WASIT COR REP ON UIA OVERTURES TO ALLAWI

C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000023

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: WASIT COR REP ON UIA OVERTURES TO ALLAWI


CLASSIFIED BY: GARY ANDERSON, ACTING REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO,
AL-HILLAH, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)





1. (C) SUMMARY. Shaykh Jamal Al-Batik, the sole Wasit National
Iraqi List (ballot number 731) member in the incoming Council of
Representatives, related discussions between Iyad Allawi and
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq head Abdul
Aziz al-Hakim. According to Al-Batik, Hakim has been in contact
with Allawi several times in search of ways to outmaneuver UIA
(ballot number 555) Prime Minister-designate Ibrahim
Al-Ja'afari. Al-Batik predicted the UIA would eventually fall
apart under pressure from other political parties and the U.S.
to form a national unity government. Al-Batik also used the
meeting to vent one final time against perceived U.S. inaction
against voting and campaigning irregularities during the
December 15, 2005 election. END SUMMARY.

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HAKIM CONTACTS ALLAWI: NATIONAL UNITY GOV. DISCUSSED
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2. (C) According to Al-Batik, Allawi has been in touch with
Al-Hakim, both on the telephone and in person, over the past
several days. Al-Batik, who is in communication with other INA
members familiar with the discussions, said Al-Hakim indicated
his extreme displeasure over the selection of Ja'afari as the
UIA/555 nominee for Prime Minister. Allawi, according to
Al-Batik, stressed to Al-Hakim that his delegation to the CoR
would continue to insist upon a national unity government and
that the federalist and separatist aspirations of the South must
be brought under control. Ja'afari, in Allawi's opinion, is
entirely unsuited to this task.


3. (C) Based on his conversations with UIA representatives as
well as Allawi list members, Al-Batik said he thought the
Sadrists were the unstable element in the pro-Ja'afari group.
The Sadrists, in the end, would refuse to cooperate in any
fashion with the Allawi list, and would thus break from the
UIA/555 as pressure to form a national unity government
increases.

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ELECTION WOUNDS STILL RAW, BUT GRATEFUL FOR PROACTIVE U.S. ROLE
IN COALITION NEGOTIATIONS
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4. (C) Al-Batik expressed his intense frustration at what he
thought were unfair and illegal campaign practices by members of
the UIA/555 prior to the December 15, 2005 elections. The U.S.,
in the opinion of Al-Batik, was constantly kept informed of
voter intimidation, defacement of campaign posters, and other
illegal tactics, yet chose to do nothing, giving the UIA/555 an
unfair advantage in Southern and South Central Iraq.


5. (C) On a more positive note, however, Al-Batik expressed his
and other rank and file Allawi List representatives'
appreciation of the active Embassy role in coalition
negotiations. The UIA/555, in his opinion, is overreaching. Only
pressure from the U.S. to form a national unity government with
non-sectarian, non-militia control of the security ministries
would bring the Shi'a Islamists into line, according to
Al-Batik.


6. (C) COMMENT: As a member of the Allawi list, Al-Batik's
statements on the internal affairs of the UIA/555 should be
treated with some skepticism. However, his descriptions of the
widespread distrust towards Ja'afari and the active machinations
against him will bear further watching as coalition negotiations
continue. Moreover, Al-Batik's statements indicate that active
U.S. involvement is seen by some as an accepted and essential
part of the process. END COMMENT.

ANDERSON