SUBJECT: ENGAGING ZIMBABWE: LOCAL DIPLOMATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000342

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR BRUCE NEULING; NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C.
COURVILLE; DEPARTMENT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV EAID ZI
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: ENGAGING ZIMBABWE: LOCAL DIPLOMATIC


Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Eric T. Schultz, Reason 1.4 (b),(d)

Summary
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1. (C) The GOZ,s latest charm offensive combined with the
country's continuing downward spiral has resulted in another
bout of diplomatic soul-searching in Harare. The
international community here has been debating whether to
engage the GOZ and if so what the message should be. Heads
of OECD Missions met on March 14 and a group of donor nation
Ambassadors met with UN staff March 15. Although there are
differences in nuance, virtually all of the Western
Ambassadors agreed that in any dialogue Zimbabwe had to take
concrete reform steps before the international community
could consider a positive response. End Summary.

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OECD Meeting
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2. (C) In his resume following the meeting, the new British
Ambassador, Andrew Pocock, said he felt that it had been the
U.S. and UK against the rest of the participants, who in
addition to the European Union Ambassadors (minus the French
Ambassador, who declined to participate),included: Japan,
Switzerland, Australia, and Norway. Although overstated, he
was correct that a number of the participants favored a
positive response to the GOZ,s latest talk of
"bridge-building," primarily out of concern for the welfare
of Zimbabweans who were suffering as the country continued to
implode economically.


3. (C) In response to these calls, Pocock and the CDA made a
number of interventions to the effect that while the U.S. and
the UK did not oppose dialogue, the GOZ would need to make
concrete reforms before the international community could
consider assistance and that we should be realistic about
what to expect from the GOZ, given its steadfast refusal to
reform. Pocock noted that Mugabe,s sincerity was in
question as was his ability to deliver; he might be "in
power, but he was not fully in control" of the GOZ.
Nonetheless, the UK was in favor of "testing' both.


4. (C) The CDA noted that in response to the Ambassador's
November speech in Mutare, the GOZ had equated calls for
changes to its policies with calls for regime change. If
this remained their position, a dialogue would lead nowhere.
Moreover, the international community needed to be mindful of
its leverage. GOZ economic officials knew what reforms were
needed and had acknowledged that the country would need U.S.
$2-3 billion to stabilize the economy. The only conceivable
source for this amount of external financing was the
International Financial Institutions.


5. (C) Unintentionally summing up the meeting, the German
Ambassador said we "had to talk to the Zimbabweans," but only
Mugabe had the authority to make concessions, and Mugabe was
paranoid and would not meet with western representatives, but
still "we had to talk to them."

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UN Donor's Meeting
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6. (C) UN ResRep Zacharias convened a meeting of donor
community Ambassadors the next day, March 15. Many of the
same Ambassadors attended this meeting, but the tone was
strikingly different. Zacharias said that following the
March 8 IMF vote not to restore Zimbabwe's voting rights, GOZ
moderates had approached the UN for help on how to implement
economic reforms. He called for donations to provide the GOZ
with this technical assistance but met with a resounding no,
with the Canadian, Austrian, and Belgian Ambassadors arguing
that the GOZ knew what to do but lacked the political will to
do it. (N.B. The IMF team that has been visiting Zimbabwe
every six months has provided the GOZ with technical advice
while in-country, which has been ignored, and has made itself
available by phone or e-mail from Washington, which the GOZ
has also failed to take advantage of.)


7. (C) Zacharias then asked for donor support for the GOZ,s
National development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, part of
the GOZ,s obligations under the Millennium Development
Goals. The response was again unsupportive. The Spanish
Ambassador summed up the situation by noting that since it
was GOZ policies that were preventing growth and increasing
poverty, this was a futile exercise absent GOZ policy
reforms.


8. (C) Zacharias also reported on Secretary General Annan,s
possible visit to Zimbabwe. He said Annan would only come if
he could move things forward in Zimbabwe, specifically by
restarting a dialogue between the GOZ and donors. To that
end, Annan wanted to come to Harare with something to offer
and to leave with some concession from Mugabe and the GOZ.
(N.B. The newly returned UN OCHA representative, Agnes
Asekenye-Oonyu, in a private meeting with the CDA and the
USAID Director on March 14, said the GOZ was becoming
increasingly desperate for Annan to visit and jump start
reengagement but was as yet unwilling or unable to offer
meaningful concessions.)


9. (C) The EC and Swedish Ambassadors, seconded by the USAID
Director, responded that it was up to the GOZ to make the
initial concession not the international community. The
Japanese Ambassador, surprisingly supported by the French,
said Annan should be prepared to speak frankly while here and
not expect to broker a solution. The Belgian Ambassador had
the last word and, echoing the CDA,s comments from the
previous meeting, noted that Annan and the UN should make
clear that the GOZ should not try to equate calls for policy
reform with "regime change."

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Comment
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10. (C) The GOZ remains its own worst enemy. Following the
parliamentary elections a year ago it threw away months of
effort courting the Europeans by reacting to its two-thirds
majority not with moderation but with Murambatsvina.
Similarly, its latest charm offensive is being undercut by
radical economic policies, such as the threatened takeover of
the mining sector, and by repressive political tactics, such
as the trumped up charges that the MDC was plotting violence.



11. (C) The result is that the international community on the
ground here remains, despite some distaste for sanctions,
largely onside when it comes to maintaining pressure on the
GOZ. In addition, while many of our diplomatic colleagues
favor dialogue and want the international community to be
forward leaning, they also agree that the ball is in the
GOZ,s court to make real changes. The trick for us and the
UK will be to maintain this international solidarity in the
face of GOZ efforts to drive wedges.

SCHULTZ