EU PRESIDENCY WAITING FOR UNSC ACTION ON NORTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 001050

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016
TAGS: PREL
SUBJECT: EU PRESIDENCY WAITING FOR UNSC ACTION ON NORTH
KOREA

REF: STATE 169418

Classified By: POLOFF David Schlaefer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (U) PolOff met with Foreign Ministry Director for Asia
Pekka Metso and North Korea Desk Officer Jari Sinkkari
Oct. 12 to discuss reftel. Metso had not yet seen reftel
due to official travel but Sinkkari had received it prior
to the meeting.

ALL EYES ON THE UNSC
--------------

2. (C) Sinkkari believes that the most useful role the EU
can play is to amplify whatever message emanates from the
Security Council, because the EU is not a member of the Six
Party format. The EU's ties to North Korea are limited to
humanitarian aid and KEDO; Metso considers both of these
initiatives off-limits from possible sanctions. He drew a
distinction between the EU's positions on North Korea and
Iran, pointing to the EU's long-standing ties to the Middle
East as opposed to its relative lack of leverage with
Pyongyang. Metso expressed hope that the UNSC would reach
a conclusion "sooner rather than later" regarding the text
of a resolution on North Korea as the EU hopes to become
politically and substantively involved.


3. (C) Metso is looking toward his consultations in
Washington Oct. 23-24 with Assistant Secretary Boucher and
Deputy Assistant Secretary Stephens regarding North Korea.
Metso discussed the "5 plus 5" format developed in Kuala
Lumpur but expressed concern that the meeting on the
margins of the UN General Assembly was "5 plus 5 minus 2."
Metso hopes that his consultations in Washington will
include discussion of the future of the "5 plus 5" format
or whether it is time for something "completely different."


4. (C) Metso explained the EU presidency statement on North
Korea as having been drafted as a quick response to the
nuclear test because the Presidency wanted to avoid the 24-
hour wait necessary for full EU coordination. An EU
statement, representing the views of all member states was
possible, but not before the UNSC acts.

ANALYZING THE DRAGON AND THE BEAR
--------------

5. (C) Metso stated that the EU was pleased with the swift,
strong statement issued by China immediately following the
North Korean nuclear test. He believed that the timing of
the test, the day after Japanese PM Abe had met with
Chinese Premier Wen and the two had issued a joint
statement condemning any North Korean nuclear test, was a
blow to Chinese diplomacy in the region and a source of
embarrassment.


6. (C) The Russian position, by contrast, was much more
difficult to predict and measure. Metso believes that
Russia is aggressively using its energy influence in
the region to extract concessions for every 'good deed'
and that economic decision-making is driving the
Russian response. He described the Russian position as
"blurred" and a "question mark."


7. Comment: (C) Given the EU's limited leverage and
presence in the region, the Finns are clearly looking to
Washington for input on how the EU can best calibrate its
response and play an effective and complementary role in
the current crisis. The GoF is also concerned that Russian
maneuvering may be exacerbated by high-level distraction
over the Politkovskaya affair. As the situation in the
UNSC becomes clearer, Finland will be prepared to use its
role as EU President to augment the international
community's response.
WARE