Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HILLAH122
2006-07-24 04:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Hillah
Cable title:  

UPDATE ON NAJAF CAR BOMBINGS

Tags:  PTER PGOV KISL IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8790
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0122/01 2050427
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 240427Z JUL 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0681
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0668
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0735
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000122 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/24/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV KISL IZ
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON NAJAF CAR BOMBINGS


HILLAH 00000122 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO Al
Hillah, US Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000122

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/24/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV KISL IZ
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON NAJAF CAR BOMBINGS


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CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO Al
Hillah, US Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary. According to local contacts, police believe
that three of an original seven VBIEDs (Vehicle Borne Improvised
Explosive Devices) are still roaming Najaf streets. However,
two suspects have been arrested for the Friday, July 6 (VBIED)
which exploded between two buses carrying tourists from Iran,
killing seventeen. One of the suspects, Abu Nadj, is a Kufa
local and possible Al-Sadr insider. Police believe his
involvement in the July 6 and possibly the July 18 bombing would
explain how the VBIEDs penetrated check points and exploded
close to Muqtada al-Sadr's compound. On July 5, provincial
security officials had received intelligence relating to a VBIED
the evening prior and tightened security leading into the city
of Najaf. The security posture, however, was lowered at 0400, 3
hours before the attack. As a result, Najaf security has been
tightened. Lines of up to 250 cars have formed on major roads
leading into Najaf as police instituted a curfew and road blocks
that effectively prevent civilian cars from driving within the
city. End summary.


2. (C) In the Kufa quarter of the city of Najaf on July 6, a
VBIED exploded, killing 17 Iranian tourists. The blast occurred
at a location between the local IP station and the Kufa mosque.
The injured were taken to Al Hakim hospital and "hasty" IP
checkpoints were raised throughout the city. It is not known
whether the attack was meant to kill the Iranian tourists,
though it is widely known that groups such as the one attacked
are frequently arriving in the area. This marks the second
VBIED attack in Kufa in the last four months. The previous
attack occurred April 6, in the vicinity of the Imam Ali Shrine,
one of Shia's most holy sites.


3. (C) The July 6 blast was followed by an even more lethal
attack on Tuesday, July 18. A KIA mini-bus picked up ten day
laborers, drove a few feet, and detonated, killing 59 and
wounding 132. The blast location was a few hundred meters from
the Kufa Shrine. According to local contacts, Najaf security

officials believe the two blasts are part of a group of seven
VBIEDs brought into the city (note: the press has reported
fifteen VBIEDs total, but police contacts put the total at
seven). Another vehicle was reportedly seized, and an explosion
against a CF convoy, originally attributed to an IED, may have
been one of the seven VBIEDs. Reportedly, three of the vehicles
are still at large within Najaf. Najaf perimeter security
remains tight with a curfew from 1800 until 0400. Lines of up
to 250 cars are common at checkpoints leading into the city and
many drivers are giving up, walking through the check points,
and looking for taxis on the far side.


4. (C) The local provincial government prides itself on its
ability to fend off the violence seen in other provinces around
Iraq. Following the July 6 explosion, they were left reviewing
their security standards and to some extent, attempting to lay
blame for the security lapse. The Governor, Assad Al Taee and
the Deputy Governor Abdul Hussein Abtan both raised the idea
that Ministry of Defense (MOD) intelligence had failed to
sufficiently collect information prior to the attack. In fact,
at 1900 the evening of July 5, MOD had passed down intelligence
to provincial officials warning that a vehicle, modified with
explosives was en route to Najaf. The vehicle was reported to
have Baghdad license plates. The security posture in Najaf was
raised to the highest alert. However, at 0400 the following
morning, the alert was lifted. It is not yet known why the
alert was lifted or by whom, but it is likely as simple as local
officials attempting to avoid traffic problems before morning
"rush hour".


5. (C) Theories quickly came to the fore. One of the most
prominent involved Mahmud Al Sarkhi. He is a former student of
Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq Al Sadr, the father of Muqtada Al Sadr.
The elder Sadr dismissed Al Sarkhi from his studies, for
unknown reasons. Al Sarkhi returned to Iraq from exile after
the fall of the former regime and allied himself with Muqtada Al
Sadr. Recently he has begun to lure disenchanted Mahdi Militia
members to a splinter group that repudiates Muqtada Al Sadr's
foray into legitimate politics. His group is the "Army of the
Guardians" and has recently raised its activity level in South
Central Iraq. As of July 20, police had arrested two suspects.
One, Abu Naji, is a Kufa resident and alleged Mahdi Militia
member, but it is unknown whether he has connections to Al
Sarkhi or perhaps even to Al Qaeda.


6. (C) Sabah Al Amiri, leader of Shaheed Allah (Allah's Martyrs)
a Sadrist organization, said that activities such as this attack
are conducted by released prisoners. He blames Coalition Forces
(CF) for allowing Baathists, who were rightly arrested by Iraqi
security forces, to be released from prison. This practice is

HILLAH 00000122 002.2 OF 002


done he said, so "the invasion forces can justify their
continued presence in Iraq". "This act", he opined, "will only
serve to make Kufa the capitol of the Islamic world". Al
Amiri's view was echoed by SCIRI representatives. Both the
deputy governor and Jafer Al Hakim of SCIRI party said that they
were satisfied with the performance of security forces, but that
Baathists were responsible for the attack. "Sunni scholars",
noted Al Hakim, "must condemn the attack in order to preserve
harmony in Iraq". COMMENT: Ex-Baathists are frequently found
among the Mahdi Militia ranks and it is possible that Naji has a
Baathist background. END COMMENT


7. (C) Comment. Attacks such as these VBIEDs had been rare in
Najaf. The fact that they have occurred in Kufa, a Sadr
stronghold, is likely more than a coincidence. Though there is
little evidence that the two recent VBIED attacks are related,
they clearly target the throngs of religious pilgrims who view
the area as holy. It is also worth noting that Muqtada Al Sadr
considers Kufa his fortress and will likely be embarrassed by
the ability of anyone to infiltrate and execute these acts of
violence. There are growing numbers of violent young men who
are being drawn to leaders who provide an opportunity to strike
at coalition forces. Sadr's political activities appear to be
diluting the cult of personality from which he has benefited
since the fall of Saddam Hussein. End Comment
FONTENEAU