A CHASTENED MUTAMBARA SEEKS ASSISTANCE AND TOUTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000772

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AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN
COMMERCE FOR BECKY ERKUL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: A CHASTENED MUTAMBARA SEEKS ASSISTANCE AND TOUTS
COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC UNITY

REF: (A) HARARE 769 (B) HARARE 698

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

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Summary
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1. (C) MDC pro-Senate faction President Arthur Mutambara on
June 27 sought the Ambassador's assistance and advice in
connection with a planned U.S. visit. The Ambassador
responded that we would support the visit and added that we
would provide equitable assistance to Mutambara,s faction in
the same manner we supported other elements of the democratic
opposition. The Ambassador suggested that while in the U.S.
Mutambara concentrate his fire on the Mugabe regime rather
than attacking the other faction of the MDC led by Morgan
Tsvangirai. Mutambara agreed and said his message would

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revolve around the need for unity of purpose (and even a
potential coalition) among democratic forces, including with
the other MDC faction. Mutambara and the faction,s Deputy
Secretary-General, Priscilla Misihairabwa-Mushonga, agreed

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with the Ambassador that the regime was increasingly
desperate as the country,s economic decline worsened and the
succession struggle within ZANU-PF sharpened. Mutambara
argued that the opposition couldn't afford to be just
observers to ZANU-PF,s implosion but needed to forge a
unified front and seize the agenda. End Summary.

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U.S. Visit and Assistance Request
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2. (C) Mutambara told the Ambassador that he and faction MP
David Coltart had been invited to visit the Aspen Institute
July 3-9. He said they planned to take advantage of the
invitation to subsequently conduct business in the United
States, including meeting with U.S. Government officials and
with the Zimbabwean diaspora. To that end he and Coltart
would be in Washington D.C. July 10-12. Mutambara said he
would then stay on in the U.S. alone to visit the diaspora
communities in Dallas, Atlanta and Chicago.


3. (C) Mutambara asked for the Ambassador,s help in
arranging meetings in Washington and also renewed his earlier
request for USG financial assistance to allow two to three
additional faction officials to accompany him to the U.S.
(ref B). The Ambassador responded that the State Department
was already working on meetings with appropriate executive
branch officials and was coordinating with the National
Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican
Institute (IRI) on other meetings. With regard to travel, we
would provide equitable assistance to Mutambara,s faction as
we did other parts of Zimbabwe,s democratic opposition.
However, resources were limited and funding travel to the
U.S. was expensive. We would nonetheless endeavor to find
funds to allow at least one additional official to
participate in the visit.


4. (C) The Ambassador added that we were also considering the
faction,s other assistance requests. We were prepared to
include the faction in training programs, including for the
faction,s fledgling information department.
Misihairabwa-Mushonga said their other top priority in that
regard was training in voter education. The Ambassador said
that should also be possible. However, he noted that the
faction,s request for assistance with equipment was more

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problematic. The faction needed to first account for all
USG-provided material in its possession. Mutambara agreed to
inventory the faction's possessions for any USG-provided
property and report back.

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Faction "Messaging"
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5. (C) In response to Mutambara's request for counsel on
what his message should be in Washington, the Ambassador
urged the faction to present a positive, forward-looking
message, explaining its objectives and how it intended to
achieve them. He also stressed that Washington interlocutors
would be most interested in how the faction intended to
challenge Mugabe and the regime, the root of Zimbabwe's
problems. Washington was well aware of the MDC's factional
strife and was concerned that it had damaged the party,s
ability to effectively oppose the Mugabe regime. Mutambara
would be best served by avoiding criticism of Morgan
Tsvangirai and instead focusing on a positive message that

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change was possible and that the democratic opposition was
working together to bring it about.


6. (C) Mutambara asserted that a successful long-term effort
would require unity of purpose across the range of opposition
elements. Projecting a strong unified front and the ability
to govern was imperative, and he was prepared to work with
the other faction, perhaps in a coalition, "to defeat the
monster." This was the message that he would take to
Washington and the U.S. Mutambara added that he had been
touring the country widely, working on party structures, and
consulting more closely with civil society. In the longer
run, forging and publicly projecting unified strength of
political actors and civil society were the keys to pressing
the regime into needed change. In that vein, he suggested
that rumored consultations between his "brothers" in the
anti-senate faction and ZANU-PF's Mujuru faction, if true,
were premature and would be counterproductive. (N.B. The
same rumors are rife with respect to Mutambara and his
faction and in our view are equally possible.)

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On Regime Desperation
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7. (C) Asked by the Ambassador for his views on the regime's
situation, Mutambara emphasized that the regime recognized
its fragility and that its latest outreach efforts, to the
churches and to some in the diplomatic community, were born
out of sheer desperation. The GOZ's recent investment in a
clumsily engineered National Day of Prayer was evidence of
its perceived need to enlist credible allies. He noted that
he had declined a last minute invitation to attend and that
Daniel Shumba of the recently launched United People's Party
was the only nominal opposition player to participate. He
also asserted that the Prayer Day ploy was undermined by
Mugabe's attack on Catholic Archbishop Pius Ncube, which
exposed its political motive.


8. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's inquiry whether
ZANU-PF had any surprises up its sleeve, Mushonga suggested a
superficially dramatic economic measure, perhaps another
devaluation or privatization push, could soon be announced.
However, the utility of such a development was open to
question given Mugabe's refusal to chart any meaningful
policy changes. The Mujuru camp - the "hardliners" in her

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view - saw Mugabe's departure as the key to international
assistance and were growing impatient. She claimed that
another group had coalesced around RBZ Governor Gono, which
was to countenance Mugabe's continuation as long as he
yielded policy to them and allow them to pursue needed
reforms.


9. (C) The Ambassador responded that either of those two
outcomes would be painful for Mugabe since they implied
significant change and reform. Either he would be forced
from office or he would remain as a figurehead, having ceded
real power to reformers. Moreover, Gono and the Mujurus had
recently been rumored to be allies. The shifting alliances
within ZANU-PF that Mushonga had described seemed to us
further evidence of a party in disarray whose leaders were
increasingly motivated by a toxic mixture of greed, fear and
ambition. Mutambara agreed and concluded by emphasizing that
the opposition couldn't afford to be observers to this game
but needed to forge a unified front and seize the agenda.

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Comment
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10. (C) Mutambara and his faction have cooled public
criticism of their "brothers" in the other faction and
quietly appear to be turning their attention to longer term
issues. More pragmatic and less antagonistic toward the
anti-senate faction than Mushonga and others in his faction's
leadership, and perhaps humbled by his faction,s dismal
performance over the past few months, Mutambara may yet
contribute to a stronger and more unified opposition given
time. Nonetheless, as suggested in ref A, he is an unproven
and struggling figure who so far has failed to build a
significant following and we urge that the Department receive
Mutambara at a level lower than Tsvangirai.


11. (C) Mushonga's characterization of Mujuru-Gono tension
as central within the ruling party is at odds with most
others' assessment, including our own. The central fight is
still between the Mujurus and Emmerson Mnangagwa. It also
fails to account for the true &hardliners,8 individuals
like State Security Minister Didymus Mutasa, who oppose any
reform or concession. That said, we don,t rule out that
there are growing cleavages even among ZANU-PF,s relative
moderates. These days, it appears it's everyone for
him/herself within ZANU-PF ) and it couldn,t happen to a
nicer, or more deserving bunch.
DELL