UN DEVELOPS ROLE IN SHIA HEARTLAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000154

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/5/2016
TAGS: IZ
SUBJECT: UN DEVELOPS ROLE IN SHIA HEARTLAND


CLASSIFIED BY: Davison, Mark, Leader, PRT Najaf, POL, Dept. of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (a)


1. (C) Begin Summary: Supported by both the Coalition, PRT
Najaf and the REO, SRSG PolAd Wilfred Buchta and an advance team
traveled to Najaf City on 5 December to lay the groundwork for a
visit in early 2007 of the SRSG to meet with Grand Ayatollah
Sistani and Shia radical cleric Muktada Al Sadr. Confined to
Special Forces Camp David, Buchta was unable to meet with
representives of either, but was able to discuss the logistics
of such a visit with military on the ground, as well as meeting
at Camp David with the Governor of Najaf and the Head of the
Provincial Council. The Governor spoke of his desire to
maintain Najaf as a secure environment and for this he needed
Baghdad to apply principles of federalism and decentralization.
End Summary

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PLANS OF THE SRSG TO VISIT NAJAF
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2. (C) Spurred by the desire of the Special Representative of
the Secretary General of the UN (SRSG) to visit the Province of
Najaf and to meet with Grand Ayatollah Sistani and radical Shia
cleric Muktada Al Sadr at the end of January 2007, the SRSG's
Political Advisor, Wilfred Buchta, carried out an advance vist
to Najaf City on 5 December 2006. While there, he met with the
Governor of Najaf and the Head of the Provincial Council, but
did not meet with any representatives of either Sistani or Al
Sadr. Buchta was accompanied by one of the SRSG's Military
Advisors, LtCol Michael Donoghue of the Army of New Zealand, and
three UN security officers. (Note: earlier reporting on this
subject provided to PolSec by way of PRT Najaf Weekly NCT
Sitreps.)

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THE UN CAN PROVIDE AN ESSENTIAL LINK TO THE GOVERNOR AS
FEDERALIST
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3. (C) In an evening debrief, Buchta told PRT Najaf Leader
Davison the following:

It is the desire of the SRSG to capitalize on Buchta's developed
contacts with the Shia in Najaf so as to provide a key link
between Sistani and Al Sadr on the one hand (who refuse to meet
directly with the Americans) and the US Embassy;
Buchta is very appreciative of the support given by PRT Najaf
and the REO to his advance visit -- notwithstanding that he did
not meet with representatives of Sistani or Al Sadr, he was able
to lay the groundwork for the movement of the SRSG, both to Camp
David and to the eventual locales for those meetings in the
future;
He had a very productive and informative meeting with the
Governor, who characterized the Province of Najaf and the South
Central region as secure and peaceful, putting into perspective
the about once per week "notable security incidents" in Najaf
Province;
The Govenor is a keen advocate of both federalism and
decentralization -- with the deteriorating security situation in
Baghdad, provincial capitals, particularly in South Central,
must be given the resources to provide for their own security,
to defend themselves against the terrorists, as well as for
their own prosperity;
A highly centralized state, according to the Governor, is as
undersirable now as under Saddam Hussein -- even worse, the
central authority now has its hands full with the security
situation in Baghad -- better that the provinces, both in the
north and south, are able to look after themselves;
The Governor attributes provincial secuirty incidents to the
former Baathist and Al Quaida undergrounds;
Notwithstanding his general view that Najaf was secure, the
Governor said that he would not be standing in the next
provincial election for the Provincial Council and thus would
not continue as Governor -- he characterized his remaining in
office as "too dangerous."

(Note: these reported comments by the Governor on federalism
track with our record of his meetings with the Coalition in
Baghdad, preparatory to the move to Provincial Iraqi Control
(PIC),scheduled for mid-December.)

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MOVEMENT, COMPLICATED BY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, AND POSSIBLE
SRSG SCENARIO
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HILLAH 00000154 002 OF 002


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4. (C) As Baghdad is aware, travel from REO Al Hillah to Najaf
overland is at present problematic and movement is made on a
case-by-case basis. Buchta arrived yesterday at the REO (the
closest site to Najaf with overnight facilities) and we have
supported his stay and that of his team. However, Buchta's
movement today was facilitated by Coalition air lift capability.
Buchta and his colleagues were transported by helicopter from
REO Al Hillah to Special Operations Camp David; the Governor and
the Head of the Provincial Council met him at Camp David and
there was no movement by Buchta or his team outside the Camp.


5. (C) Buchta spoke of the possible scenario for the SRSG to
meet with Sistani and Al Sadr in the near term. The SRSG would
be taken by helicopter to Camp David and then transported to
former FOB Hotel for either meetings with the Governor and/or
staging for travel to the homes of Sistani and Al Sadr. During
consultations at Camp David today, the Coalition offered
military transport; in his de-brief, Buchta told PRT Leader
Davison that he the SRSG would not like such transport,
preferring a UN armored vehicle, as he felt to be in a HumVee
made him look "imbedded" with the miliary. LtCol Donohugh is
working closely with Coalition elements, both at Camp David and
in Kalzu to make the SRSG's January trip a logistic reality.


6. (C) Comment: Buchta is both dynamic and well-informed; his
good contacts within the Shia religious and political community
will facilitate any desires the SRSG holds to make an impact for
the UNAMI in Najaf Province and with the Shia themselves; it
remains to be seen if the SRSG can or will be able to follow
through on this initiative by his Political Advisor.


7. (C) PRT Najaf leaves further distribution of this cable to
the discretion of the Political Counselor.
VIERGUTZ