ARREST OF KARBALA PROVINCIAL COUNCIL CHAIRMAN ROILS SOUTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000105

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL IZ
SUBJECT: ARREST OF KARBALA PROVINCIAL COUNCIL CHAIRMAN ROILS SOUTH
CENTRAL POLITICS

CLASSIFIED BY: Douglas Meurs, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO
Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY: Lack of public information about the arrest of
Karbala Provincial Council Chairman Sheikh Akeel Fahem
al-Zubaidi fueled condemnation of the raid in Friday afternoon
sermons throughout the South Central region. Sadrist clerics
were the most vehement in condemning the ISF/CF raid. At least
one cleric promised there would be retribution to come. The
Najaf provincial government reportedly said it would suspend
contact with Coalition Forces to protest the raid. However,
Karbala public demonstrations have been relatively low-key so
far. Karbala Governor Dr. Akeel Mahmood Kareem Al-Khaza'li and
the Provincial Council called upon the Prime Minister to
investigate why "an elected representative of the people" was
detained. Press reporting continues to follow the line that an
arms cache found in al-Zubaidi's home was simply weapons
belonging to his Personal Security Detail. END SUMMARY


2. (C) An early morning raid on the compound of Karbala
Provincial Council Chairman Sheikh Akeel Fahem al-Zubaidi by
Iraqi Security Forces backed by Coalition Forces netted large
sums of cash and a large cache of weapons, including sniper
rifles and RPGs. Al-Zubaidi is reportedly a senior commander
for terrorist activities in the province, and has ordered the
placement of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that resulted
in the deaths of six US soldiers.


3. (C) The Karbala provincial government immediately announced
a halt to cooperative activity with Coalition Forces. The
Provincial Council suspended operations and municipal workers
were told to suspend work for two days. Deputy Provincial
Council Chairman Abdul Al -aal Yaseen Mohammed told REO staff
that Iraqi Forces were present at the raid as a "formality."
The Americans, the DPCC continued, had failed to present in
advance to Governor Al-Khazali concrete evidence needed to prove
that an important representative of the people was actually
wanted for terrorist acts.


4. (C) DPCC Al-Aal Yaseen Mohammed stated that there had been
four public demonstrations so far against the raid and
detentQ Local contacts and CF staff present in the
provincial government building reported that the demonstrations
had been relatively poorly attended and obviously staged by the
governor.


5. (C) Press reporting and Friday afternoon prayer sermons
generally followed the line presented by Karbala provincial
government; the seized weapons were for use by Al-Zubaidi's
75-person Personal Security Detail. Sadrist clerics in Karbala,
Najaf, and Babil were particularly vehement in condemning the
attack and warning that the attack would lead to retribution.


6. (C) COMMENT: The halfheartedness of the defense for Sheikh
Al-Zubaidi suggests that it is common knowledge that Al-Zubaidi
is a true "bad guy." However, the detention of a prominent
elected public figure raises the stakes for regional provincial
leaders, most of whom have considered themselves immune from
prosecution for corruption or ties to terrorist activities. For
this reason, political leaders here will likely want to spin out
their condemnation of Al-Zubaidi's detention. In the absence of
a compelling public case as to why Al-Zubaidi needed to be taken
off the streets, Sadr and Da'wa party organizers will put
substantial effort into whipping up public indignation over the
raid during the days to come. END COMMENT

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