Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HILLAH109
2006-06-22 13:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Hillah
Cable title:  

BABIL SCIRI BOSS ON SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL

Tags:  PGOV KISL KDEM IZ 
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VZCZCXRO7321
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0109/01 1731313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221313Z JUN 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0668
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0654
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0719
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000109 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR NCT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: BABIL SCIRI BOSS ON SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL
PARTIES

REF: HILLAH 0106

HILLAH 00000109 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000109

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR NCT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: BABIL SCIRI BOSS ON SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL
PARTIES

REF: HILLAH 0106

HILLAH 00000109 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (U) This is a Babil PRT cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY. During a recent meeting Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraqi (SCIRI) Babil party boss, and also
Provincial Council (PC) member, Ali Al Qasser presented
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) staff with an insider's
view of the party's aspirations in the region. Qasser also
noted that Coalition Forces (CF),the Regional Embassy Office
(REO),the PRT and the Babil provincial government must
intimately coordinate political and security efforts to
stabilize the province and embolden emergent democratic
institutions. While the meeting was highly cordial, it was
obvious from the beginning that Qasser's primary mission was to
advocate increased U.S. political support of SCIRI and to
underscore a positive image of the party as a whole. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
BABIL PROVINCE AND SECURITY
--------------

3. (C) Qasser started the meeting by reiterating a commonly
expressed theme amongst local and provincial politicians that CF
need to pay greater attention to strategically important Babil
Province. The "political process" and "democratic development,"
he added, are moving forward with the encouragement of the
United States and CF, but he cautioned that "democracy is still
new to the Iraqi people." If "the people get a wrong
understanding of democracy [e.g. the U.S. not overtly supporting
decisions of local and provincial governmental bodies] the
security situation in the province will almost certainly
deteriorate."


4. (C) Qasser also suggested that the REO, the PRT and the PC
need to harmonize security efforts. As previously expressed by
the SCIRI governor, (reftel) Qasser seemed to insinuate that
security issues should be debated and evaluated outside of
currently existing structures, such as the weekly briefs held at
the REO. (COMMENT. This suggestion appears to be an attempt to
marginalize Babil Police Chief General Hamza Aboud Al-Momouri

Qais who regularly attends the weekly REO security meeting. END
COMMENT). PRT staff countered that the REO always welcomes the
participation of PC members in security meetings despite the
fact that the past record of attendance of the PC invitees has
been far from stellar. Qasser answered, "We cannot continue
cooperation if your support is hidden. We need Coalition Forces
to make security plans open for all and we should jointly agree
upon them."

--------------
THE PC AND GENERAL QAIS
--------------

4. (C) When asked about SCIRI's position on the current
controversy surrounding General Qais, Qasser stated that the PC
decision to fire the popular general is unalterable. Moreover,
as the PC retains the highest legal authority in Babil, the
United States has a moral obligation to support the decision in
order to hearten the nascent democratic institutions in the
province. In line with declarations made by other PC members,
Qasser added that Qais' termination rested upon his inability to
compromise with the council. Such insubordination, Qasser
stated, is the basis of the PC's decision to remove the general,
"but don't worry," he concluded, "Qais will find another job."


5. (C) Qasser stated bluntly that it is commonly known that
General Qais enjoys unfettered U.S. support. This backing, he
maintained, only weakens the rapport between the PC and
Coalition Forces and also might confuse the people of Babil. He
admonished that the public will no longer trust U.S. actions and
statements because the United States, while overtly advocating
the development of democracy in the province, is seemingly
subverting the legal authority of the PC. Moreover, he said
that the United States should not view the verdict to fire Qais
as politically motivated considering that only twelve of the
forty-one PC members actually belong to a political
organization. (COMMENT. All information received by the REO and
PRT concerning party loyalties of the Babil PC indicates that
this contention is incorrect. END COMMENT).

--------------
SCIRI, BADR, AND POLITICAL PARTIES
--------------

6. (C) Qasser stated that SCIRI in Babil is not so much of a
political party, but "an arbiter of political cooperation that
looks to enable every Iraqi to join the [democratic] process,"

HILLAH 00000109 002.2 OF 002


including supporting weaker, likeminded political entities to
compete in local and national elections. "We also advocate
cultural activities," Qasser added, "and ask for very little in
return." Qasser failed to mention that the Islamic Da'wa party
and many Sadrists have been deeply critical of the current
SCIRI-dominated provincial administration.


7. (C) When asked to describe the relationship between the Badr
Corps and SCIRI, Qasser stated that while Badr was previously
the military arm of SCIRI before the 2003 U.S.-led liberation,
such militias are no longer needed. Badr, he maintained, has
essentially transformed into a sister political organization of
SCIRI, but remains presently independent of SCIRI leadership.
"Badr," he continued "is loyal to its own leadership and
therefore does not want to unify with SCIRI at this time.
However, at some point in the future, the two parties may
decided to unify into a single entity."


8. (C) When asked if he could list specific philosophical and
theological differences between SCIRI and the other Shi'a
Islamist political parties in South-Central, Qasser responded
that, in fact, there are none. The Shi'a Islamist parties, he
declared, agree largely upon major political issues, including
the creation of a moderate Islamic state that codifies core
religious values. Qasser added "individuals who are not Muslim
will be respected, but Islam must take precedence over all
others in Iraq." Moreover, Qasser observed that SCIRI intends
to change its name to the "Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq
(SICI)," as the revolution was completed with the 2003 U.S.-led
liberation.


9. (C) COMMENT. Qasser is a friendly and straightforward
politician, with little intention of hiding SCIRI political
goals in Babil or nation wide. While his polemical commentary
is difficult to take seriously, including his interpretation of
the Qais controversy, the PC and the role of Badr in Babil, he
did offer some interesting observations pertaining to the Shi'a
Islamist parities in general. His reflection that most of these
political parties share the same ultimate objective of creating
an Islamic Iraq is perhaps most striking. PRT staff have asked
local contacts time after time if they could articulate key
political differences between the various Shi'a Islamist parties
- with little success. Also interesting is his assertion that
SCIRI intends to support other Shi'a Islamist parties in
upcoming local and provincial elections, which possibly alludes
to a combined 555 ticket. It remains to be seen what level of
cooperation SCIRI officials in Babil will be ableQo obtain from
the other Shi'a Islamist parties, many of which remain highly
critical of the current SCIRI administration of the province.
END COMMENT.
FONTENEAU