SOUTH-CENTRAL IRAQ FEDERAL REGION: A DONE DEAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000132

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/16/2016
TAGS: PTER MARR PGOV ASEC IZ
SUBJECT: SOUTH-CENTRAL IRAQ FEDERAL REGION: A DONE DEAL

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO Al
Hillah, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: On August 14 Regional Embassy Office (REO),
Al-Hillah staff met with the head of Wasit Badr Corps and
Provincial Council member Qasim Mohammad Jalal to discuss
pressing issues of the province and region. The meeting proved
to be fruitful when Jalal presented new information in regards
to the looming issue of federalism. Jalal outlined both a time
frame and the manner in which a federalist state in
south-central Iraq would come into being. Jalal asserted that
the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) would address and
move forward with a federalism draft law by the end of
September. According to Jalal, this aggressive, accelerated
time frame is driven out of the fear that SCIRI may lose the
majority rule of the Provincial Councils in south-central Iraq
come next provincial elections and that such an outcome could
spell doom for the proposed south-central federal region.
Working at the grass roots level, he indicated that Badr has
been applying pressure on those parties and entities opposed to
a federalist solution. He went on to suggest that these two
moves would culminate in the establishment of a nine province
south-central Iraq Federal Region shortly after the end of
September. End Summary.


2. (C) After a long hiatus from Wasit Province, REO Al-Hillah
staff had the opportunity to return, on August 14, and meet with
the head of Wasit Badr Corps and Provincial Council member Qasim
Mohammad Jalal. Comment: Jalal is seen as a young, clever
up-and-comer in Badr Corps with extensive connections in the
Dawa Party. Often cooperative and frank, when Jalal speaks it
is generally regarded that he is speaking for the Badr
collective. Accordingly, as a senior representative to the
militant arm of SCIRI he ostensibly projects SCIRI's intentions
as well. End Comment. While the meeting was brief, Jalal was
able to illuminate Badr's position on the issue of federalism
with great clarity.


3. (C) REO staff inquired about the likelihood of a federalist
solution to which Jalal plainly responded, "The south-central
Iraq Federal Region is a done deal." He indicated that while a
final vision for a federal province in south-central has yet to
be agreed upon the overall concept of a federal region for
south-central was widely accepted by Shiites and Kurds
throughout the country. One major detail had apparently been
resolved though, according to Jalal, the Merjiyah had concluded
that there should be a singular south-central federal region
comprised of nine provinces and not two or three smaller federal
regions in south-central Iraq as some had been advocating. He
went on to add that this "super" federal region would be located
within a unified Iraq and that Baghdad would be a federal region
unto itself.


4. (C) "Shiite leaders consider that they have accomplished
nothing after the liberation without achieving the federal
state," according to Jalal. As such, Badr had been given clear
instructions from SCIRI leader, Abdel Aziz Al Hakim, to mobilize
efforts and people to advocate the necessity and importance of
establishing the nine-province state. Jalal went on to say that
Badr had begun applying pressure to those who opposed a
federalist solution. Jalal noted that the Sadrists and the
Fadheela Party remain the primary opponents to federalism and by
extension the Provincial Councils of Basrah and Missan, as the
Sadrists and Fadhella control the voting majority on the
Provincial Councils of these two provinces. Minus the Sadrists
and the Fadheela Party, the remaining United Iraqi Alliance
(UIA) members support federalism, according to Jalal. Jalal
indicated that Badr had already begun massive grass-roots
initiatives in an effort to pressure these two parties through
their base. As SCIRI holds the majority rule in seven of the
nine Provincial Councils in south-central Iraq, pressure would
be applied singularly to the provinces of Basrah and Missan.
Jalal said that within both provinces Abdel Aziz Al Hakim and
his son have been meeting regularly with community and religious
leaders for the purpose of advancing their federalist vision.
Ultimately, Jalal was dismissive of Basrah and Missan's efforts
to fight federalism and noted, "We did not need the support of
the two provinces to see a federal state realized as we (SCIRI)
hold the majority vote in the Iraqi Council of Representatives."



5. (C) When pressed on a possible time frame for the realization
of a south-central federal state, Jalal stated that the COR will
discuss the draft law for a federal system come September. He
went on to add that a resolution would be passed shortly
thereafter, as the Kurds were in full support of any such
resolution. With the full support of SCIRI, the Kurds, a
significant portion of UIA's voting block and seven of the nine
Provincial Councils of south-central Iraq, Jalal suggested that

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passing a federalism resolution through the COR would be a
matter of course. When REO staff inquired further on the
apparent hasty manner in which Badr is handling this critical
matter, Jalal admitted that Badr is pressing for the quick
passage of a resolution primarily because of the real
possibility, come next provincial elections, that SCIRI may not
be able to retain control of the critical seven south-central
Provincial Councils set to be included in the proposed federal
region.


6. (C) Comment: Perhaps most startling was the admission that
SCIRI may in fact lose governing authority in several provinces
in south-central Iraq. Such a frank admission suggests that
SCIRI may be losing favor among the masses and the Sadrists and
Fadheela Party may be in a position to gain from this disfavor.
As such, Badr is courting the Sadrists and the Fadheela Party's
base in the event that their time line for a final federalist
resolution falls through. Further, Jalal appears to be
suggesting that if SCIRI were to lose the majority rule of some
or all of the seven south-central Provincial Councils, currently
under its charge, the political landscape would be altered in
such a way that the SCIRI vision of a nine province
south-central federal state be squashed in its infancy. Though
Jalal paints a somewhat overly optimistic picture of how
federalism will spring forth within the coming months, the fact
remains that SCIRI and its federalism allies have the
legislative muscle to squeeze a federalism resolution out of the
COR in the time frame Jalal put forth, particularly if their
efforts are not countered by significant popular or political
opposition. End Comment.
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