Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06HILLAH107
2006-06-20 04:51:00
SECRET
REO Hillah
Cable title:  

DIWANIYAH PROVINCE: MAHDI MILITIA ON THE OFFENSIVE?

Tags:  PTER PGOV KISL IZ 
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VZCZCXRO4166
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0107/01 1710451
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 200451Z JUN 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0665
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0651
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0716
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000107 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/20/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV KISL IZ
SUBJECT: DIWANIYAH PROVINCE: MAHDI MILITIA ON THE OFFENSIVE?

REF: HILLAH 0102

HILLAH 00000107 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c)



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000107

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/20/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV KISL IZ
SUBJECT: DIWANIYAH PROVINCE: MAHDI MILITIA ON THE OFFENSIVE?

REF: HILLAH 0102

HILLAH 00000107 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(c)




1. (C) SUMMARY: During a recent visit to Diwaniyah, REO staff
found that with the fulcrum of political influence in Diwaniyah
swinging toward the Office of Martyr Sadr (OMS) and its
associated Mahdi Militia (MM or Jaysh al-Mahdi),the Mahdi
Militia are increasingly able to declare large sections of the
city off-limits to Iraqi Security Forces. The reluctance of ISF
units to patrol within Sadrist neighborhoods encourages Mahdi
Militia to attack Coalition Forces patrols, as seen in a major
MM assault against a Latvian patrol on the night of June 16.
That same night, an Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP) attack
south of Diwaniyah killed one US soldier. The next morning, an
EFP strike on an Aegis convoy left three severely wounded. The
attack occurred within city limits, close to Camp Echo, and not
far from a police checkpoint. An Iraqi Army intelligence
contact placed the attacks in context, saying that local MM
strategy has moved from targeted assassinations to mounting high
visibility operations aimed at intimidating the local population
and displaying MM strength with attacks on unpopular targets.
END SUMMARY


2. (C) On the night of June 16, a routine Latvian patrol passing
through a Sadrist neighborhood in the center of Diwaniyah came
under intense RPG and small arms fire in what appears to have
been a deliberately pre-staged ambush. Patrol participants
estimated that upwards of one hundred MM members fired on the
patrol from second-story rooftops, beginning with an initial
wave of RPGs. The patrol had been accompanied by Iraqi Army
gun trucks who refused to go further just before the ambush,
saying it was too dangerous. Iraqi police were not present.
The patrol pushed out of the immediate area without casualties.
For Diwaniyah, the intensity of the assault was unprecedented.


3. (C) An EFP strike the same night left one American soldier
dead south of Diwaniyah in what had been a historically calm
rural area. The next morning, a hastily placed EFP hit a

civilian convoy not far from the entrance to Camp Echo, severely
wounding three Aegis private contractors. COMMENT: There is
as yet no evidence as to the intended target, but the attack
closely coincided with the expected arrival time of a REO
Al-Hillah convoy headed to Diwaniyah for the biweekly PRDC
meeting. END COMMENT Disturbingly, the EFP was quickly placed
without site preparation in an area near a police check point in
an example of the new "drop and pop" IEDs.


4. (C) The security situation in Diwaniyah has dramatically
worsened over the last two months. Since January, there have
been 38 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents within the
province, of which twelve were found and 26 exploded. Seventeen
of those were placed within the last 45 days.


5. (C) Frequent, but thankfully inept indirect fire (mortar and
rockets) against Camp Echo continued over the same period. Four
Katushka rockets were fired on the night of June 15. The next
night, thirteen unidentified explosions were heard within the
city along with small arms fire. While the explosions may have
been caused by a tribal or tribal/sectarian dispute within
Diwaniyah, it is more likely that the thirteen explosions were
mortar rounds fired across the city from northern Sadrist
neighborhoods toward Camp Echo on the south, falling short, and
reportedly damaging at least one home and a school. Since
April, formerly rare indirect fire against Echo is now occurring
1-2 times per week. A base contact noted that these days, the
lights often are turned on after hours at the downtown OMS
office building as MM members gather to celebrate the latest
attack.

Putting it into Perspective: Mahdi Militia Moving into a New
Phase?
-------------- --------------
--------------


6. (C) Provincial officials, Camp Echo intelligence personnel,
and local contacts concur that a ring of neighborhoods on the
north side of Diwaniyah are considered by Sadrists to be under
their control. Local police will not patrol in those quarters.
Qadisiyah provincial governor Hamza last month attempted to
issue a "no go" order to Iraqi Security Forces and CF that
placed those neighborhoods and some central areas close to
Diwaniyah's OMS office building into a no-go "red zone."
Provincial government and ISF contacts invariably urge REO staff
to ask CF not to patrol in those areas, stating that patrols are
an unnecessary provocation to the Sadrists. COMMENT: Coalition
Forces retain full authority to decide patrol routes without
prior consultation with the provincial government. Given the
frequency of indirect fire attacks originating in these areas,

HILLAH 00000107 002.2 OF 002


unimpeded ability to patrol and react to threats in these
neighborhoods seems essential. END COMMENT


7. (S) A local Iraqi security forces intelligence contact
offered his personal assessment of the escalation of significant
acts in Qadisiyah Province. He linked the Mahdi Militia's more
aggressive stance to the assassination of former Governor Jamal
Susoon Al-Lizimali on May 29 (reftel). Claiming that Muqtada
al-Sadr's mother lives in Diwaniyah and that MAS frequently
visits the city, he said that Mahdi Militia elements in the city
were pushing forward to make the city a MM stronghold. Their
campaign, he claimed, had an initial organizational phase,
including the infiltration of IP units. The second phase
included assassinations of ex-Baathists and Iraqis working with
Coalition Forces (including public mention of a target "Black
List"). Mahdi Militia has now entered the third phase, he
stated. In order to intimidate a public which had grown
increasingly weary of religious parties due to the lack of basic
services, Mahdi Militia was moving toward more public acts of
terror, beginning with the assassination of Al-Lizimali. He
believed that MM now placed a high priority on showing the
public that MM controlled the police at will and no longer
recognized the Coalition Forces as having the "right" to enter
Diwaniyah. In his view, the most effective way to respond would
be to conduct raids, detaining leaders and cell organizers,
while avoiding patrols that Sadrists would view as a
"provocation." He urged that CF assign more attention and
assets to counter the increased terrorist activity in the
province.


8. (S) COMMENT: No one has claimed specific responsibility for
Al-Lizimali's shooting, and while MM are suspect, the Badr
Organization is also capable of ordering and carrying out the
attack. The disappearance of the police from the scene during
the shooting is one indicator pointing to possible Badr
involvement, given their extensive influence within local IP
units. Our contact figuratively threw up his hands, noting that
Fadilha's militia, al-Sarkhi/al-Hassani, and Wahibists are all
active within the province, with each group willing to carry out
operations in ways that suggests another. Regardless, the
Qadisiyah provincial government seems increasingly at a loss in
restoring order within the city. Governor Hamza's principal
response so far has been to step up anti-CF rhetoric, taking on
a Sadrist tone in his public comments.


9. (C) Arguably, terrorist acts are up across all five South
Central provinces. However, Qadisiyah's travails are a reminder
that significant differences exist across provinces in what
might appear from the outside to be a monolithic region. To
Qadisiyah's east, Wasit Province remains relatively calm and
most acts of violence are assassinations and murders. To the
north, Babil has avoided significant public unrest, in part
because of effective police enforcement. The religious centers
of Najaf and Karbala see occasional militia posturing, but
security concerns are more along the lines of stemming
assassinations, rolling up IED cells, and preventing car bombs.
END COMMENT
FONTENEAU