QADISIYAH INA LEADER: BADR ORGANIZATION IS SETTING UP SADR

S E C R E T HILLAH 000131

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/10/2016
TAGS: KISL PTER MARR IZ
SUBJECT: QADISIYAH INA LEADER: BADR ORGANIZATION IS SETTING UP SADR
POLITICAL OFFICE FOR A FALL

CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO Al
Hillah, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (S) SUMMARY: In a August 2 meeting with REO staff, Abd
Muslim, the head of the moderate Iraqi National Accord party in
southern Qadisiyah (Diwaniyah) province, warned against
attributing all instability in Diwaniyah Province to the Mahdi
Militia (MM). Muslim believed that local MM cells are
frequently manipulated by provincial Badr Corps officers into
violence as a way of setting up Moqtada al-Sadr's political arm,
the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS),as a target of Coalition
Forces. He noted that the political party Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Badr Corps have an
uneasy relationship in Qadisiyah. Muslim saw provincial SCIRI
head Hassan al-Zamari and Badr Organization commander Al-Khaldri
as rivals. The struggle between them extended to the provincial
police with SCIRI attempting to remove an ineffectual Badr Corps
officer from the Chief of Police post. Muslim blamed
Qadisiyah's high incidence of assassinations on Badr. He
predicted that Coalition Forces targeting of OMS leaders would
backfire given that they often serve as a restraint on militias
susceptible to influence from Iranian intelligence officers
acting through Badr agents. END SUMMARY


2. (S) The August 2 meeting with Abd Muslim was as a follow-on
to a discussion of Diwaniyah's security problems between REO
staff, Qadisiyah Governor Hamza, and eight Provincial Council
members of a newly formed security committee (reftel). Muslim
stated that the Security Council's meetings with the REO and
MND-CS personnel on Camp Echo had led Governor Hamza to call an
immediate meeting with all high ranking police commanders.
Muslim and Governor Hamza, in a separate phone call to REO
staff, related that the Security Committee and Hamza had
threatened police commanders with arrest if indirect fire
attacks against Camp Echo occurred from their areas of
responsibility. The Governor divided the city into eight areas,
assigning each area to teams of six police officers.


3. (S) Muslim saw the Governor's willingness to demand more
from provincial police as a positive sign, but warned that
Governor Hamza and SCIRI head and Provincial Council Chairman
Hassan al-Zamily were frustrated by their inability to fire
Police Chief General Abdel Abbass. Abbass, Muslim claimed,
benefited from the protection of national Badr Corps leader
Al-Amary. Al-Amary, Muslim claimed, was more interested in
protecting Badr Organization autonomy and influence in
provincial secrecy than backing SCIRI in the Provincial Council.


4. (S) Muslim stated that the new Office of the Martyr Sadr
(OMS) leader in Diwaniyah, Abdul Razak al-Madali, was willing to
work with the provincial security committee. He noted that
al-Madali intended to go on television and announce that JAM
units were not responsible for attacks on Camp Echo. To Muslim,
this was a sign that OMS was willing to work with the committee
to restrain JAM units. Consequently, he said, Badr commanders
in the province were under orders to incite MM members embedded
in the police to conduct attacks against Coalition Forces
whenever possible. Their ultimate aim, Muslim said, was to
discredit OMS and provoke Coalition Forces into raiding OMS
headquarters and arresting key personnel.


5. (S) Muslim said that a serious issue in restoring security
is the overall incompetence of the current provincial Police
chief. Xxx remains in place because of his solid Badr Corps
credentials, Muslim remarked, pointing out that he was never
more than a First Lieutenant in the Iranian Army. Muslim
described a complex tug-of-war between Badr, SCIRI, and the
Provincial Council Chairman, who, while nominally SCIRI, works
more for Badr. In Qadisiyah, Muslim said, SCIRI and Badr,
while nominally affiliated, are actually competing for autonomy
and control over security decisions in the province. In the
meantime, he said, Badr would go ahead financing and controlling
Sadrist attacks while conducting its own aggressive
assassination campaign against ex-Baathists, translators, and
independents.

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