MUTARE BISHOP ON DIALOGUE WITH MUGABE, NATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000783

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN
COMMERCE FOR BECKY ERKUL\
TREASURY FOR J. RALYEA AND B. CUSHMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: MUTARE BISHOP ON DIALOGUE WITH MUGABE, NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION

REF: (A) 2004 HARARE 1434 (C) 2003 HARARE 1599 (C)

2003 HARARE 1599 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

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Summary
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1. (C) In a June 29 meeting with the Ambassador, Evangelical
Fellowship of Zimbabwe Bishop Trevor Manhanga said President
Mugabe seemed genuine in his recent efforts to reach out to
religious leaders. He said Central Intelligence Organization
(CIO) head Happyton Bonyongwe was facilitating the bishops'
efforts, including a meeting between the Mutare troika and
Mugabe. Manhanga said he would use the meeting to push for
reforms to support a national dialogue that could lead to
&managed change" in Zimbabwe. The Ambassador said the USG
was open to working with all parties toward positive change
in Zimbabwe, but that a more constructive GOZ relationship
with the democratic opposition and with the international
community would require concrete first steps by the GOZ
toward sustainable economic and political reform. End
Summary.

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Meeting Mugabe
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2. (C) In a meeting at the Embassy, Manhanga told the
Ambassador that in spite of all the independent media's
negative spin on Mugabe's recent engagements with the
churches, Mugabe's tone and hands-on posture in their recent
meetings had given him hope that Mugabe was sincere in his
desire to reach out. During a four-hour meeting with Mugabe
and about a dozen other clerics at State House earlier in the
month, Manhanga said Mugabe had clearly been listening to the
religious leaders, taking his own notes, and refusing to be
distracted by aides' interruptions. Although many clerics
present had been sycophantic ZANU-PF supporters, others had
been quite frank in their criticism of the GOZ, and in
response Mugabe had acknowledged the non-performance of many
in his cabinet.


3. (C) During the meeting with Mugabe, Manhanga said he had
noted that he and Bishops Mutume and Bakare ) the Mutare
troika -- had "done the homework" Mugabe had assigned them
two years ago and had approached both the MDC and western
diplomats about what sort of government actions could lay a
foundation for dialogue (reftels). However, they had been
unable to get a promised follow-on appointment with the
President to report their findings. Manhanga said Mugabe had
acted surprised and had turned to Security/Lands Minister
Mutasa and Justice Minister Chinamasa demanding to know why
he hadn't been informed.


4. (C) Manhanga said after the meeting, CIO head Bonyongwe
had approached him and promised to facilitate a meeting with
Mugabe. He blamed Party Chairman John Nkomo and Secretary
for Information Nathan Shamuyarira, who had been the bishops'
earlier intermediaries with Mugabe, for their failure to
secure a presidential meeting. Manhanga said he had tested
Bonyongwe's sincerity with a request for an initial
appointment with Bonyongwe, and, joined by two other senior
CIO officials, Bonyongwe met the troika for two hours last
week. Manhanga said Bonyongwe had promised to arrange a

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meeting with Mugabe following the latter,s return from the
AU Summit in Banjul.

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Message to Mugabe
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5. (C) The Ambassador asked Manhanga what issues he intended
to raise with Mugabe when he finally saw him. Manhanga
responded that he would urge Mugabe to "normalize" the
domestic political situation as a foundation to support
bridges with the international community. He would assert
that inter-party differences were not as great as many
believed and that Mugabe should meet with opposition leader
Morgan Tsvangirai. The MDC wanted improvements in the
political environment but "the government's legitimacy was
not a problem" for them. Broad-based constitutional reform
was a possibility in that differences between various
constitutional proposals (e.g, the GOZ's 2000 version and the
NCA's draft) were not great. Even land reform offered common
objectives -- transparent distribution to benefit the
landless -- that could be agreed across political lines.


6. (C) The Ambassador noted that policy and process were the
issues for the USG, not the identity of those in government.
The USG would continue to evaluate GOZ policy with an open
mind, even if there was considerable doubt about Mugabe's
motives or will to follow through on commitments based on
prior experience. The Ambassador questioned whether Mugabe
was sincere this time or was simply biding time, as he had
done so often in the past. Moreover, even if he had the will
and apparent authority, would Mugabe be able to overcome
resistance by an entrenched ruling elite deeply invested in
the corrupted status quo? Manhanga agreed that these were
fundamental questions on which he hoped to get a handle in
the coming weeks.


7. (C) The Ambassador added that the first steps in any
bridge-building exercise with the international community
would have to come from the GOZ. To elicit engagement from
the USG, those steps would have to involve concrete actions
that demonstrated clear commitment to genuine, serious and
deep reforms. Meetings, while potentially constructive,
would not be sufficient if not coupled with meaningful
action. Security and Lands Minister Mutasa's land reform
briefing for the diplomatic corps (ref A),for example, had
been a publicity exercise that ignored the real issue of how
to make the agricultural sector productive again. Only real
reforms on the economic front -- secure land tenure, fiscal
discipline, market-based exchange rates -- would get the
international community's attention.

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Meetings with Tsvangirai, Mujuru, Shumba
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8. (C) Manhanga said he was scheduled to also meet
separately with MDC anti-senate faction President Morgan
Tsvangirai, former army chief and ZANU-PF kingmaker Solomon

SIPDIS
Mujuru, and United People's Party interim President Daniel
Shumba (N.B. a political ally of Mujuru's principal
intra-party rival, Emmerson Mnangagwa). Manhnga said that in
his opinion no new political arrangement could go forward
without the approval of Mujuru, who still held the upper hand
within the ruling party. For its part, Manhanga observed,
the MDC would need to tone its rhetoric down and be prepared

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to engage. The party needed to understand that it was in for
a sustained struggle, not necessarily a climactic moment of
change. He said he feared a national descent into chaos or
violent internecine conflict, and hoped the bishops' effort
would contribute to a process of peaceful managed change.

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Comment
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9. (C) The bishops' latest effort, however sincere, has a
painfully familiar air about it and we are frankly skeptical
that it will go any farther than their earlier forays. We
see no evidence that Mugabe or those around him have even
begun to consider the meaningful reforms that are a sine qua
non of a national dialogue and of reengagement by the
international community, a view reinforced by Mugabe's recent
headline remarks rejecting the idea that Zimbabwe needed
"rescuing" by Kofi Annan or anyone else. In our view, Mugabe
instead likely hopes to use his engagement with the clerics
to project a conciliatory posture to domestic and
international audiences as his regime casts about desperately
for a lifeline.
DELL