more favorable to the international community and to
the United States.


9. (C) Still, UIA contacts maintained that Jafari would be a
strong Prime Minister. But most contacts, secular and religious,
agreed that the issue is not yet over. Shaykh Hussein, of SCIRI,
described Jafari as a strong leader and said that any failures
attributed to him from his current stint as Prime Minister were
the fault of circumstances beyond Jafari's control. (Note:
Shaykh Hussein is a savvy politician and likely praised Jafari
to REO Al-Hillah staff in large part to maintain a united UIA
front before a U.S. government official. End note.) He added,
"there is a small chance that the Council of Representatives
will not vote Jafari in, and in that case Dr. Adel Abdul Mehdi
will be the next choice." Shaykh Hussein was firm in stating
that the Prime Minister, whether Jafari or Mehdi, must be from
the UIA and at least half of the key governmental positions and
ministries must go to UIA members. Saad Madhloom, Diwaniyah Head
of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) and a
political independent, said that the real test of Jafari's
candidacy would take place outside of the UIA, on the floor of
the CoR. "No one can say it is finished," he avowed.

BABIL: JAFARI'S HARDLINE ON KIRKUK SEALS BID
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10. (C) Babil Province officials and observers generally praised
the Jafari nomination and predicted dire consequences were he to
fail to gain the post. Kadhum Majeed Tomam, a Sadrist member of
the Babil Provincial Council, praised Jafari for his strict
stance against yielding Kirkuk to the Kurds, an act that many
contacts across the region suggested that Jafari's competitor,
Mehdi, would consider. Saad Al-Haddad, a pro-UIA journalist with
Al-Hillah-based newspaper Al-Fayhaa, praised Jafari in almost
the exact same words, calling the Prime Minister "more strict,"
a description also used by Babil Communist Party Head Dr. Ali
Abdul Kareem, who favored the nomination of Mehdi because of his
flexibility.


11. (C) Others, while expecting the Jafari nomination, preferred
the alternative. Bassem Jassem Al-Humaidi, a member of the
Transitional National Assembly from the UIA slate who did not
win a seat in the current CoR, offered that, "I wouldn't have
hesitated for one minute to chose Mehdi." He reported that he
favored Mehdi because of his perceived flexibility, versus the
strictness of Jafari. Because of this, Al-Humaidi maintained,
Mehdi is more capable of dealing with the Kurds and Sunnis, and
is more acceptable to the international community.


12. (C) None of the contacts saw much chance of Jafari failing
to win the position. Tomam maintained that there was "zero
expectations" that the CoR would not approve Jafari. Dr. Ali,
the Communist leader, conceded that the Prime Minister should be
a member of the UIA, and said that Jafari has a "great chance"
to win the post. He predicted a "parliamentary crisis" if Jafari
did not. Al-Haddad, the journalist, related that a surprise was

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not unthinkable in the political machinations surrounding the
Prime Ministership, but said that if Jafari is not approved by
the CoR, "the whole political process is going to fall apart."


WASIT FADHILA AND INA: JAFARI'S BARGAINS WILL NOT HOLD
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13. (C) In Wasit, CoR representatives both inside and outside
the UIA doubted that Jafari's victory would last. Basim Sharif,
presently a Fadhila TNA member and incoming CoR member,
expressed his skepticism over the UIA's selection of Jafari. In
Sharif's opinion, SCIRI's Mehdi is still well positioned to
emerge as the UIA's nominee. Though he conceded that Jafari's
negotiating skill is formidable, he avowed that the Sadrist and
Shi'a independent support that carried the day for Jafari is too
unstable to be relied upon in the long term. According to
Sharif, Jafari's selection cannot withstand the pressure of
negotiation with Kurds, Sunnis and secularists in the search for
a governing majority in the CoR. Sharif asserted that the poor
record of the current Jafari government in providing basic
services and security and his weak record as an administrator
would eventually cause the tide to turn against the Prime
Minister.


14. (C) Shaykh Jamal Al-Batik, the sole Allawi list
representative from Wasit in the CoR, speculated that Jafari had
offered a cabinet position to a member of the Wasit UIA list in
order to gain their support. (Note: The Wasit UIA slate won
seven of Wasit's eight allocated CoR seats. End note.) According
to his (unconfirmed) information, Jafari offered Mohammed
Al-Khateeb, the Wasit Deputy Governor and lead Wasit UIA
candidate in the December 2005 election, a ministerial level
position in a Jafari-led government. In spite of these efforts
by Jafari, Al-Batik argued, his nomination would not survive.
Al-Batik speculated that the Sadrists' refusal to cooperate with
Allawi and his supporters, a seemingly necessary plank in the
formation of a national unity government, would shatter the UIA
coalition, and Jafari's support, and open the door to another
nominee.
ANDERSON