NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED: PART II

S E C R E T HILLAH 000106

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR NCT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED: PART II


CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, RC, REO Al Hillah, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (U) This is a Babil PRT Cable.


2. (S) SUMMARY: During a series of recent meetings Babil
Province Governor Salem Saleh Mehdi Al-Muslimawi and members of
the Provincial Council (PC) related to REO and PRT staff that
the security situation in the province is deteriorating as
evidenced by the violent June 6 protest at Al-Qasim (reftel).
The recent rash of attacks against both Coalition Forces (CF)
and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),however, has only solidified
the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI)-dominated PC's conviction that Babil Police Chief
General Qais Hamza Aboud Al-Momouri is the wrong individual to
command the Iraqi police forces in the province. It is also
highly possible that the governor and the PC are exploiting
these recent events as an excuse to acquire further control over
all ISF in Babil. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) During a June 14 Provincial Council Reconstruction
Development Committee meeting the governor, the PC Chair and one
PC member presented a short video, which showed portions of the
protest at Al-Qasim (reftel). In line with previous information
received by the PRT, the angry demonstrators protested outside
of the city's municipal building and severely damaged the
governor's U.S.-provided armored SUV with rocks and sticks. The
short clip additionally showed that Iraqi Police (IP) assigned
to protect the venue failed to intervene or even attempt to
appease the disorderly crowd.


4. (C) The governor and the PC members reiterated during a June
15 meeting at the REO that the failure of the IPs to act
demonstrated at best Qais' incompetence and at worst his
loathing of legitimately elected officials. One PC member
stated, "When mortars landed near the REO the other day, General
Qais arrived within five minutes. When the governor and PC
members were attacked by protesters at Al-Qasim, General Qais
took an hour and a half." Al-Muslimawi more forcefully noted,
"Are the governor and PC members not important enough to have
police protection?"


5. (C) The governor further articulated that additional
"security infractions" will produce decidedly negative
consequences for the capital and therefore the nation as a
whole. The violence at Al-Qasim, he noted, can easily spread
throughout Babil and beyond. The possibility of such an
increase, one PC member stated, has led the Babil provincial
government to create a new committee directly charged with the
coordination of all Babil security forces, including the Iraqi
Army and the police forces.


6. (C) Dr. Usama, a member of the PC, charged that the problem
with Qais runs much deeper than professional competency. Qais,
he maintained, could have resolved his personal problems with
the PC through compromise. (COMMENT: Dr. Usama did not
articulate what type of compromise he or the PC wanted from
Qais. END COMMENT). Usama explained that General Qais - and
not the Babil PC - aspires to control the provincial security
forces for the purpose of establishing a dictatorship over the
province. Furthermore, Usama stated that Qais' continued
insistence to bypass the recommendations of the council and
ignore other governmental bodies has not passed unnoticed. "I
can do nothing," the doctor concluded, "General Qais has simply
gone too far. The security of the province does not rest upon
the shoulders of one individual."


7. (C) COMMENT: The events at Al-Qasim and the current
province-wide deterioration in security have forced the governor
and the SCIRI PC members to actively seek REO and PRT assistance
and collaboration. The governor proposed a larger security
meeting that would bring together ISF, the U.S. military, the
provincial government and the REO to discuss an overall strategy
for the province. While on the surface, the reengagement with
the governor is a positive step that will hopefully translate
into increased coordination between the Babil government and the
PRT, the governor's possible motivations are disturbing. In all
likelihood the SCIRI governor is exploiting the security card as
pretext for garnering increased influence over the provincial
security forces. The PC's interest in establishing a new
security committee and the endless attempts to hold Qais
responsible for the events at Al-Qasim certainly lends credence
to this probability. Despite the governor's and Dr. Usama's
allegations, REO assessment continues to be that General Qais is
competent, effective, and non-sectarian. END COMMENT.

FONTENEAU